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Abstract 
 
This thesis makes a theoretical contribution to interpreting the Labour Party and an 
empirical contribution to our understanding of Labour’s ‘modernisation’, from 1983-
1997. It significantly develops Henry Drucker’s original insight – that Labour has an 
ethos as well as doctrine – and systematises it into a theoretical framework around 
four ‘fault lines’ within Labour’s ethos. The fault lines are: the relative prioritisation 
given to articulating a coherent socialist theory; policies simultaneously regarded as 
both emblems and outdated shibboleths; tension between autonomy for Labour 
politicians and participatory approaches to decision-making; and more ‘expressive’ or 
more ‘instrumental’ political styles. The study argues that both an individual 
interpretation of the party’s ethos, held by a political actor, and a dominant 
interpretation of the party’s ethos, perceived by actors to have greater salience in the 
party as a whole, help to shape the strategic calculations actors make. Ethos is 
considered a distinct determinant of party change in this regard. 
 
The empirical contribution challenges linear narratives of modernisation from 
Kinnock to Blair. The study argues that different interpretations of the party’s ethos 
affected the pace and scale of modernisation after 1983. At times this made the 
political strategy of modernisation cautious and gradualist, sensitised as it was to 
Labour’s competing traditions. Kinnock’s leadership was inwardly pragmatic, yet 
outwardly cautious in engaging with Labour’s creed and challenging emblematic 
policies. This led to periods of inaction, appearing to defy electoral rationality. Blair 
was more attuned to Labour’s ethos than is sometimes suggested in the existing 
literature, selective in his challenges to Labour’s traditions, and employing, at times, 
an expressive style of Labour politics. Through interviews, archival research and 
document analysis, this study delves into political processes. It examines the beliefs 
actors held, their judgements of the party and their strategies, to show the effect of 
ethos on political action. 
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Introduction 
 
‘Let me be more honest than prudent. If the Conservatives have been guilty of betrayal, then so too has 
Labour. The Labour betrayal consisted in its failure over an extended and crucial period to be the kind 
of party, and to offer the kind of programme, that a majority of electors wanted to vote for. If the 
country has had to endure nearly two decades of one-party rule from the new dogmatists of the right, it 
is in no small measure because the forces of the centre-left made it so easy.’ 
Tony Wright, Why Vote Labour? 
 
‘But was not the Labour Party brought into being for the very purpose of raising politics to loftier 
altitudes? Was not the vision of the new Jerusalem something which the Labour movement pursued as 
never before? Were not all, or almost all, the leading figures among the pioneers, or their successors, 
touched at some moment by this same dream? Was not part of their appeal the rejection of sordid 
practicalities...’ 
Michael Foot, The Uncollected Michael Foot 
 
‘But you make a fundamental mistake by believing that by going on marches and passing resolutions 
without any attempt to try to tell the British people what the consequences were, you should carry their 
vote. And you lost millions of votes.’ [Shouting] 
Jim Callaghan, Report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party 1983 
 
What it means to be Labour 
 
‘I have seen a much-loved figure on the Left of the party travel the last few hundred 
yards to a public meeting on foot, haversack on back,’ Henry Drucker wrote in his 
classic text, Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party. ‘The ministerial car waited 
round the corner. For them such conceits are harmless enough.’1 To be Labour, in this 
instance as a high-profile party member invited to address political meetings, is to 
stress one’s ‘ordinariness’. This can be difficult, particularly for Labour Party people 
who were not born or raised with a social or familial connection to the labour 
movement, but embraced the party because of their beliefs. Drucker noted that 
Labour politicians needed to stay ‘connected’2 to the movement they were a part of. 
To buy a round of drinks at the Labour Club, for instance. Hugh Gaitskell would stay 
with friends while visiting his constituency of South Leeds, before holding Saturday 
                                                 
1 H. Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979), 
p.15. 
2 Ibid., p.14. 
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surgeries and ‘touring the working men’s clubs’.3 As with Gaitskell, while Anthony 
Crosland was unable to pretend he was ‘anything other than an upper middle-class 
Oxford educated economist’,4 he went and drank locally in Great Grimsby all the 
same. Following Tony Blair’s election as Labour leader, the manager of the Labour 
Club in Trimdon village, within Blair’s Sedgefield constituency, noted that Blair 
‘likes a night in the club. People know him as a friend and tell him what their 
problems and hopes are. Tony knows what the people around here expect of him. We 
do want fairness and justice, and jobs and security. Tony’s listened. That’s what 
drives him’.5 
 
Staying ‘connected’ in both presence and style (leaving the ministerial car around the 
corner) is a part of what Drucker called Labour’s ethos, the ‘traditions, beliefs, 
characteristic procedures and feelings which help to animate the members of the 
party’.6 Such practices may not be the preference of the political actor. Perhaps the 
haversack Minister really would have preferred the comfort of the car, and considered 
the need to ditch it rather ridiculous. Yet they are considered to be appropriate 
behaviour in the context of the Labour Party and a person’s identity within it. What is 
and what is not appropriate is passed down, through the generations, with fellow 
Labour Party people becoming introduced to such practices. They are effectively 
‘socialised’ into the party’s ethos. Other shared and accepted practices have been 
noted in historical studies, for instance Labour’s instinct for moralism, or ‘to be 
critical of affluence’.7 Drucker offered some other examples illustrative of the 
‘impact of ethos’,8 though, it must be remembered, he was writing in the 1970s. 
These included the loyalty shown to Labour’s leaders among Labour Party people, 
the sacrifice expected from leaders and party employees, the hoarding of money 
(which has not aged well), and belief in a rule book. 
 
                                                 
3 B. Brivati, Hugh Gaitskell, (London: Richard Cohen Books, 1997), pp.153-154. 
4 P. Diamond, The Crosland Legacy, (Bristol: Polity Press, 2016), p.33. 
5 Quoted in G. Smyth, ‘“The Centre of My Political Life”: Tony Blair’s Sedgefield’ in M. Perryman 
(eds.), The Blair Agenda, (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1996), pp.63-75, p.65. 
6 Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos, p.1. 
7 L. Black, The Political Culture of the Left in Affluent Britain, 1951-64, Old Labour, New Britain? 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.40. 
8 Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos, p.17. 
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Barbara Castle, writing in her diary in the mid-1970s about a Labour Party document 
on membership of the European Economic Community, noted how there were threats 
‘to move a hundred amendments… while the International Committee has reversed 
the decision of the Home Policy Committee that a copy of the Government White 
Paper should be distributed to every delegate to the special Party conference’.9 Such 
processes are not, Eric Hobsbawm argued, simply a way of getting through business. 
Derived from the customs and practices of the trade union movement, he suggested 
that ‘there is no escaping the impression that the formality itself provides a certain 
ritual satisfaction’.10 It is hard to imagine the Labour Party’s fondness for committees 
and special procedures, and the special kind of madness they induce, being replicated 
within the Conservative Party. Indeed, the contrast speaks to a substantive difference 
in how Labour Party people understand internal party democracy and decision-
making. 
 
There is a fine line, however, between nurturing a connection with Labour’s ethos 
and attempting to define it for your own purposes. While challenging Jeremy Corbyn 
in 2016 for the leadership of the Labour Party, Owen Smith gave a newspaper 
interview in a café in his Pontypridd constituency: ‘Receiving his “frothy coffee” in 
Pontypridd’s Prince’s café, Owen Smith stopped mid-sentence to express some 
amusement. “I tell you it is the first time I have ever been given little biscuits and a 
posh cup in here,” Smith said, looking up at the owner… “Seriously, I would have a 
mug normally,” the MP added.’11 Doubts over whether the South Wales MP really 
did normally have his cappuccino in a mug were raised. 
 
In addition to shared traditions that are broadly accepted by Labour Party people, 
there are competing traditions within Labour’s ethos. Competing traditions offer 
divergent interpretations as to the beliefs and practices one should follow in the 
Labour Party. Drucker highlighted some of them, including: a simultaneous 
commitment to, and suspicion of parliamentary democracy as a route to socialism;12 
an oppositional tendency within the Labour Party which kicks back at the 
                                                 
9 B. Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-76, (London: PAPERMAC, 1990), p.595. 
10 E. Hobsbawm, Worlds of Labour, (London: Phoenix Books, 2014), p.76. 
11 D. Boffey, ‘Labour is miles away from government, says man out to replace Corbyn’, The Observer, 
17th July 2016, accessed 15th June 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/17/owen-
smith-labour-leadership-interview. 
12 Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos, p.4. 
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establishment,13 alongside a history of moderation as a ‘respectable’ institution;14 the 
relative freedom Labour’s representatives in parliament should expect to enjoy, 
versus more mass participatory internal democracy;15 and different takes on the 
nature of Labour’s progressivism16 – something Robinson has noted in her 
understandings of progressivism as optimism, as rupture, and as social justice.17 
 
Yet Drucker did not explicitly identify and expand upon, in a systematic way, the 
competing traditions within Labour’s ethos. Nor did he subject them to much 
empirical investigation. While emphatically stating the place of a concept – ethos – 
and the need for it to be taken seriously in political science,18 Drucker’s book did not 
provide a framework for analysing the effect of ethos as a determinant of party 
change, despite viewing it as something which had undoubtedly affected Labour’s 
political trajectory. For example, Drucker argued that the ‘symbolic value’ of Clause 
IV for ‘a continuous tradition of opposition to capitalism’ was ‘ultimately’19 why 
Gaitskell failed to change it. This study addresses this absence in the existing 
literature – that of a framework for analysing ethos as a determinant of party change, 
and one subjected to empirical investigation. The remainder of this introduction will 
present an overview of this study’s argument and my research questions. I then 
engage with the debate on Labour’s modernisation period, and outline the chapters 
that follow. I finish with a discussion of my methodology. 
 
What is ethos? 
 
Labour’s ethos is comprised of shared traditions and competing traditions. There are 
distinct interpretations of Labour’s ethos, based on competing traditions that have 
long been contested, quite legitimately, through the party’s history. These traditions – 
and the fault lines they give rise to, which are the focus of this study – are inscribed 
in the institution of the Labour Party. They involve particular beliefs and practices 
                                                 
13 Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos, p.37. 
14 Ibid., p.4. 
15 Ibid., p.98. 
16 Ibid., p.25. 
17 E. Robinson, History, Heritage and Tradition in Contemporary British Politics, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2012), p.21. 
18 Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos, p.vii. 
19 Ibid., p.38. 
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about how to conduct Labour’s politics. What Hobsbawm called the ‘ritual 
furniture’20 of the British labour movement – including an elaborate approach to 
decision-making which I mentioned above – is the basis for some of these traditions. 
Identification with the rituals and language of the working class, either through birth 
or through a process of socialisation, are incredibly important to Labour’s ethos. As 
both Hobsbawm and Ross McKibbin suggested, these traditions go further than 
‘ritual’ too. Hobsbawm pointed to a working class tradition which took ‘little 
interest’21 in political theory alongside traditions of militancy and dissent.22 
McKibbin argued that the British working class ‘inherited traditions which both 
burdened and liberated it’, including ‘an ambiguous set of social values which it 
shared with other classes and which gave legitimacy to institutions and sentiments 
whose ideological power precluded a revolutionary rhetoric or strategy’.23 Both 
Hobsbawm and McKibbin set out how, in addition to more ritualistic displays of 
working class identity, the roots for the British Left’s ‘practical’ reformism could be 
traced to traditions found within working class communities as well.  
 
Reflecting upon Labour’s origins, and its ethos, includes consideration of the building 
of institutions as a defence for working class communities in the face of 
untrammelled market forces. It involves comprehending the language and acts of 
‘solidarity’ among working people, and the cautious engagement with parliamentary 
politics. So too the relationship between working class communities, trade unions and 
political movements of Liberal, socialist (of which there are many variants) and 
Marxist forms, as well as the powerful influence of Christianity and its different sects 
in Britain. These add up to more than iconography, important as that is. They 
demonstrate a blend of motivations, aspirations and objectives, all present – quite 
legitimately – in the competing traditions of Labour’s ethos through the party’s 
history. In analysing four key fault lines that result from these competing traditions, 
this thesis seeks to show how distinct interpretations of the party’s ethos are factored 
into an actor’s strategic calculations, affecting political actors themselves, as well as 
their strategic contexts. 
 
                                                 
20 Hobsbawm, Worlds of Labour, p.70. 
21 E. Hobsbawm, Labouring Men, (London: Weidenfled and Nicolson, 1964), p.373. 
22 Ibid., p.377. 
23 R. McKibbin, The Ideologies of Class, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.17. 
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The argument 
 
This study contends that ethos, while often acknowledged, has not been subject to 
enough analysis in work seeking to understand Labour’s political trajectory. It 
significantly develops and builds upon Drucker’s definition of Labour’s ethos, 
understood here as both shared and competing traditions. Because of the competing 
nature of some traditions, I argue for a dual understanding of Labour’s ethos: an 
individual interpretation of the party’s ethos which a Labour Party person holds, and 
a dominant interpretation of the party’s ethos, perceived by Labour Party people to 
have greater salience and acceptance in the movement more widely. Both individual 
and dominant interpretations of Labour’s ethos co-exist and can affect an actor’s 
strategic calculations. 
 
Labour’s competing traditions give rise to four key fault lines within Labour’s ethos. 
These are discussed further below. An actor’s beliefs, derived from Labour’s 
competing traditions, constitute their individual interpretation of the party’s ethos, 
including on these contentious fault line issues. The dominant interpretation 
represents the beliefs and practices which are considered by Labour Party people to 
be the prevailing narrative within the movement as a whole, including on the four key 
fault lines. This is a distinctive analytical approach to our understanding of how and 
why Labour’s political trajectory changes over time. I apply this theoretical 
framework to Labour’s ‘modernisation’ period of opposition from 1983 to 1997. My 
principal argument is that Labour’s ethos is an under-appreciated determinant of party 
change during this period, and that during Labour’s modernisation the party’s ethos – 
and the competing traditions within it – affected Labour’s political trajectory. Distinct 
interpretations of the party’s ethos – both individual and dominant – affected the pace 
and scale of modernisation prior to Labour entering government, making it (at times) 
a gradual political strategy that was sensitised to Labour’s traditions.  
 
Challenging an ‘ethos gap’ in explanations of Labour’s modernisation, this study 
critically engages the existing literature in two ways: 
 
• first, where some accounts have sought to portray political strategies 
motivated by the ‘politics of catch-up’ during this period, along with steadily 
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accruing outcomes of change and reform, this study presents instances where 
the party’s behaviour appeared to defy electoral rationality and where political 
actions and outcomes (including inaction) were significantly affected by 
Labour’s ethos; 
 
• second, suggestions that Labour’s modernisation witnessed the ‘remaking’ of 
Labour’s ethos are disputed. Instead, this study contends that Labour’s 
modernisers were, in different ways and to different degrees, engaged with 
Labour’s ethos and affected by it. New Labour, as it moved from opposition 
to office, then began what would be better described as a disengagement with 
Labour’s ethos, leaving the competing traditions within the party’s ethos 
intact.  
 
The contribution this study makes is twofold. First, it offers a distinctive theoretical 
framework for interpreting the Labour Party. This framework recognises the party’s 
ethos as a distinct determinant of party change, separate, though relational, to other 
organisational, ideational and external factors. Ethos is relevant to our understanding 
of a strategic actor (the individual interpretation), their strategic context (the 
dominant interpretation) and the calculations they make before taking strategic action 
– the building blocks of Colin Hay’s strategic-relational approach.24 Second, this 
study puts forward an analysis of Labour’s modernisation which challenges more 
linear narratives of modernisation from Kinnock to Blair, and defines both leaders in 
the context of the competing traditions within Labour’s ethos. 
 
This study’s significance lies both in its contribution to understanding the nature of 
today’s Labour Party, including retellings of its pasts, and in its potential for future 
application in political analysis. In relation to the Labour Party, this thesis shows how 
longstanding, competing traditions within the Labour Party affected the outcomes of 
Labour’s modernisation – in other words, how factors long present on the Left of 
British politics affected the party’s trajectory in the 1980s and 90s. Labour’s 
modernisation, therefore, must be seen as a period of political change that was rooted, 
                                                 
24 Hay’s description of the strategic-relational approach was summarised as the ‘dynamic 
understanding of the relationship of structure and agency which resolutely refuses to privilege either 
moment (structure or agency) in this dialectical and relational interaction’. C. Hay, Political Analysis, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p.134. 
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still, in longstanding debates within the Labour Party and the distinct interpretations 
of the party’s ethos held by Labour Party people. This has important contemporary 
relevance. Powerful retellings of Labour’s past have, throughout the party’s recent 
history, been utilised by Labour politicians to differentiate their own ‘project’. 
Indeed, Blair and New Labour did so with some success, as I discuss below. Yet, in 
attempting to emphasise Blair’s modernising approach, allies of Blair have, in part, 
fostered a story of upheaval and a focus on discontinuation – something that is only 
one element of the whole New Labour story, and least applicable to Labour’s early 
modernisation period. Critics of Blair and New Labour, often focusing on 
personalities who have evangelised about modernisation too, have added to this 
narrative of upheaval and discontinuation, drawing connections between Blair’s early 
reforms as Labour leader (portrayed as a simple accommodation with Thatcherism 
and an overt dislike of Labour’s traditions) and his unpopular policy choices, mainly 
from his second and third terms as Prime Minister – for example, the war in Iraq. As 
such, modernisation and New Labour’s tenure more generally – from opposition to 
the end of Labour’s period in office – is seen by some Labour Party people as 
something that was ‘done to’ the Labour Party, ditching the party’s traditions and 
associated practices and beliefs. 
 
Jeremy Corbyn’s election as Leader of the Labour Party was, in some ways, a 
reaction to this narrative. Subsequent retellings of Labour’s recent past, from Corbyn 
and his supporters, have built on this. Jon Lansman, the former aide to Tony Benn 
and founder of Momentum, the campaign group which sprang from Corbyn’s 2015 
leadership campaign, claimed that Blair ‘was never in the right party’ and that as a 
consequence of Corbyn’s election ‘there will never be a return to his [Blair’s] 
politics’.25 This thesis challenges the former assertion, showing how Blair worked 
within the competing traditions of Labour’s ethos in his early years as leader. In 
terms of the latter prediction, the thesis provides a basis for exploration. Some of 
Labour’s recent discord can be explained by the continued presence of fault lines in 
the party’s ethos – issues that predated Blair, and continue to affect Corbyn’s Labour. 
                                                 
25 J. Pickard and H. Mance, ‘Tony Blair hints at creation of UK centrist party’, Financial Times, 7th 
September 2018, accessed 19th March 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/24237acc-b270-11e8-8d14-
6f049d06439c. 
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Through its systemisation of Drucker’s concept of ethos, and the articulation of key 
fault lines in Labour’s ethos, this study also provides an analytical tool for historical 
and more contemporary political analysis of the Labour Party in the future. While 
scholars have studied continuity and change in Labour’s doctrine, and in Labour’s 
organisation – literature I discuss in Chapter 1 – since Drucker’s work in the late 
1970s, Labour’s ethos, and the distinct interpretations Labour Party people hold, have 
been under-theorised and under-analysed. With some exceptions – which I discuss in 
Chapters 1 and 2 – Labour’s ethos has, to different extents, been ignored or 
misconceived as an assortment of old habits that can be easily dropped. Instead, this 
thesis seeks to justify consideration of ethos as a distinct determinant of party change 
in analyses of the Labour Party. It is a factor, or variable, internal to the party, one 
which interacts with other internal and with external factors, and one which affects an 
actor’s motivations and judgements – featuring in a dynamic, continuous process of 
strategic calculation by political actors.  
 
Research questions 
 
A delineation between ‘doctrine’ and ‘ethos’ in the Labour Party’s ideology seems 
obvious to many observers of the party. Yet a focus in the literature on doctrine has 
meant the party’s ethos is relatively neglected – an observation Drucker made writing 
in the late 1970s, and something which remains the case decades later. As a concept, 
ethos is under-theorised, and as such, while Drucker’s work is rich and suggestive, 
ethos remains too broad and too vague to offer much explanatory power. This study 
seeks to address that problem. My research questions stem from Drucker’s original 
insights, including arguments he began to make, but never fully developed.  
 
Drucker suggested that both an institutional ethos, and an individual actor’s own 
interpretation of what it is to be Labour, co-exist and can clash. For example, he 
noted that a defensive Labour ethos ‘prefigures the lack of political grip which has 
characterised so many Labour administrations and paralysed so many of its leaders’.26 
In other words, that an institutional ethos has affected, and in this instance 
constrained, Labour’s actors.  He also recognised that a gap had developed ‘between 
                                                 
26 Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos, p.21. 
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those who operate within the terms of the party’s ethos, the constituency parties, and 
those who march to new tunes’,27 meaning that Labour’s ethos had come to mean 
different things to different Labour Party people. 
 
My first two research questions take this argument – that Labour’s ethos is contested, 
with competing traditions leading to divisive debates – as a starting point, leading to: 
RQ1 Are there different interpretations of Labour’s ethos held by Labour Party 
people? Drucker argued that Labour Party people, at times, opposed what appeared 
to be a ‘dominant’ ethos, and instead followed a different path. This leads me to my 
second research question: RQ2 Do both individual interpretations of the Labour 
Party’s ethos and a dominant interpretation co-exist? If there are different 
interpretations of Labour’s ethos, are there a multitude of interpretations of the 
party’s ethos held by individual Labour Party people, or is there a coalescing around a 
smaller number of interpretations? And, as Drucker suggests, does Labour’s ethos 
have a dominant interpretation, perceived by Labour Party people as being prevalent 
within the institution?  
 
Following on from RQ1 and RQ2, this study considers the substance of Labour’s 
ethos and its competing traditions. If there is division and disagreement about what it 
is to be Labour, aside from doctrinal debates, what are those disagreements? This 
leads to my third research question: RQ3 What are the different interpretations of 
Labour’s ethos? I see competing traditions in Labour’s ethos giving rise to four key 
‘fault lines’, defined in the OED as a ‘divisive issue or difference of opinion that is 
likely to have serious consequences’. It is the nature of a fault line that you are either 
on one side or the other. I see some Labour Party people as holding views on 
competing traditions that are further away from the opposing argument than others, 
meaning there is something of a spectrum of opinion. However, broadly, there are 
two sides to each divisive issue. The term fault line is simpler for understanding the 
effect of competing traditions, while accepting that some people are closer to each 
other than others. Some of these conflicts were noted in early reviews of Drucker’s 
                                                 
27 Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos, p.111. 
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Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party,28 and I present them, briefly, in the chapter 
summary below. 
 
My fourth and final research question asks whether the existence of different 
interpretations of the party’s ethos affects Labour’s political trajectory: RQ4 Do 
individual interpretations of the party’s ethos, and a dominant interpretation, 
affect a political actor’s strategies and choices? In relation to RQ2 (around the co-
existence of both an individual and a dominant interpretation) how do these relational 
factors impact upon an actor’s strategic calculations? This study contends that there is 
an ‘ethos gap’ in analyses of Labour’s modernisation, defined as the period from Neil 
Kinnock’s election as Leader of the Labour Party in 1983 to the advent of New 
Labour and Tony Blair’s period as leader. Ethos is rarely mentioned in the existing 
literature, and nearly entirely absent when considering what shaped either the 
motivations of political actors or the political outcomes of the period. 
 
Ethos as a determinant of party change – and narratives of modernisation 
 
Positing the effect of ethos as a determinant of party change during Labour’s 
modernisation challenges the (relatively) linear narrative of the ‘politics of catch-up’ 
thesis. According to Heffernan, Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives ‘successfully 
helped map out a dominant political agenda, one altering the environment(s) within 
which Labour is located. Where they led, Labour has eventually followed’.29 The 
principal dynamic here is between ‘an electorally successful Thatcher government 
and an unsuccessful Labour opposition’.30 Labour’s leadership accommodated itself 
to the electorally-successful and consensus-defining Thatcherite paradigm, thereby 
explaining how and why Labour ‘modernised’. There is little room in such an 
analysis for consideration of an actor’s beliefs. As such, Labour’s leadership and 
associated political actors are lumped in together as one compliant bloc. ‘In short, 
where Thatcherism has led, the Labour Party of Kinnock, Smith and Blair 
followed,’31 Heffernan reiterated. This analysis has been criticised in studies of 
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Labour’s doctrine and political philosophy. Diamond, for example, has noted New 
Labour’s ‘old roots in ethical socialism and revisionist social democracy’.32 The 
argument that neo-liberalism has ‘pervaded the body politic, colonising intellectual 
territory inch by inch’33 has also been contested, with analysis of New Labour’s 
legacy suggesting ‘the track of left-wing ideas is… not only visible but impressive’.34 
This study focuses less on the substance of New Labour’s policy programme and 
more on the political strategies of Labour’s modernisers, adding further and different 
points of disagreement with those positing the replication of Thatcherism. It shows 
how the behaviour of political actors during modernisation, and resultant outcomes 
(including inaction), demonstrate, at times, a hesitant and disjointed route to party 
change that was significantly affected by Labour’s ethos. 
 
Wickham-Jones has noted that Labour’s leaders set out to make ‘rational’ choices, in 
that ‘after deliberation, Labour politicians seek to attain their preferences subject to 
the external constraints that they confront’ with ‘the perceptions of the actors 
concerned… a significant factor shaping these choices’.35 This Wickham-Jones called 
a ‘“soft” rational-choice perspective’, in that the role of agency means ‘different 
preferences coupled with varied constraints will result in different outcomes’.36 This 
study questions, a little more than Wickham-Jones’ ‘soft’ rationality, the extent to 
which we can understand an actor’s political decisions through the lens of rational 
choice. It does so in part by inserting into an actor’s strategic context their own 
interpretation of Labour’s ethos – something which, rather than being understood as a 
‘constraint’, is more like a ‘preference’. 
 
Describing it as ‘rational’, however, is insufficient. Rather, as Bale noted with the 
phrase ‘culturally rational’,37 this study contends that an actor’s strategic calculations 
are affected by their individual interpretation of Labour’s ethos – which will affect 
what they consider to be an appropriate action within their institutional setting – as 
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well as their perception of the dominant ethos of the party, which depending on an 
actor’s view and potential action, may be a constraint or a resource within the same 
institutional context. I do not dispute the usefulness of elements of rational choice-
inspired analyses in understanding Labour’s modernisation, particularly the electoral 
motivations of the actors involved. Inevitably, however, such parsimony – from 
motivation to outcome – overlooks the complexity of an actor’s deliberations. I 
expand on this point in Chapter 1, and throughout the chapters in this thesis.   
 
Some studies have considered, more directly, Labour’s ethos and New Labour’s 
articulation of ‘Old’ and ‘New’. However, at times there has appeared too ready an 
acceptance of what New Labour’s architects have sought to have people believe: that 
New Labour was ‘literally a new party’,38 and that Blair and the New Labour 
leadership team were set on giving the party ‘some electric shock treatment’.39 Cronin 
suggested that New Labour’s leaders undertook ‘a kind of Kulturkampf aimed at 
displacing the party’s inherited political culture’40 resulting in the Blair and Brown 
teams taking on ‘so directly the party’s traditions, its doctrines and ethos’.41 New 
Labour, it is claimed, ‘mounted a frontal assault on the party’s traditions. In so doing 
the modernisers took considerable risks’.42 Cronin is not alone in reaching these 
conclusions. It has been claimed New Labour brought about a ‘fundamental 
reordering’43 of the party’s ethos. These are overstatements, both in relation to the 
actions of relevant political actors – if not their words – and in terms of the effect of 
the New Labour period. Reflections on the latter, of course, have been aided by the 
passage of time. 
 
I do not dissent from Cronin’s analysis of some aspects of Blair’s style. Indeed, I 
think he was right to argue that ‘the desire to escape the constraints of party on their 
behaviour in government seems to have been especially attractive to the generation 
represented by Blair and Brown, for while Kinnock seems mainly to have wanted to 
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taste victory, they wanted to win, to govern and then to win again and again’.44 Blair 
as Leader of the Opposition was more willing than Neil Kinnock to challenge some 
of the traditions within Labour’s ethos. However, he chose strategies that were, 
wherever possible, not openly hostile to those same traditions. Those at the top of 
New Labour recognised that their individual interpretations of Labour’s ethos existed 
alongside, and sometimes clashed with, a dominant interpretation accepted across the 
movement. The early political strategies of the New Labour leadership also showed 
sensitivity to traditions they did not personally accept. As the years went by, Blair 
gradually ceased to engage with those traditions. 
 
I am not seeking to dispute the argument that Blair and his team selectively 
associated themselves with certain aspects of Labour’s history. Nor dispute that they 
retold Labour’s history in a way which sought to portray elements of the ‘Old’ in a 
negative light, and to reconstruct the party’s identity following the perceived 
embarrassment of the late 1970s and early 80s. I agree with Randall’s argument that 
New Labour had a ‘focus on particular moments in the party’s history and… [a] 
differential gaze upon particular policy areas within the party’s prospectus. As such, 
this mobilisation by New Labour is perhaps best understood as a disarticulation of 
the party from its past’, better conveying ‘the complexity of the pattern of 
recollection and forgetting in which New Labour was engaged’.45 I develop this 
argument, with applicability to the party’s ethos, by drawing a contrast to New 
Labour’s (principally Blair’s) early engagement with the party’s ethos with a relative 
disengagement as the years of office ticked by. The result was similar to Randall’s 
observation about New Labour’s relationship with the party’s past: one of 
disarticulation, leaving the project, its architects and inheritors unanchored when it 
came to Labour’s traditions. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 1 provides the theoretical underpinning for my understanding of ethos, 
enhancing its effectiveness as a tool for political analysis. Based on Drucker’s 
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clearest definition of ethos – that is the beliefs, characteristic procedures and 
feelings46 which help to ‘animate’47 Labour Party people – Labour’s ethos is 
understood in this study as being comprised of shared and competing traditions. I 
argue in Chapter 1 that actors hold certain beliefs about what Labour’s ethos is which 
are derived from these traditions. Traditions can become dominant within Labour, 
gaining greater salience and acting as a constraint or a resource, depending on an 
actor’s individual interpretation. Labour’s ethos – through this dual understanding – 
can shape an actor’s ideas and actions. Chapter 1 also explores the relevance of 
Drucker’s ideas to more recent and contemporary debates regarding the role of 
‘tradition’. In particular, I focus in Chapter 1 on the work of Bevir and Rhodes, and 
‘the contestation between interpretivists and critical realists about whether meanings 
and traditions exist independently of individual subjects’.48 
 
The argument I unpack in Chapter 1 is broadly consistent with the view that ‘agents 
interpret traditions, but these interpretations are constrained by the way in which 
those traditions are inscribed in institutions, processes and narratives’.49 As an 
empirical question, the enduring nature of Labour’s competing traditions suggests 
they cannot be easily ‘changed’ or reinvented. Actors derive interpretations of the 
party’s ethos already ‘inscribed’ in the existing institution and narratives. I also set 
out how ethos can – and not necessarily always will – shape an actor’s chosen 
strategies, even when an actor’s motivation for a given action appears to go against 
what is perceived to be the dominant ethos. For example, the outcome of a political 
action may be presented by an actor in a subtler way to manage any consequences for 
having ‘gone against’ the party’s dominant ethos, meaning its effect shouldn’t be 
discounted simply because it didn’t fully constrain an actor or explain their 
motivation. The precise outcome of a political action – from timing to content – can 
be affected by the party’s ethos. Ontologically, this study posits that traditions are 
partly constitutive of an actor’s beliefs and their institutional environment. 
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Epistemologically, I consider an actor’s ‘process of strategic deliberation’50 as an 
important part of understanding political action. This deliberation can be analysed to 
derive empirical findings about the role of ethos.  
 
Chapter 2 sets out the substance of the competing traditions and beliefs within 
Labour’s ethos along four key fault lines, presented very briefly in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Summary of fault lines 
Fault line 1 Objects – clarifying Labour’s aims and 
values. 
Fault line 2 Emblems – deeply-rooted policies 
symbolic of Labour’s identity. 
Fault line 3 Decisions – the parliamentary party and 
internal democracy. 
Fault line 4 Outsiders – ‘expressive’ and 
‘instrumental’ politics. 
 
Fault line 1 – Objects – is the product of an enduring and divisive issue in the Labour 
Party: should the party prioritise the articulation of a coherent socialist theory, or 
should it retain what some analysts have called the ‘pragmatic and unintellectual’51 
nub of the Labour Party? This is a divide between what one could call ‘theoretical 
socialists’ and ‘practical socialists’. In the case of the latter, this is also connected to a 
belief that Labour already has a clear purpose – to represent the interests of the 
working class. This fault line is rarely subject to much empirical investigation in 
academic literature on the modernisation of the Labour Party. Some Labour Party 
people are committed to articulating clearer ideological goals, while others deem such 
activity to be divisive, unnecessary and out of kilter with the dominant ethos of the 
Labour Party. 
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Fault line 2 – Emblems – shows how, in Drucker’s words, some Labour policies can 
come to play a role in ‘solidifying the ethos of the party’,52 blurring the line between 
doctrine (changeable) and ethos (something far closer to a Labour Party person’s 
identity). To some Labour Party people this results in the creation of shibboleths, 
distinguishing Labour from the opposition but appearing outdated. To others, it 
means unifying emblems, providing enduring and symbolic contrasts between Labour 
and its electoral foes. A fault line exists between those Labour people who accept that 
some of the party’s policies are emblematic and untouchable, and those who see such 
attachments as either an ideological shortcoming or an obstacle to ‘common sense’ 
pragmatism. Fault line 3 – Decisions – is derived from an antagonism between the 
power of the movement in the country and the power of the politicians in the 
parliamentary party at Westminster. For some Labour Party people, politicians are 
delegates of the wider movement. For others, Labour must recognise Britain’s 
constitutional settlement, and politicians making around-the-clock decisions which 
can adhere to principle, but rarely await conference directives. 
 
Finally fault line 4 – Outsiders – stems from Frank Parkin’s insight that expressive 
and instrumental politics are a core tension of Labour Party politics.53 Expressive 
politics places less emphasis on ‘fairly specific material ends’54 while instrumental 
politics places great emphasis on ‘getting things done’.55 Instrumental politics places 
less emphasis on ‘gestures felt to be morally right’56 while expressive politics places 
greater emphasis on ‘the defence of principles’.57 However, Labour Party people 
rarely take an absolutist position, in spite of some of the characterisations of 
expressive politics that tend to come from the Labour Right (‘the politics of protest’) 
and of instrumental politics that tend to come from the Labour Left (the 
‘abandonment of principle’). Instead Labour Party people have a different 
interpretation of the blend of these traditions, giving rise to more expressive or 
instrumental political styles. The fault lines considered in Chapter 2, the products of 
competing traditions within Labour’s ethos, attest to an important point made by 
Bale: that Labour ‘is a complex and shifting amalgam whose traditions act both as a 
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constraint and a resource for people capable of making their own history and 
competing quite legitimately within the same heterodox tradition’.58 I agree both that 
Labour’s ethos is a heterodox tradition – a tradition within which are shared and 
competing traditions – and that Labour Party people have been competing along these 
four key fault lines ‘quite legitimately’. There is great pluralism within the Labour 
Party, in doctrine and in ethos. I also address, at the beginning of Chapter 2, Labour’s 
origins in working class communities and the changing class composition of the 
Labour Party (particularly in the 1980s and 90s). While it is important to revisit 
Drucker’s arguments regarding the class basis of Labour’s ethos – in light of a 
changing Labour membership –  I argue the presence and endurance of the fault lines 
in Labour’s ethos, in part the products of Labour’s origins, reaffirms the centrality of 
Drucker’s thesis. 
 
Chapters 3-6 of this study analyse the impact of Labour’s ethos on the process of 
party change during the modernisation period. Presented as ‘case study’ chapters, 
each considers one of the key fault lines in Labour’s ethos through a moment of 
Labour’s modernisation which engaged with one of these divisive issues. In Chapter 
3, I consider proposed reforms to Labour’s ‘Party Objects’ – its aims and values as a 
political party – that came about through the Aims & Values process, bridging Neil 
Kinnock’s first and second parliaments as leader. Often considered a precursor to the 
much-studied Policy Review process, and consistent with Labour’s developing 
political economy, I argue that Aims & Values was a limited restatement of Labour’s 
goals. While Kinnock believed Labour’s existing Party Objects – contained within 
Clause IV of the party’s constitution – were inadequate, his decision to leave them 
untouched can be better understood by appreciating the role of Labour’s ethos. Both 
Kinnock’s individual interpretation of Labour’s ethos, and his perception of the 
dominant interpretation of the time, meant that he considered clarification around 
Labour’s Party Objects to be an unnecessary and divisive risk.  
 
Chapter 4 considers the place of emblematic and symbolic policies in Labour’s ethos. 
As the case study, it analyses Kinnock’s approach to Labour’s policy on nuclear 
disarmament. Prior to unilateralism being adopted under Michael Foot, disarmament 
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had generated controversy within the party. It had proven its ability to become a 
factional weapon in the battle between the Gaitskellites and the Labour Left. Yet, 
despite its place as an emblematic policy in Labour’s history, and the enormous 
energy expended in changing it, unilateralism has not been subject to much political 
analysis in studies of Labour’s modernisation. Chapter 4 looks at the role of 
Kinnock’s individual interpretation of Labour’s ethos – one which valued pragmatism 
over ‘emblems’ – and his perception of the dominant interpretation as one which 
placed great importance on the retention of emblematic policies. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 move into the New Labour years. In considering approaches to 
decision-making – in particular, how policy is made in the Labour Party – Chapter 5 
analyses the secretive process which culminated in one of the first acts of New 
Labour in government: independence for the Bank of England. Again, while this 
issue has been subject to policy analysis, its significance as a political decision has 
gone under-analysed. The decision-making process was one of control and secrecy at 
the top of the party, with details decided upon by Blair, Brown and close aides. Yet 
this is not the whole story in relation to Labour’s competing traditions. During this 
period, Blair and Brown did not opt for a strategy of open confrontation with their 
party. And while bypassing decision-making structures, Blair simultaneously engaged 
with Labour’s debates regarding internal democracy. He experimented with 
membership plebiscites, and he recognised the distance that could emerge between 
detailed policy documents from Labour conferences, and an unwilling Cabinet or 
Shadow Cabinet hoping for greater flexibility. The juggling of a leadership 
preference for autonomy, along with giving voice to the wider party in decision-
making, is a familiar approach of Labour leaders past and present. 
 
Chapter 6 looks at Tony Blair’s leadership campaign in 1994 and offers an analysis 
which positions Blair and early New Labour as a more cautious political project than 
is suggested by those who were involved – from Blair himself to Phillip Gould. I take 
Blair’s leadership campaign as an example of a political strategy seeking to work with 
what New Labour perceived to be the dominant ethos of the party: one attached to its 
past, fond of symbols, and necessitating a blend of expressive and instrumental 
politics. During Labour’s leadership contest, Blair published the Fabian pamphlet, 
Socialism, aimed at regaining ‘the intellectual high ground, stating with clarity its 
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[Labour’s] true identity and historic mission’.59 At the time of Blair’s initiative to 
rewrite Clause IV of the party’s constitution, Brown argued the process needed ‘to 
show that fundamental socialist values endure and continue to inspire, which is why 
they should be clearly reflected in both the Labour Party constitution and in Labour 
Party policy’.60 The ‘early Blair’ selectively challenged, but did not disavow all of 
Labour’s traditions. In this sense, he was different, but connected to the leaders who 
had preceded him. The crude instrumentalist label with which New Labour is now 
often tagged is not appropriate to this earlier period. 
 
The case study chapters all conclude by discussing how distinct interpretations of the 
party’s ethos – both individual interpretations and the dominant interpretation of the 
time – affected the choices of the actors involved in Labour’s modernisation. The 
study ends with Labour’s period of opposition. From the day Blair and Brown entered 
Downing Street, governing and Whitehall became a key part of their institutional 
context, necessitating a separate study in relation to the party’s ethos. Analysis of 
New Labour requires a recognition of the different phases of New Labour, and the 
‘different Blairs’. The Blair who worked for years to convince his party of a different 
kind of socialism, or social democracy, was very different to the Blair who left office 
focused on ‘policies that work’, and indeed the recent Blair incarnation as someone 
seeking policies to define an electoral centre, rather than the other way around. 
 
Methodology 
 
Bale noted those ‘who believe meanings and understandings – transmitted by and 
constitutive of traditions… still matter as much as incentives and institutions’,61 must 
embrace an approach of ‘immersion in the life-worlds of those who create and carry 
those meanings’62 and of ‘talking to people, listening to their stories, understanding 
how they make sense of and thereby act upon the world’.63 Whether such methods are 
the unique preserve of interpretivists is arguable, as Bale noted.64 Immersion, 
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particularly through interviews and the building blocks of many background 
conversations, can be found in the work of Lewis Minkin, among others. This study 
is the product of such immersion, using familiar qualitative research methods to ‘tell 
a story’. However, the methods I have used, and the analysis I present here, are both 
firmly rooted in a distinctive theoretical perspective – one which considers ethos to be 
a determinant of party change. The ‘processes’ I investigated, interrogated and 
analysed are those which – I believe – help us understand ethos as a part of ‘the 
dynamic relationship between structure and agency’.65 Positing the presence and 
effect of ethos on both strategic actors and a strategic context was the ‘structure’ for 
my research methods – a less familiar outlook. 
 
I employed a mixed methods approach in this study. Semi-structured elite interviews 
formed a key part of my research, shedding light on how actors felt and what factors 
they considered to be most important in their strategic calculations. The ‘structure’ of 
the interviews was the effect of the party’s ethos, both an actor’s own understanding 
of it, and their perception of an organisation-wide, dominant set of traditions. 
Interviews are surely critical to gaining as complete an understanding as is possible of 
the ‘dynamic’ between structure and agency. An actor – particularly reflecting with 
the benefit of time having passed, and the pressure of instantaneous judgements 
having been taken away – can provide crucial insights into their perceptions, both of 
their own agency and the structural obstacles or opportunities they encountered. 
Similarly, relationships between the internal and the external, or the domestic and the 
international, can be better understood with insight into an actor’s judgements – 
something greatly aided by hearing from the actors themselves. As a researcher, I also 
benefited from the passage of time. My interviews for this study began in earnest 
after Labour’s 2015 election defeat. Prominent members of New Labour’s leadership 
team had, by that point and for different reasons, become less affected by 
contemporary, day-to-day Labour Party politics and could reflect, more freely, on 
their pasts. 
 
All of that being said, interviews can throw up inconsistencies in a story. People can 
misremember, or choose to dwell on particular details that have, over time, become 
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an important part of their own retelling of events. The other key parts of my research 
helped to mitigate some of these risks, as well as providing another rich source of 
insight. Archival research and textual/document analysis helped to provider a fuller 
account of the case studies I pursued. Through memorandums between political 
actors, a researcher can follow the strategic deliberations of key players involved in 
political decision-making. Similarly, through analysis of documents subject to 
numerous revisions, and with the benefit of comparing different stages of drafts to a 
final product, one can see how outcomes were ultimately affected. 
 
The interviews for this study covered a broad range of political actors. They ranged 
from the Labour Party leadership – from the leader and their close colleagues – to 
trade union leaders, senior members of the parliamentary party, party officers and 
members of the National Executive Committee (NEC). I spoke to senior journalists 
from the time, often to be seen mingling in and around Labour’s HQ when an NEC 
meeting concluded, waiting for the leaks and briefings that inevitably followed. As 
has been the case in recent decades, with the ‘professionalization’66 of political life, 
many interviewees also had careers spanning the entire modernisation period, from 
staffers to politicians. I interviewed 24 individuals, the majority of whom were actors 
at the top of the party during Labour’s modernisation, taking key decisions, drafting 
policies, managing relationships and providing strategic advice. Some interviewees 
were close observers of events or key stakeholders – themselves actors, affecting the 
strategic context of others and reacting to political actions. Nearly all of these 
interviews took place from 2015 to early 2018 (one took place in late 2014), with 
later interviews focusing on specific points or processes that required checking. 
 
In the case of Charles Clarke, Neil Kinnock’s chief of staff and later Home Secretary 
in Tony Blair’s government, and with Ed Balls, Gordon Brown’s chief aide and later 
Education Secretary in Brown’s government, I conducted more than one interview. 
This was due not only to the generosity of both in granting me the time to talk to 
them more than once, but also to their central role in the case studies I analysed for 
this thesis. Their respective roles were often remarked upon in early conversations 
and ‘scoping’ interviews that I conducted before my research interviews. Identifying 
                                                 
66 P. Allen, The Political Class, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p.4. 
 30 
key individuals through scoping conversations, and research of both primary and 
secondary sources, can lead to elite interviewing of those ‘in the room’, or 
consistently mentioned by other actors as knowing the ins and outs of something. 
This forms a part of the ‘process-tracing’ method: ‘When researchers use process 
tracing, the key issues to consider when drawing the sample are to ensure that the 
most important and influential actors are included, and that testimony concerning the 
key process is collected from the central players involved.’67 
 
The process of identifying interviewees, approaching them, and conducting long, in-
depth conversations was aided, at least in part, by my institutional experience. While 
I was not a participant in the events analysed in this study (I was in my first year at 
secondary school when Tony Blair became Prime Minister), I began working in 
Labour Party politics as a young graduate after Blair’s departure from Number 10 in 
2007. Over the years of working with more senior staff and politicians, I made 
connections that were very helpful in both the scheduling and process of elite 
interviewing. My work with some of the politicians I interviewed (however brief), 
and my institutional knowledge more generally, made the interview experience a 
more familiar one for me. Interviewees already had, of course, great experience of 
speaking to people about their judgements and their views – be they journalists, 
researchers, party members or voters. What I benefited from was, more than 
anything, time with elite actors and the opportunity to ask questions about specific 
processes and events. I defined my subjects of interest very clearly to those I 
interviewed, which provided some certainty for those involved about what they could 
usefully reflect upon, as well as some reassurance that more contemporary political 
affairs – such as what was in the newspaper on a given day – was not important to 
me. From my experience of working with politicians, clarity over subject matter is 
vital to an open and engaging interview experience. 
 
In addition to the archival research I undertook for this study, I have also had access 
to unarchived papers, including notes produced for the policy of Bank independence, 
and speeches which are currently not available in research libraries. Memoirs and 
more contemporary accounts also helped provide a clearer picture of events, or the 
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strategic calculations involved. Often these sources were mutually reinforcing, 
showing the distinct interpretations of Labour’s ethos which individuals held – 
including the key political actors involved – as well as the perceptions and 
judgements from those at the top of the party about the dominant ethos of the 
movement. These perceptions and judgements were about what actors thought would 
‘work’ and what wouldn’t. Their judgements on what people could ‘take’. Or, in 
Kinnock’s words, what would make the Labour Party ‘tanker’ snap in half? These 
considerations – if not in the precise language I’ve presented here – came across 
strongly in the interviews, papers and other primary sources from the period. Overall, 
this study is an example of a ‘high politics’ approach, something which can help us 
understand how political actors think, ‘even if they are more or less constrained and 
to some extent formed by… institutions and ideas’.68 A risk and potential limitation 
of such an approach is to divorce the decisions taken at the top of political parties 
from our understanding of the ‘grassroots’. This study does attempt to understand 
‘high’ politics in the context of party politics more generally, including interactions 
with party members and perceptions of how they feel and what drives them. I do 
believe that chance encounters in Labour Party committee rooms can affect – 
however minimally – the strategic context of political actors. I discuss bridging this 
gap a little more in this study’s conclusion. 
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Chapter 1 
The party has a life of its own: ethos as a determinant of party change 
 
‘No amount of instruction on the playing fields of Eton and Winchester could ever be a substitute for 
the lore to be learnt at Cardiff Arms Park, White Hart Lane, Highbury or Home Park.’ 
Michael Foot, The Uncollected Michael Foot 
 
Introduction 
 
Following Tony Blair’s victory in the Labour Party’s 1994 leadership election, Tony 
Benn watched the new leader’s speech, and reflected in his diary: 
 
‘I watched Blair carefully, because I’ve never heard him make a general 
speech, and it was really quite radical… I think he’s frightened the life out of 
the Liberals. The Tories must be frightened in the South. He got a huge 
ovation. It was a good and radical speech and I have no complaint about it at 
all.’69 
 
Twelve years later Blair addressed Labour’s annual conference for the final time as 
leader of the party, having signalled his intention to resign as party leader and prime 
minister the following summer. Benn’s reflections on this conference address read 
rather differently to his 1994 diary entry: 
 
‘He [Blair] hectored us and bullied us, and “change”, “change, change”, “got 
to change!”, “you’ve got to change!”, making us feel totally inadequate.’70 
 
When Blair left office less than a year later, Benn noted he ‘didn’t mention any other 
minister, or anything to do with the Labour Party, anything to do with the Cabinet. It 
was a monarchical address, the abdication of King Tony’.71 Nearly a decade in 
government had seen Blair’s popularity wane, both inside and outside of the Labour 
Party. From Benn’s perspective, policy differences – particularly on foreign affairs 
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71 Ibid., p.366. 
 33 
and the Iraq war – had turned Blair into a man with few friends.72 Gordon Brown, 
while watching the 9/11 attacks unfold, told his aides that ‘while economics had 
dominated the previous decade, security and foreign policy…. would be front and 
centre in the coming one’.73 While the 2008 financial crash and longer term trends of 
economic fragility would ultimately take over by the end of the noughties, in terms of 
Blair’s trajectory as Prime Minister, Brown was right. Alongside Blair’s focus on 
‘system change’74 in public services, his commitment to the United Kingdom’s 
diplomatic and military alliance with the United States came to define his premiership 
and consume both his time and political capital. Yet, while Benn was never a New 
Labour man (to say the least) and while Blair’s record as prime minister had soured 
any feelings of warmth Benn may have felt for a Labour colleague, what is 
particularly noteworthy for this study from the two Benn diary entries is what they 
say about Blair’s attitude and behaviour towards his own party, and the response he 
received from people like Benn. 
 
In 1994 Blair was focused on the Labour Party because, as a newly elected opposition 
leader, that was his job. By 2007, his job was more complicated and far more 
demanding. Yet when he turned his attention to his party – and this had become rarer 
towards the end of his time as prime minister – he had stopped speaking its language. 
Assuming his party was now thinking and acting in a new way, Blair sought to 
entrench his policy agenda, rather than consolidate a political one. Blair had stopped 
advocating for a ‘project’ connected with the traditions and history of the Labour 
Party. What he – and, to be fair, the vast majority of Labour people – did not see was 
that the party was only a spell of opposition away from junking Blair’s politics and 
his (later) policies. He had ceased to engage with his party’s ethos, and this cost him 
and his successors. This narrative, from an engaged Blair versed in the competing 
traditions within Labour’s ethos, adopting strategies that were quite nuanced and 
sensitive to Labour’s traditions and beliefs, to a later Blair who disengaged, thinking 
(wrongly) that only doctrine mattered, is relatively absent from the existing literature. 
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This chapter has two objectives. The first is to provide a clearer theoretical basis for 
the concept of ethos, and to understand its role in both the actions of strategic actors 
and a strategic context. The second is to position this study within the existing 
literature, highlighting the ‘ethos gap’, and setting out how analysing ethos as a 
determinant of party change can affect our understanding of Labour’s modernisation. 
This thesis analyses how something internal to the Labour Party – ethos – interacts 
with both external and other internal factors. Labour’s modernisation period, from the 
aftermath of the 1983 election defeat, to Tony Blair’s electoral triumph in 1997 and 
beyond, has been much studied. Labour’s policy programme was transformed during 
this period, a process inseparable in the early years of modernisation from Neil 
Kinnock’s organisational reforms, and one which sped up as Kinnock progressed 
towards the 1992 election. Building on these reforms, and following John Smith’s 
brief tenure as leader before his sudden death, Blair went further in trimming and 
refining Labour’s prospectus. There are significant differences in academic 
interpretations of this policy change, both in its substance and in understanding the 
drivers behind it, but there is general agreement that policy was changed. 
 
Subject to far less attention in academic studies is the role of Labour’s ethos. Neither 
its substance nor its role as a determinant of party change during Labour’s 
modernisation have been sufficiently explored. It has been suggested that in the 
1990s, Labour’s ‘ethos was altered consciously to exclude its traditional members 
and styles of discourse’,75 and that Tony Blair ‘produced a fundamental reordering’76 
of the party’s ethos. Yet what Labour’s ethos is – and was during the period in 
question – has not been adequately established. Scholars sensitive to the party’s 
internal habits and traditions, including Eric Shaw, have considered such internal 
factors to have affected, and aided, the modernisation process. As Shaw noted in 
relation to the Kinnock period, Labour people ‘do not act exclusively as individuals 
but as actors within an organisation with its own independently existing ethos, norms, 
customs and traditions’.77 The party’s ethos – both its instinct to support its leader, 
                                                 
75 B. Brivati and R. Heffernan, ‘Introduction’ in B. Brivati and R. Heffernan (eds.), The Labour Party: 
A Centenary History, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000), pp.1-7, p.6. 
76 Chadwick and Heffernan, ‘Introduction’, p.1. 
77 E. Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979: Crisis and Transformation, (London: Routledge, 1994), 
p.164. 
 35 
and a gradually accruing urge for electoral victory – were important, Shaw argued, in 
understanding how Kinnock worked with his party in order to change it.78 
 
Yet Shaw also noted, in a comparatively short section on ethos, that his findings 
relied heavily on interviews,79 (suggesting ‘something’ important was there, but hard 
to pin down) while his thoughts on the scope of ethos as a determinant of party 
change were limited to Labour’s tradition of loyalty to its leadership. Shaw 
recognised a leader (in Kinnock) motivated by factors outside of Labour Party 
committee rooms – factors exogenous to Labour as an organisation – and the crucial 
interaction with factors alive and well in constituency Labour parties throughout the 
land – factors endogenous to Labour as an organisation. Overall, the current academic 
literature on Labour’s modernisation period goes little further than that recognition. 
And where it does go further – as with Cronin’s work – ethos is presented as an 
assortment of baggage New Labour sought to dump, rather than as competing 
traditions which early New Labour sought to engage and interact with, utilising 
arguments found within the party’s heterodox tradition. The first part of this chapter 
significantly develops Drucker’s concept of ethos. Informed by more recent work on 
tradition, I unpack how Labour’s ethos – comprised of shared and competing 
traditions – is understood and debated within the party. The second part considers the 
‘ethos gap’ in the existing literature and examines how filling it affects our 
understanding of Labour’s modernisation.  
 
Clarifying terms 
 
Both the brevity and discursive nature of Doctrine and Ethos are, in some ways, what 
make Drucker’s work such a stimulating read. Yet they have also, perhaps, limited its 
application in contemporary political science. Drucker noted that Labour’s ethos 
included the ‘traditions, beliefs, characteristic procedures and feelings which help to 
animate the members of the party’,80 but his concept of ethos has not been developed 
in literature interpreting the Labour Party. In Cronin’s work, he noted that ‘the 
vague… powerful political culture of the party’81 was expressed most effectively by 
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Drucker, but the concept itself remains unclear in the literature. Similarly David 
Marquand, in his stimulating work on the party which I will return to later in this 
chapter, noted the importance of Drucker’s insight,82 but again left it undeveloped as 
an analytical tool. This section of this chapter will seek to clarify and significantly 
develop Drucker’s original insight. First, I consider the plethora of terms which could 
be considered relevant to ‘ethos’, and explain my narrowing of terminology to 
‘traditions’. I then explore Drucker’s insights into how traditions work within the 
Labour Party, and consider them alongside more contemporary debates regarding the 
role of tradition. I then explain this study’s framework of shared and competing 
traditions, with individual and dominant interpretations, and how Labour Party people 
are socialised in the ‘practical knowledge’ of these traditions and beliefs. 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary definition of ethos is ‘the characteristic spirit of a 
culture, era, or community manifested in its attitudes and aspirations’. This definition 
is pretty close to one used by Drucker when he wrote that ‘by the ethos of the party I 
have I mind what an earlier age might have called the spirit of the party; its traditions 
and habits, its feel’.83 Put another way, Drucker also argued the Labour Party ‘has a 
life of its own’84 and was not simply ‘a vote-gathering machine’.85 As Shaw wrote of 
Lewis Minkin’s work, accepting Drucker’s concept means understanding political 
actors and their actions as ‘explicable only in terms of the social milieu they inhabit, 
their upbringing and their social experiences and relationships’.86 Jobson made a 
similar point about Minkin, noting that ‘in a similar manner to Drucker… [he has] 
paved the way for new interpretations of the [Labour] party’s post-war trajectory that 
stressed the critical nature of the role that had been played by less visible underlying 
factors’.87 Minkin is the most notable proponent of the role of ‘norms’ in Labour 
Party literature. 
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Minkin’s understanding of the trade union-party dynamic was defined by: 
 
‘…patterns of inhibitions and unwritten “rules”. I described how this was 
based on role playing, and a differentiation of functions and spheres of the 
industrial and the political. It was also based upon a core of fundamental 
values shared by the Labour Party and trade union leaderships. This 
framework enabled observers to see the party-union relationship in 
dramatically different terms… and it proved to be readily recognisable to the 
players.’88 
 
All of this makes the definition of what, exactly, the Labour Party’s own ‘life’ is 
unclear. The term ethos is often accompanied or replaced by other terms, including 
political culture, norms, customs, role-playing, rules or habits. To fully appreciate any 
effect ethos may have on the strategies of political actors, we must define it more 
clearly. This is not a simple task. Wickham-Jones has argued that while ‘norms’ – 
that is a standard or pattern of social behaviour – have a role in our understanding of 
Labour’s political change, ‘it is by no means clear… that customs, traditions and 
habits have played a primary role in Labour politics over the last two decades or 
so’.89 Partly, this lack of clarity over the role played by norms is due to the number of 
terms falling under the umbrella of ‘norms’ – something Wickham-Jones also 
noted.90  
 
Eric Hobsbawm provided a useful categorisation to narrow this terminology. He 
argued that some terms can have technical as much as ideological justifications.91 For 
instance, ‘customs’ or ‘habits’ can be intertwined with ‘traditions’, but a distinction 
can be made ‘between tradition… and convention or routine, which has no significant 
ritual or symbolic function as such’.92 For example, it may be the custom or habit of 
Labour Party leaders to attend all trade union receptions held at the party’s annual 
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conference. While attending these receptions, it may be a tradition for the leader to 
include in their speech a passage on the indivisibility of the party-union ‘link’ and to 
attack real or imagined arguments for severing such a link. The former – simply 
attending – has no real meaning in itself. The latter is invested with meaning and 
could, therefore, be labelled a tradition. Based on Drucker’s original definition, and 
informed by Hobsbawm’s argument regarding the difference between ‘routine’ and 
something invested with meaning, this study understands ethos as shared and 
competing traditions. These traditions incorporate both practices and beliefs. How we 
understand tradition (including the basis for its existence), its role in ‘socialising’ 
people within an institution and the extent to which actors can alter traditions is the 
next area of focus for this chapter. 
 
Tradition 
 
Tradition, Mark Bevir has argued, is ‘a set of understandings someone acquires as an 
initial web of beliefs’.93 Actors can ‘come to hold beliefs, and so act, only against the 
background of a social inheritance; but this inheritance does not limit the beliefs they 
later can go on to hold, or the actions they can go on to perform’.94 As individuals 
inherit traditions, they interpret them and pass on their individual interpretations. This 
point is linked to Bevir’s discussion of how our understanding of traditions interacts 
with intentionality. He has argued that ‘individuals necessarily reach the beliefs they 
do against the background of a social tradition… [However] we do not have to give 
up intentionality to accept that individuals can neither reach the understandings they 
do nor make the utterances they do in isolation from society. Intentionalism is 
compatible with a belief that that the social context necessarily influences what 
people see, believe, and say’.95  
 
There is a similar argument in Bevir’s later work with Rhodes. ‘Tradition is a starting 
point,’ they suggested, ‘… we think of tradition as an initial influence on people that 
colours their later actions only if their agency has not led them to change it’.96 This 
point was reiterated by Bevir and Rhodes in more recent work, where they argued 
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that ‘people act against the backcloth of inherited traditions that influence them. But 
people can vary these traditions for reasons of their own in response to circumstances, 
so these traditions do not determine what they come to believe and do’.97 On the 
subject of change, Bevir and Rhodes focused on ‘dilemmas’, defined as ‘any 
experience or idea that conflicts with someone’s beliefs, and so forces them to alter 
the beliefs they inherit as a tradition’.98  
 
The concept of tradition is incredibly flexible in the work of Bevir and Rhodes. They 
are said to be ‘evolving, adaptable… they are sometimes resilient and enduring, and 
at other times ambivalent or contradictory in their core beliefs. Some parts are 
codified and rule-bound; others exist as a loosely connected constellation of ideas 
variously constructed by participants or observers’.99 Such flexibility in defining 
tradition can lead to mixed outcomes. In an analysis of how civil servants interact 
with ‘Westminster traditions’, Bevir and Rhodes argued that civil servants ‘exist in, 
and are subordinate to, a legitimate political authority. So, there is a derivative 
character to their traditions. They work in formalized traditions of governance that are 
dependent and contingent on the political process and notions of proper decision 
making and accountability’.100 This conclusion is suggestive of institutional 
traditions, resulting in ‘formalized’101 traditions and ways of working. Similarly, civil 
servants also work within ‘administrative bureaucracies with strong norms, precepts 
and values’,102 yet they also cultivate and preserve other traditions.103 
 
An interesting example that Bevir and Rhodes used is of a Cabinet Secretary in the 
UK Civil Service who, in the midst of Whitehall reform and New Labour’s approach 
to governance, used his valedictory address to staff to ‘identify and preserve the 
virtues of the traditional civil service in the face of recent challenges…it represents a 
reinterpretation of administrative traditions… defending their understanding of their 
administrative traditions’.104 This is a compelling example of competing traditions, 
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where a political actor (albeit a ‘neutral’ one) seeks to argue the case for a 
longstanding tradition in the face of increasingly strong arguments for a competing 
tradition. However, the scope this actor appears to have to ‘reinvent’ or vary tradition 
seems limited. It is certainly the case that an actor, exercising agency, is seeking to 
explain their view of their institution, utilising traditions that compete with others. 
Yet the Cabinet Secretary is utilising traditions inherited from previous generations, 
not changing them. Putting forward the vision of an impartial, all-knowing civil 
service as a counter weight to political masters is not the ‘reinterpretation’105 of a 
tradition, but the defence of an existing one. 
 
The vagueness in the use of tradition by Bevir and Rhodes has been commented 
upon. Smith argued that ‘exactly what tradition is doing, what it is sustaining and 
what it is not, is difficult to see’,106 in their work. Furthermore, ‘the causal 
relationship between traditions and beliefs is vague. Traditions exist but do not 
determine. They are strong in that they socialise, but weak in not preventing other 
forms of beliefs’.107 Classical interpretivists, Smith wrote, are concerned with ‘how 
norms fix the way people act’.108 Yet Bevir and Rhodes, ‘in ignoring the ways in 
which norms and institutions shape and, on occasions, determine (although always 
with the possibility of not determining) behaviour, are ignoring both power and social 
structures. When humans are placed within a web of power relations, actions and 
institutions may depend on beliefs, or beliefs may be a consequence of webs of power 
relations’.109 And on the agency of a political actor to alter traditions, Smith 
concluded that classical interpretivism suggests that ‘although institutions are socially 
created, they are not subject to change as a consequence of the beliefs of most 
people’.110 Similarly, Marsh responded to Bevir and Rhodes by arguing that 
‘traditions (or a dominant tradition) will be inscribed in institutions (and processes), 
as well as in ideas, and, as such, will shape but not determine ideas. Consequently, I 
do not reify traditions. Rather, I suggest that there is a degree of path-dependency, not 
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path-determinacy; how much is an empirical question’.111 In other words, past 
experience and traditions can affect a person’s beliefs – and their judgement is 
dependent on their strategic context, which is itself informed by traditions. In this 
understanding, tradition does not determine or dictate a path, but nor does it allow for 
such flexibility that traditions can be easily reconstructed on the basis of an 
individual’s ideas. 
 
That tradition ‘affects how agents interpret and respond to events’112 is a point of 
agreement in much of the literature, and one that reinforces Drucker’s central thesis 
in Doctrine and Ethos. As Diamond and Richards noted, ‘the insight of interpretivist 
approaches is that in order to understand actions, practices and institutions, it is vital 
to grasp the beliefs and preferences of individual actors and the meanings that they 
ascribe to particular events’.113 This is undoubtedly helpful in understanding Labour’s 
ethos and how it influences a political actor’s motivations and strategies. I agree with 
Bevir and Rhodes that actors ‘necessarily come to hold the beliefs they do within a 
social context that influences them. To explain the beliefs of a particular individual, 
we have to appeal to an aggregate concept, such as tradition, that evokes this social 
context’.114 Where the work of Bevir and Rhodes stirs controversy – and clashes with 
Drucker’s concept of ethos – is in their insistence that ‘traditions have no existence 
apart from in the contingent beliefs of particular individuals’115 thus making 
traditions ‘contingent, produced by the actions of individuals’ with ‘every strand of a 
tradition… in principle open to change’.116 
 
Drucker undoubtedly considered meanings and traditions to exist independently of 
individual Labour Party people. Labour’s ethos, Drucker argued, involved 
‘internalised’117 traditions that endure. Unlike doctrine, they are not ‘always open to 
challenge’ or to modification ‘if experience shows this to be necessary’.118 In the 
sense that all meanings and traditions emerge from social contexts, Drucker believed 
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Labour’s ethos sprang from working class communities, and that despite substantial 
change in those communities and in the Labour Party, those traditions were enduring, 
and inscribed in the institution of the Labour Party – leading to a clash between the 
party’s defensive ethos and the party’s parliamentary group.119 The enduring nature 
of Labour’s competing traditions, including beliefs and practices from the party’s 
roots in working class communities, suggests that Drucker was right. The concept of 
a ‘dilemma’ as articulated by Bevir and Rhodes has some applicability to competing 
traditions. An event or action can interact significantly with a dominant interpretation 
of Labour’s ethos, questioning it, weakening the potency of some of the key 
arguments. I don’t, however, believe this means Labour’s ethos has changed. Rather, 
there has been a shift between competing traditions within Labour’s ethos, affecting 
the role of ethos in an actor’s strategic environment, loosening a constraint, or 
catalysing action.  
 
My understanding of ethos is closer to that of Marsh, and to Hay’s contention that 
‘institutionally situated actors [are] orienting themselves towards their institutional 
environment through a series of subjective and intersubjective understandings… and 
normative dispositions’.120 In other words, the subjective (personal) and 
intersubjective (shared) aspects of the Labour Party’s ethos are relevant to how 
Labour Party people behave. Both an actor’s preferences, and therefore ‘agency’, 
alongside social institutions, and therefore ‘structure’, matter. Conscious actors see 
and engage with the normative aspects of an institution. They also have their own 
beliefs about those norms and traditions. Without reifying (as Marsh put it) traditions, 
but seeing them as relevant to our understanding of strategic actors and their strategic 
context, I see Labour Party people as acting in a way informed by the shared and 
competing traditions within Labour’s ethos. This study argues for a dual 
understanding of Labour’s ethos: an individual interpretation of the party’s ethos and 
the dominant interpretation. The individual interpretation represents an actor’s beliefs 
and preferences on the matter of Labour’s competing traditions. The dominant 
interpretation represents what is considered by Labour Party people to be the 
prevailing narrative on those competing traditions, gaining additional resonance.121 
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This formulation seeks to remedy the grey area between institutional influence and an 
actor’s interpretation of them. Both an individual interpretation and the dominant 
interpretation include shared practices and traditions which are relatively 
uncontroversial, as well as competing traditions, which are more controversial. With 
regard to an individual’s interpretation, their views are still derived from Labour’s 
ethos, as Marsh argued in relation to actors interpreting traditions, but being subject 
to the constraint of how ‘those traditions are inscribed in institutions, processes and 
narratives’.122 Neither a Labour actor’s individual interpretation, nor the dominant 
one provide the explanation for a person’s actions. Rather, as I noted in the 
Introduction to this study, ethos can shape an actor’s chosen strategies. And as with 
the concepts of a strategic actor and a strategic context, the individual and dominant 
interpretations are relational and form a part of an actor’s strategic calculations. This 
means actors can challenge dominant traditions, be reinforced by them, or be 
constrained, depending on the preferences of the actor and their strategic 
deliberations. 
 
Inherited tradition 
 
A further pertinent point from Drucker, also relevant to recent debates on tradition, is 
on people becoming ‘socialised’. Drucker saw Labour Party people inheriting 
traditions from previous generations, like Bevir and Rhodes. However, Drucker did 
not develop arguments as to how people become socialised, or how they experience 
Labour’s competing traditions. He did make the distinction between doctrine as a 
debatable, paper-based set of ideas and ethos as a set of traditions arising from 
experience.123 Doctrine could be adopted, altered and re-adopted, all with a paper trail 
and not in any way confined ‘to those who have long been acquainted with it’.124 In 
contrast, ethos was not ‘open to recruitment by agreement’125 in the same way. 
Labour people – through family and community – had a direct link to the lived 
experience of working class life, while ‘intellectual members of the Labour 
movement’ could ‘seek to understand, and to be sympathetic to, the ethos of the 
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workers’.126 In understanding the process through which Labour’s ethos is interpreted 
by Labour Party people, this study adopts Michael Oakeshott’s articulation of 
‘technical’ and ‘practical’ knowledge. ‘Every human activity whatsoever, involves 
knowledge,’ Oakeshott argued, ‘and, universally, this knowledge is of two sorts, both 
of which are always involved in any actual activity.’127 The first sort of knowledge 
Oakeshott called ‘technical knowledge’, where the knowledge is ‘formulated into 
rules… [and where] its chief characteristic is that it is susceptible of precise 
formulation’.128 The second sort of knowledge is ‘practical’, it ‘exists only in use… 
the method by which it may be shared and becomes common knowledge is not the 
method of formulated doctrine’.129 
 
The two forms of knowledge are ‘distinguishable but inseparable’,130 and while 
‘technical knowledge can be learned from a book… practical knowledge can neither 
be taught nor learned, but only imparted and acquired… [and] acquired only by 
continuous contact with one who is perpetually practising it’.131 Like Drucker, it’s 
important to stress that Oakeshott’s theory does not mean to suggest that doctrine, or 
technical knowledge, is for intellectuals, and that ethos, or practical knowledge, is for 
workers – and that the latter is a ‘less demanding, less articulate’ level of 
knowledge.132 Far from it. As Oakeshott notes, both forms of knowledge are 
inseparable. The concept of practical knowledge, and Drucker’s more limited 
thinking on how Labour’s ethos is passed on, rely on experience within the Labour 
Party, regular contact with fellow Labour Party members, and the resultant 
socialisation into an institution inscribed with the shared and competing traditions of 
Labour’s ethos. 
 
This leads us to considering how Labour’s political actors surmise Labour’s dominant 
ethos. Neil Kinnock’s process of party engagement, the ways in which he would 
interact with and reach a judgement on the dominant interpretation of Labour’s ethos, 
and how he factored this in to his wider strategic context, illustrates this well. In a 
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1993 Institute of Historical Research seminar, a paper given by Kinnock summarised 
his view of the 1983 Labour Party. ‘Labour was increasingly seen to be a party 
slipping towards impossibilism,’ Kinnock wrote, ‘succumbing to fads, riven by 
vicious divisions, speaking the language of sloganized dogma – and usually voicing it 
in the accents of menace. It was almost as if sections of the party measured the purity 
of their socialism by the distance which they could put between it and the minds of 
the British people. These characteristics… were not, of course, typical of the great 
majority of party members. But it is an inevitability of politics that the nature of a 
party is judged not so much by the modulated voice of the many as by the braying of 
the few.’133 Here Kinnock noted a familiar observation, certainly among more 
contemporary leaders of the Labour Party, that a vocal minority can lead to the party 
as a whole being seen as a reflection of the few. 
 
That Labour’s institutional structures, from local branches upwards, had people in 
positions of power who were reluctant to embrace change was a point Kinnock 
returned to. ‘I was aware from wide personal contact that there was a body of opinion 
in the Labour Party that, in the wake of the defeat of 1983, would either embrace 
change eagerly or – at worst – give it the benefit of the doubt,’ Kinnock noted. ‘That 
asset was not, however, readily available. Its supply was blocked to some extent by 
those who thought of themselves as guardians of the soul of Labour. Many of the 
people, sitting on General Committees and other decision-making bodies had 
armoured themselves against public opinion and changing realities and were 
constantly on the look-out for what they considered to be “deviation” … Some could, 
as time passed, be persuaded by argument and they were. Others were going to have 
to be superseded by the more general realism of party members.’134 
 
Gauging the dominant ethos of his party, and reaching judgements, was an ongoing 
process for Kinnock. He ‘began a series of regular meetings with leading trade 
unionists and dialogues with party sympathisers with particular specialist capabilities’ 
as well as ‘periodic regional meetings with ordinary members of the party… they 
were conducted as question and answer sessions and, although the attendances always 
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ran into hundreds, none of the confidences that were frankly – and sometimes 
acrimoniously – exchanged in such meetings, over a period of nearly eight years, ever 
became public’.135 In addition, Labour MPs ‘naturally, had to have attention. In some 
cases MPs would bring genuine matters of concern and we would talk them through – 
sometimes with effect. In other cases I would seek out members of the PLP for 
discussion, and meetings of that kind were usually more productive’.136 
 
In an interview for this study, Kinnock expanded on these reflections, with particular 
pertinence for some of the arguments I have put forward in this chapter. Kinnock 
recognised that there were different interpretations within the Labour Party with 
regard to what he called the ‘social or organisation ethos’.137 Within this, Kinnock 
argued, was a ‘split personality’, though split in a number of ways: 
 
‘The split personality is a large number of people in the Labour Party, mainly 
rank and file, who recognise the absolute priority of winning. Their perception 
is substantially at local government level, because they witness and [are] 
enraged by the way in which Tory councils… inflicted unnecessary woe on 
their localities. In reaction against that, they organise, they work… they 
produce policies that are consistent with the general theme of Labour… and 
they manage, they whip, they have tight – sometimes overtight – group 
discipline, and they win… That is the body of the Labour Party, it is made up 
of people who want to win. 
 
‘The other part of the split personality is people who either believe that it’s 
Labour’s natural right to rule, and if it wasn’t for the newspapers poisoning 
the minds of the proletariat, people would recognise that it is in their own 
individual, family and community interest to have a Labour government… the 
larger grouping understands the realities, but thinks that the function of 
Labour is to represent more than to manage or to organise… thirdly, there are 
the people who don’t really care much about power, they’d rather be right… 
faced with challenges many of them will develop pragmatism, will negotiate, 
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will concede, will strike deals, but left to their own devices, without being 
confronted, they’re very happy to belong to a protest movement.’138 
 
While inwardly pragmatic on policy, and armed with the primary objective of 
returning Labour to power, outwardly Kinnock appeared to sympathise with those 
committed to Labour’s programme, and was reluctant to say publicly – at least early 
on in his leadership – that programmatic and organisational change was necessary. 
This caution was heavily due not only to the organisational strength of the Labour 
Left, but to Kinnock’s perception of a party institutionally incapable of sudden 
change. ‘When the party is demoralised,’ Kinnock argued, ‘especially in the wake of 
defeat… those who are idle… can be the voices of resentment, antagonism, protest, 
kick against the traces, poke the establishment in the eye with a sharp stick, can get a 
surge of support.’139 This, Kinnock believed, had happened after Labour’s 1979 
defeat, and – as with the differentiation between technical and practical knowledge – 
Kinnock absorbed evidence of it over the years, from the drama of Labour’s high 
politics and his place on the NEC, to his own constituency – where experienced party 
hands, in the group of Labour people Kinnock viewed as steeped in local government, 
discipline, and winning elections, expressed dismay. 
 
‘Any thinking person didn’t need to be taught that, all the evidence was right 
before you… those years between 1980 and 1983, of anarchy and civil war, 
which was enjoyed by some, particularly the Bennites, that was exploited by 
ultra-Leftists… so I understood in about ’81… in the wake of the Denis 
Healey/Benn contest… I sat on that stage and thought “you bloody idiot, why 
didn’t you vote for Healey”, [Kinnock abstained on the deputy leadership 
ballot] because it was a nail biter and at that juncture I thought Benn had won 
by a couple of per cent, happily he lost… in the wake of that, the following 
Friday was my monthly GC [General Committee], and I went out for a drink 
as I always did with my closest mates… real comrades, [they said] “what are 
we going to do, what are we going to do” … I was on the NEC and I knew 
that the organisation was a shambles… I saw at first-hand how we couldn’t 
sustain the broad church... [however] there was a big impediment [to change]. 
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Defeat didn’t teach everyone the same lesson… [the Left] were substantially 
in control of the institutions of the party…this was a tanker that was going to 
have to be turned around in a very measured way… [otherwise] the tanker 
would have snapped in half.’140 
 
The conclusions Kinnock reached early on about political strategy were based on his 
judgement, and the judgements of those he trusted and could confide in. His 
perception of the party’s ethos, which so preoccupied him, was not something written 
down, nor based on systematic analysis and a ready flow of information. Instead, 
Kinnock’s strategic context was affected by his own interactions – from the ‘high’ to 
‘low’ politics – and from intelligence fed to him across the country, from friends, 
Members of Parliament, party officers and others. The extent to which Kinnock’s 
judgement was right is, of course, debatable. Kinnock perhaps knew better than most 
what Labour’s members in the South Wales valleys made of the state of the party. His 
chief of staff, Charles Clarke, was steeped in the context of London Labour politics. 
Yet the extent to which elite actors – certainly at this point in time – knew what the 
dominant ethos of their party was came down to their perception, their judgement, 
and ‘hard’ evidence contributed by, for example, conference motions, votes, and 
subsequent defeats or victories.    
 
To summarise, I am very conscious of Smith’s view that, in the work of Bevir and 
Rhodes, ‘the concept of tradition does too much work’.141 It appears, simultaneously, 
as the meaning an actor gives to their actions, it explains their motivations (along 
with desire), it informs their beliefs but can be altered by those beliefs, and it contains 
a mixture of strong, weak, institutional and actor-centred traditions, many of which 
are left undefined. In this study I argue for an understanding of ethos as something 
comprised of shared and competing traditions. Actors hold certain beliefs about what 
Labour’s ethos is which are derived from those traditions. Traditions can also become 
dominant within the institution, gaining greater salience and acting as a constraint or 
a resource, depending on an actor’s individual interpretation. Labour’s ethos – 
through this dual understanding – can shape an actor’s ideas and actions. 
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However, I do not seek to privilege, as Smith says of the work of Bevir and Rhodes, 
traditions or beliefs above other causal explanations, including material, or other 
institutional and ideational factors. I consider the different narratives within Labour’s 
traditions to be a separate and distinct determinant of party change,142 albeit one 
interacting with other factors in an actor’s strategic calculations. As Bale noted, ‘any 
solution, certainly, has to reject from the outset the notion – commonplace, believe it 
or not, among academics but probably crazy to everyone else – that anyone seeking to 
explain something political should have to choose between a focus on ideas (the 
ideology that drives those involved and the policies they favour), a focus on interests 
(the material considerations that motivate them or at least those that fund and support 
them), or a focus on institutions (organisations, rules, and customary ways of doing 
things). Instead we have to appreciate that politics, including party politics, can only 
be understood not just by melding contextual and generic explanations but by 
focusing on the intersection, the interrelationship, and the reciprocal influence of 
ideas, interests and institutions’.143 This section has sought to develop Drucker’s 
work, providing a more robust definition of ethos, applicable to political analysis, and 
contributing to our understanding of political action in the way expressed by Bale. It 
is to the existing literature on the Labour Party, and how these factors have affected 
its political trajectory, that I now turn. 
 
Interpreting Labour’s modernisation 
 
How does Labour’s ethos feature in explanatory strategies for understanding 
Labour’s political trajectory? Overall, there is something of an ‘ethos gap’ in the 
existing literature, particularly when considering Labour’s post-1979 period of 
conflict and transformation. Randall offered a classification for the ‘how and why’ of 
Labour’s ideological trajectory over a number of decades: materialist; ideational; 
electoral; institutional; and syntheses.144 There is much variety within all five – and 
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they apply to the history of Labour’s outlook, with many pre-dating the Kinnock and 
Blair periods. For Randall, materialist approaches included Marxist analyses of 
Labour’s inbuilt (and highly limited) reformism, along with those predicated on the 
transformational nature of capitalism, which can be challenging but positive, and its 
consequences for political ideologies. Ideational strategies included what Shaw has 
called the ‘theory of labourism’,145 encompassing both Marxist and social democratic 
interpretations, and with both contending that Labour’s political project is tied to, and 
limited by, the defensiveness of the trade unions and the gradualness of Fabianism. 
At its heart, this ideational argument asserts that Labour’s ideology lacks 
radicalism.146  
 
From the Left, notably from Ralph Miliband, came the argument that Labour’s 
reforms and objectives had ‘never been conceived as part of a strategy for the 
creation of a fundamentally different kind of society’147 with ‘large socialist 
objectives’ being only ‘a very weak concern’.148 Electoral strategies, and what other 
scholars have termed social democratic ‘electoral constraints’,149 included Adam 
Przeworski’s conclusion that ‘once socialists had decided to struggle for political 
power and once they began to compete within the existing representative institutions, 
everything that followed was narrowly constrained’.150 Institutional approaches 
considered the mode of interaction within the party, including its elite actors, while 
approaches which attempted a synthesis sought to combine some of the strategies 
above, alongside a consideration of the interaction between them in an actor’s 
strategic context. 
 
As Randall noted, there is a ‘risk of oversimplification’151 in such categorisation, and 
these groupings are not without their problems. For example, Randall’s grouping 
together of institutional analysis positing leadership hegemony – such as the work of 
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Robert Michels or Robert McKenzie, which I return to later in this chapter – along 
with biographies and autobiographies (Randall uses Brian Brivati’s biography of 
Hugh Gaitskell as one example) is troubling. Grouping the personalities and ideas of 
elite actors – like Gaitskell – alongside institutional factors overlooks the impact of 
ideas on an actor’s strategies, along with external factors that scholars often attempt 
to synthesise. Indeed, this is something Brivati does well when he positions Gaitskell 
within the ‘battle-lines of the 1950s’.152 Overall, there is more synthesis than these 
five groupings imply. As Bale argued, ‘social scientists and their preferred ways of 
working are (thank goodness) rather more loosely coupled’.153 
 
Randall offered a further insight which is relevant to the contribution the concept of 
ethos could make to our understanding of Labour’s political change. Having noted 
that questions over Labour’s trajectory required some separation between what 
shaped the ‘agenda’ for change and ‘the content of ideological changes thereafter’,154 
Randall argued: ‘Electoral imperatives may prompt reassessment of an existing 
ideological commitment but the substantive shaping of the new commitment may be 
better understood by reference to the institutional dynamics of the party.’155 This is an 
important point. As with the approaches to explaining Labour’s century of political 
change, literature on Labour’s modernisation engages with Labour’s ‘structural and 
ideological scaffolding’.156 That is: (i) the organisational basis on which the party 
exists, including its rules, bureaucracy and affiliates; and (ii) its ideology, typically 
understood to mean it doctrine and policy programme. 
 
The ‘agenda’ is varied and much debated in the literature, including electoral 
pressures, ideological currents (Labour, Conservative and global), Labour’s social 
democratic – rather than socialist – heritage, and the personalities of those at the top. 
The party’s ethos is only rarely mentioned when considering factors which shape the 
agenda. The ‘outcome’ is consistently doctrinal and organisational change, with a 
move away from the Labour Left on both counts. Yet it is not common-place to see 
Randall’s concern over outcome-shaping (and the different factors that may be at 
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play) analysed separately to pre-conceived agendas. References to ethos are present 
when looking at the outcome of modernisation, though these references are far from 
systematic, and do not provide any detail as to how or why Labour’s ethos may have 
been ‘altered’ – as some claim. In terms of considering ethos as a factor in 
understanding a political outcome, the concept is nearly entirely absent – with some 
exceptions, as I discuss below. 
 
Labour’s ethos, I argue in this study, is a determinant of party change relevant both to 
the ‘agenda’ or motivation for change, and the ‘content’ or outcome of the change 
process. An actor’s motivations can be affected both by their individual interpretation 
of Labour’s ethos – for instance, the extent to which the party as a whole should be 
involved in the process of change – and their perception of the dominant ethos within 
the party, for instance, the extent to which a change might cause such unease as to 
threaten an actor’s prioritisation of party unity and cohesion. Moving onwards to the 
outcome of political change processes, these factors remain relevant. An actor could 
have a change of heart, or pull back from the original motivations for change on the 
basis of their own beliefs that such an action risked going too far beyond the party’s 
traditions. Similarly, an actor may perceive the party’s dominant ethos as being 
resistant to their chosen strategy for change, and so amend their strategy accordingly.  
 
Importantly, these evaluations and judgements are not made in isolation, nor are they 
made just once. Labour’s ethos interacts with other determinants of party change – 
organisational factors or external political events, for example – which can affect how 
relevant Labour’s ethos is in an actor’s strategic calculations. This is incredibly 
dynamic, and political actors are evaluating their room for manoeuvre, their 
opportunities and limitations, all of the time. The party’s dominant ethos, an actor 
may perceive, could appear to block off an initiative at any given point, but following 
its interaction with an external shock, or a significant organisational change, an actor 
reassesses and can come to a different judgement. Understood in this way, ethos is 
not simply ‘the past’ or a set of traditions that can be jettisoned, but a set of 
competing traditions directly relevant to an actor’s strategies, interacting – like other 
determinants of party change – with other factors relevant to the actor. 
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The process I have described above is important in understanding how political 
change either does or does not happen. For example, Martin Smith rightly noted that, 
in Kinnock’s first parliament as Labour leader, his ‘problem’ was that ‘although he 
wanted change, he was constrained by both the party and his own past. Rather than 
changing policy, the manifesto was full of compromise and ambiguity’.157 The nature 
of Kinnock’s constraints can be more fully understood by an appreciation of Labour’s 
ethos – both Kinnock’s individual interpretation and the dominant interpretation. For 
in addition to his past, his record and his identity, Kinnock’s own take on Labour’s 
competing traditions was inwardly pragmatic and outwardly cautious. He prioritised 
unity and would not risk internal defeat. While organisationally he did not feel 
unassailable, equally important was his judgement about what the party could and 
could not ‘take’. His judgement on this matter was subject to constant re-evaluation, 
by both Kinnock and his team, and as his perception of the party mood shifted in a 
pragmatic direction, so too did his strategy. The same can be said of Blair’s 
judgements, though to a less extent than Kinnock’s. This is complimentary to other 
accounts of Labour’s political change, many of which focus on ideational agendas 
and outcomes. 
 
Driver and Martell saw a line of argument ‘drawn between those who see New 
Labour as marking continuity with revisionist social democratic politics and those 
who see it as having accommodated itself to the New Right’.158 Their analysis 
suggested New Labour was post-Thatcherite in ideology, drawing ‘on the Labour 
Party’s social democratic traditions while modifying them so as to reflect the 
economic and social challenges confronting British society, the legacy of 
Thatcherism and the need to win elections’.159 In terms of their consideration of the 
agenda for New Labour’s change, Driver and Martell offered a convincing synthesis, 
yet there is little consideration of other factors that may have affected New Labour’s 
outcomes. The stress was very firmly placed upon New Labour – even after two 
terms of office – being understood as existing within a ‘hybrid’160 social democratic 
tradition that was not ‘radically new’.161 Yet questions as to how New Labour’s 
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approach evolved, and the attention the New Labour leadership paid to the party’s 
ethos, were not attended to. 
 
Considering the approach of Blair’s predecessor, Smith argued that the changes 
during Neil Kinnock’s tenure were ‘not completely new but a continuation of a 
process initiated by Hugh Gaitskell… to modernise the party by identifying it as a 
national social democratic party’.162 Here, external factors – principally electoral 
consideration – incentivised a return to the ‘revisionist social democracy that 
dominated the Party from the 1950s to the 1970s’.163 The internal factor was the 
presence of an ideological tradition within the Labour Party considered – by the 
Kinnock leadership, in this instance – to be the more appropriate posture to a party 
seeking to form a government. Smith, along with Michael Kenny, also offered a 
slightly more complex take on New Labour which concluded that, while ‘the ethical 
socialist tradition has been mobilised in fairly conscious ways by [Blair’s] Labour’,164 
it was simultaneously ‘a long way from social democracy’ and ‘clearly not neo liberal 
in any straightforward sense’.165 All of these accounts posit change from the Labour 
programme of 1983, with the caveat that ‘change’ has involved some revisionist 
rediscovery. Yet, while Smith recognised the limitations placed upon Kinnock, 
overall there is only a limited appreciation of the effect of Labour’s ethos, and its 
competing traditions, in ideational explanatory strategies for Labour’s modernisation.  
 
The acceptance of Thatcherism as a paradigmatic shift, rather than the rediscovery of 
social democracy, is posited most clearly in Heffernan’s New Labour and 
Thatcherism where he argued that ‘modernisation is… a metaphor for the politics of 
“catch-up”, a reflection of a new political consensus, one informed not by post-war 
social democracy, but by Labour’s accommodation to and adaption of Thatcherism’s 
neo-liberal political agenda’.166 The minds of Labour people were deprioritised in 
Heffernan’s account. Indeed, he stressed that modernisation had been done to the 
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Labour Party rather than the Labour Party having modernised itself. ‘Taken in the 
round,’ Heffernan argued, ‘Labour did not so much change or modernise itself as it 
was changed by the impact of events. In short, where Thatcherism has led, the Labour 
Party… followed.’167 This was political change ‘wrought by events’,168 with the main 
event being the common sense established by the ideational hegemony of Margaret 
Thatcher and the Conservative Party. Heffernan did suggest that ‘a party’s propensity 
for change is coloured by its “genetic code”: its historical background, past 
ideological associations, traditional identity and the various expectations voters and 
political commentators have’.169 Yet, aside from a recognition that Kinnock left many 
policies ‘qualified rather than revised’170 in his first parliament as leader, this set of 
‘genetic code’ factors went relatively underexplored, with Heffernan’s central 
argument positing an uninhibited leadership marching to orders set by Thatcherism. 
The motives, in Heffernan’s account, were electoral and ideational. The outcome was 
driven by Thatcher’s ideological hegemony. 
 
Reviewing Heffernan’s study, Desai suggested that while Heffernan argued ‘Labour 
capitulated to Thatcherism’171 he had failed to explain why it did so. Heffernan did 
put forward points which seemingly relied, implicitly, on self-interest and rationality. 
For example, he noted Labour’s stance reflected ‘the Thatcherite political agenda. It 
is a form of accommodation to the prevailing orthodoxy… Labour counselled itself to 
embrace and work within the mood, aspirations and culture of Britain as it has 
become in the Thatcherite 1980s and the post-Thatcher 1990s’.172 Such a statement 
raises questions. Was it the intellectual power of the ideas that meant Labour 
embraced them? Or were these ideas overwhelmingly popular, making them the only 
route to power? Heffernan did provide answers, more explicitly, on the basis of self-
interest (in this case, to get elected) and rationality (in this case, the best way to get 
elected). ‘Labour’s gradual acknowledgment of an alteration in its electoral 
environment went hand in hand with the perception of a shift in the ideological 
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climate… the one reinforcing the other’,173 he noted. The ‘politics of catch-up’ theory 
attempted to bring together two things: an acceptance that parties alter their position 
to attract the median voter, along with an acceptance that parties can shape the 
preferences of voters. The crux of Heffernan’s argument was that Labour 
accommodated to the views of voters and to the success of Thatcherism in having 
shaped the ‘electoral environment’,174 rather than continuing with attempts to shape 
that environment themselves. Yet in both senses the motivations and main driver of 
outcomes for those ‘catching up’ – in this instance, Labour’s modernising leaders – 
remains electoral rationality, not the political ideas themselves.  
 
A more nuanced analysis from Colin Hay looked at the relationship between 
perceived economic reality and political ideas. Taking Anthony Downs’ economic 
theory of democracy, where political parties and voters are assumed to act logically in 
an electoral market place, Hay argued that a Downsian approach could not explain 
Labour’s modernisation, yet could describe it.175 In other words, Labour’s policy 
positions had converged with the Conservative Party’s during its period of 
modernisation, from Kinnock’s leadership onwards, but this convergence could not 
be explained by New Labour’s acceptance of Downsian logic. Rather: ‘It is not 
purely (perceived) electoral expediency that has dictated Labour’s neo-liberal 
conversion and convergence. Along with almost all of the (former) social democratic 
parties of western Europe… New Labour now accepts that there is simply no 
alternative to neoliberalism in an era of heightened capital mobility and financial 
liberalisation – in short, in an era of globalisation.’176 Yet, Hay did not argue for a 
deterministic economism, which would fail ‘to acknowledge the political “authoring” 
of processes such as globalisation’,177 as well as the political choices that were open 
to the Labour Party. In this sense, his analysis posited far greater political agency than 
Heffernan – specifically, greater on the part of Labour people – in considering 
arguments around globalisation, and in embracing them. In addition, Hay noted that a 
crude rationality applied to political parties would preclude ‘the possibility at a stroke 
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that political parties might engage in a cost-benefit analysis of the price (in terms of 
political convictions, ethos and tradition) at which electoral victory is bought’.178 
 
Andrew Hindmoor also injected agency and political creativity into his analysis of 
how New Labour ‘constructed’ the political space of ‘the centre’ through rhetoric, 
innovation, framing and leadership.179 Hindmoor’s argument differed significantly 
from the ‘politics of catch-up’ thesis. He noted that ‘whilst there is no alternative to 
the political centre there are alternative political centres… The critique [of New 
Labour] is that New Labour embraced a post-Thatcherite consensus when it did not 
need to do so, when it could have sought to construct an alternative understanding of 
the centre. The defence is that it has constructed just such an alternative 
understanding’.180 In relation to New Labour’s acceptance and embrace of ‘the 
centre’ as a spatial political identity, Hindmoor argued that New Labour presented 
itself ‘as a moderate party that has transcended the extremes of both the old Left and 
the new Right’.181 Yet this presentation was based not on a simple move to the centre, 
but rather a construction of it. ‘At any one time, the electorate may believe a 
particular policy to be at the political centre but this belief will be a constructed 
one,’182 Hindmoor noted. 
 
Depending on where an analysis of Labour starts – with its organisational or 
ideological scaffolding – the ‘how and why’ of modernisation can be different, 
though not necessarily because of ‘fundamental differences of interpretation’.183 Hay 
has noted that ‘were one to periodise Labour’s transformation… in terms of the 
development of policy, one might end up with a rather different mapping of the 
modernisation process over time than if one were to periodise the same process with 
respect to the structure and governance of the party’.184 This may seem obvious, but it 
is a point rarely made in the literature. To expand upon it, we can see Hay’s point in 
studies that offer either an organisational focus, or a synthesis which addresses a 
range of motivations and outcomes affected by a number of factors. Meg Russell’s 
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Building New Labour presented the ‘far-reaching reform’185 of Labour’s internal 
organisation during Labour’s modernisation. Russell questioned assumptions that 
Blair and New Labour marked a dramatic and undemocratic power grab through 
organisational and party structure reform, rightly noting that much change occurred 
under Kinnock and John Smith, Labour’s leader from 1992 to 1994. These changes 
were not without historical precedent either, certainly in practice. The assumption, 
Russell argued, ‘that Labour’s internal reform has resulted in a shift of power towards 
its leaders and away from its members… is thus found to be questionable at best’.186 
Organisationally, Russell argued for continuation between Kinnock and Blair, and 
indeed for an analysis of modernisation that took into account Labour’s mixed history 
with regard to internal democracy, and the absence of a halcyon participatory period. 
Absent the ideational starting point, and the role of Thatcherite ideological 
hegemony, this narrative of modernisation concludes that there was less internal 
upheaval than is often assumed. 
 
Challenging this view somewhat, and addressing a wider range of motivations and 
outcomes, Minkin drew attention to the ‘distinctive character, mechanisms and 
development of Blair’s party management’.187 By ‘party management’ Minkin did 
not mean a narrow definition of the form in which administration through 
institutional structures took – though that was a part of it – but a broader definition of 
management as being ‘the attempt to control problem-causing activities, issues and 
developments in order to ensure that outcomes were produced which the managers 
considered to be in the party’s best interests’.188 Minkin’s approach examined not 
only changes to internal organisation, rules and structures, but behaviour and 
practices, in all manner of political circumstances, which sought to manage any given 
situation in the interests of Blair – or, at least, how actors perceived his interests. The 
differences between Blair and Kinnock are accentuated in this approach. The agenda 
of those around Blair, Brown and Peter Mandelson meant ‘any uncircumscribed 
powers could become a potential problem. Any problem not under control could be a 
media embarrassment. Any protracted consultation was an attrition of leadership 
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energy. Any inhibitive traditional rules and customs were an obstacle to effective 
executive power’.189 This led to a desire for constant change and the centralisation of 
control, which Minkin argued ‘was at odds with much of the traditional Labour 
right’s practical reformism, which appreciated the potential costs of change as much 
as the benefits and understood the wisdom of settling immediate difficult problems 
before you plunged into others’.190 Minkin’s work was both a complex and important 
contribution to the literature on Labour’s modernisation. It clearly engaged with a 
broader range of motivations and factors affecting political outcomes, all 
painstakingly explained through a rich, detailed account of the actors involved, and 
their evolving strategic considerations.  
 
Using Minkin’s management frame – albeit one broadly defined – it is possible to 
interpret Labour’s modernisation in highly distinct phases, with Blair’s leadership 
bringing a distinctive style, and delivering outcomes shaped by both different 
motivations (in comparison to his predecessors) and internal restraints. Eric Shaw 
considered Minkin’s study to be one which focused on ‘the intersection between 
institutions, culture and power… [with] institutions as constituted by formal rules and 
procedures, routines, norms and conventions, and political action arising from the 
interplay between strategic calculation and institutional opportunities and 
restraints’,191 and this is broadly the approach Shaw himself took to analysing 
Kinnock’s period as leader. Shaw defined Kinnock’s motivations, described the 
strategies Kinnock employed, and analysed how outcomes were affected by a number 
of factors, including the identities of Labour Party people. Shaw set out Kinnock’s 
motivations for change as being the ‘triple crisis’192 of ideological collapse (during 
the Wilson/Callaghan government),193 a breakdown in leadership-supporting internal 
party democracy,194 and Labour’s ‘electoral crisis’ of consecutive defeats.195 
Kinnock’s strategy was presented as double-phased: the first parliament laid the 
necessary basis for party change through ‘tighter central control’.196 Until such 
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changes were embedded, and until Labour people were ready for greater 
programmatic change, Kinnock’s first parliament failed to significantly alter the 
party’s offer to the electorate. Shaw concluded that ‘in order to avoid antagonising 
opinion within the Party, policy shifts were often surreptitiously introduced – which 
greatly dulled the impact on a sceptical public, since messages which are not 
congruent with existing perceptions need to be openly and insistently proclaimed to 
have any effect’.197 
 
Kinnock’s second parliament marked a shift, with the Policy Review process being 
more systematic, and the arrival of what Shaw termed ‘post-revisionism’, with more 
modest aims – compared to ‘traditional’ Keynesian social democracy – of ‘abating 
social distress, extending individual opportunity and incremental improvements to the 
public services’.198 Writing prior to Blair’s period as leader of the opposition, Shaw’s 
account did not draw conclusions on what could be termed ‘different 
modernisations’, though in later work – which I return to later in this study – he did 
comment on the limitations of Kinnock’s project. Shaw’s work specifically on New 
Labour focused on Labour’s social democratic tradition, concluding that while New 
Labour retained a commitment to social justice – one half of the tradition – its 
commitment to fraternity and cooperation had been jettisoned. ‘The values of 
competition, individual self-assertion and “entrepreneurialism”, and not “fellowship, 
co-operation and service” are those that New Labour extols’.199 In selecting 
Gaitskell’s attempt at defining Labour’s creed, and suggesting it constituted a 
‘succinct and accurate description of Labour’s “soul”’,200 Shaw ultimately reached 
the same conclusion as Brivati when he noted that ‘Gaitskell embodied a strand of 
British politics now extinct’.201 
 
From the Left, and rooted in the Milibandian perspective, Panitch and Leys presented 
New Labour within the historical frame of social democracy being caught in the 
dilemma of seeking to transform society while simultaneously managing it, having 
accepted the democratic conventions of the modern state. They argued: ‘The internal 
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life of the social democratic parties had undergone a serious decline as a result of 
their integration into the institutions of “managed capitalism”. When the socialist 
vision gives way to the pragmatic management of capitalism, there is little scope or 
need for a party-based “counter-hegemonic” community.’202 Yet there is much more 
to their argument which posits great agency on the part of Blair, along with an 
attempt at explaining how different interpretations of Labour’s ethos affected New 
Labour’s motivations and reforms. On the latter point regarding ethos, they argued: 
‘[Labour’s ethos] contained a great deal that was archaic, formalistic and anti-
intellectual; but it also comprised some of the most egalitarian, humanistic, 
internationalist and brave elements of progressive British culture. Previous party 
leaders had been influenced by this ethos to different degrees: none was as untouched 
by it as Tony Blair… he operated in a milieu with a different ethos, that of 
professional politics based on higher education, management skills, and the culture of 
the communications industry. Some… more or less openly despised that of the old 
labour movement.’203 
 
While beginning from a different conception of Labour and its place in British 
politics, such arguments sit alongside Minkin’s in terms of the New Labour 
leadership’s approach to politics. Similarly, such a position invests Blair with great 
agency. His election as leader marked a ‘radical break with Labour’s past,’ Panitch 
and Leys argued, ‘New Labour’s big idea was to accept definitively that global 
capitalism, and the political power of global capital, was a permanent fact of life, so 
that socialism, if it still meant anything at all, was a set of values that should guide 
policy under capitalism, nothing more’.204 
 
Bale’s work on the Labour Party advocated analysis which combined empirical 
knowledge with ‘analytical theses on the nature of the Labour Party… [where] all 
those writing in this tradition stress the need to approach the Labour [Party] less as a 
party pure and simple and more as a political culture’.205 Bale used Drucker’s 
definition of ethos as his definition of political culture,206 and placed his own book on 
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the party ‘firmly in such an approach’,207 alongside Minkin and David Marquand. In 
exploring ‘why the British Left had been such an abject historical failure’,208 
Marquand posited the need for an electoral alliance between liberals and social 
democrats along with an ‘alignment of ideas’.209 Ideas matter in Marquand’s work, 
and motivations and outcomes are undoubtedly shaped, he argued, by ideological 
preferences. More important for this study, however, is Marquand’s argument that 
ethos, though ‘hard to catch on paper’ nevertheless ‘provides the better guide to the 
party’s behaviour’.210 This recognition led Marquand to conclude that Labour’s ethos, 
and a Labour person’s interpretation of and interaction with it, were critical to the 
process of modernisation, both in motivation and outcome. 
 
Marquand’s analysis of Kinnock, in particular, is a good example of this approach: 
 
‘The resilience of Labour’s ethos also provides a large part of the explanation 
for Kinnock’s victories over the Left. In a sense true of surprisingly few of his 
predecessors, Labour ethos was his ethos… The myths and symbols of 
Labourism, which he manipulated with such artistry, were his myths and 
symbols… As never before in this century, the Labour movement, the Labour 
culture, the values and practices which made up the Labour ethos, and the 
institutions which embodied those values and practices, were under attack 
[from Thatcherism] … Labour people saw this and, like Kinnock, drew the 
conclusion that the pursuit of electoral success should trump ideology. But if 
the resilience of the party’s ethos was an asset, it was also a handicap.’211 
 
As a ‘handicap’, Labour’s ethos made it difficult for the party ‘to respond sensitively 
and imaginatively to the new moods and new demands… it stood in the way of an 
open, responsive and pluralist politics appropriate to an increasingly diverse and 
heterogeneous culture’.212 This adoption of ethos as a determinant of party change is 
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an important part of the literature on Labour’s modernisation, and one I seek to build 
on with this study. Marquand fleshed out important considerations for party change in 
his analysis, including how the ethos of the party – and an individual’s interpretation 
of it – can both enable and frustrate different political strategies for change. He noted 
that symbols and myths can be utilised by political actors, but, as with Bale’s work, 
ethos was presented here as more than something ‘floating or sitting on top of 
practice or behaviour’, instead ‘they are seen to be part of it’.213 Ethos emerges, then, 
as a factor that should be treated like other, more widely used ideological 
determinants – such as doctrinal traditions.  
 
Marquand’s take on how Labour needed to change, post-Kinnock, ‘had more to do 
with culture and mentality than with policy or programme’.214 It had to ‘abandon 
tribalism, to give up the dream of single-party hegemony and to practise a politics of 
pluralism’.215 Yet, oddly following his rich understanding of Kinnock’s interpretation 
of Labour’s ethos, Marquand was rather light on what Blair made of it, what his own 
interpretation was, and how that impacted upon New Labour’s trajectory. While 
doctrinally New Labour was ‘not, in any obvious sense, social-democratic or social-
liberal’,216 Marquand argued it remained similar to ‘Old Labour’: ‘The Labour tribe 
had moved into new ideological territory, but it was still the same old tribe with the 
same old culture. It hunted new prey in new ways, but performed the same war 
dances and carried the same totems.’217 This is a starkly contrasting conclusion to that 
of Panitch and Leys, though echoes Bale’s conclusion that, on welfare policy in his 
study, New Labour appeared to follow a well-established Labour Party practice of 
sending ‘signals of good faith to those forces that caused previous Labour 
governments so many problems… one does not have to buy into the far-left critique 
of Labourism to suggest that the Labour Party under Tony Blair is not so much sui 
generis as reverting perhaps to type’.218 
 
Such an argument was highlighted by Diamond as one of three general narratives on 
New Labour. In addition to the accommodation with Thatcherism (which I addressed 
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earlier in this chapter) and Labour being a site of paradoxes and overlapping 
ideational discourses, there is the view that Labour ‘has always been moderate, 
pragmatic and reformist in government. New Labour was hardly an exception, 
pursuing programmes which ensured that financial stability and a growing economy 
would generate budget surpluses to be used for redistributive objectives’.219 Yet while 
I agree this is a recognisable tradition within Labour’s ethos, Marquand’s analysis of 
New Labour and Tony Blair overlooked the competing traditions that exist, and how 
these can affect an actor’s motives and the outcome of political change. One can see 
continuity in Labour’s ethos, and in an actor’s engagement with it, but unlike with 
Marquand’s analysis of Kinnock, his description of Blair’s early leadership fell back 
on a purely institutional understanding of ethos, understood as a ‘drag’ on progress. 
 
Broadly, such a stance can also be seen in Cronin’s work, though he also concluded 
that New Labour sought to ditch the ‘Old’ traditions. As I noted earlier, Cronin 
suggested the leadership of New Labour undertook ‘a kind of Kulturkampf aimed at 
displacing the party’s inherited political culture’ resulting in the Blair and Brown 
teams mounting ‘a frontal assault on the party’s traditions. In so doing the 
modernisers took considerable risks’.220 To support this argument, Cronin noted that 
‘Blair as party leader would repeatedly reiterate his sceptical stance toward the 
party’s past and towards the myths of both the left and the right. Characteristically, he 
remained decidedly unwilling to embrace fully even the most celebrated moment in 
the party’s mythic history… the Labour victory in 1945’.221 Yet, while Blair did 
argue for a greater appreciation of the liberal roots of the welfare state introduced by 
the postwar Labour government, I don’t believe Blair – certainly the early Blair – was 
unwilling to embrace the 1945 government, nor many of Labour’s traditions. Indeed, 
what has become something of a Labour Party adage was expressed repeatedly by 
Blair as Leader of the Opposition and as Prime Minister: ‘The 1945 Labour 
government was the greatest peacetime government this century.’222 The 1945 
government had a ‘remarkable record’, its leaders ‘were statesman of enormous and 
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enduring stature’, it ‘shaped the political agenda for a generation’ and ‘not to be 
forgotten, it won the hearts and minds of millions of voters’.223  
 
Selectivity in historical assessment, which Blair and New Labour were steeped in, 
should not be confused with an unwillingness to embrace the party’s ‘myths’ and 
traditions. If there is a myth of the 1945 Labour government, Blair furthered it, albeit 
to a lesser extent than others. I think Cronin was right to argue that Labour’s 
dominant ethos is one ‘reluctant to abandon the goals and the rhetoric bequeathed by 
its past. It was a party long on loyalty, rich in traditional lore, weak on theory and 
determined to achieve and maintain a recognition not only of its claims to represent 
“the people” but of the inherent social worth of the particular interests, and values, it 
sought to represent’.224 However, to argue that Blair – as Leader of the Opposition – 
mounted a frontal assault on these kinds of practices and traditions is to, perhaps, read 
too much into the personal motivations of some of New Labour’s leading lights – 
who were undoubtedly dismissive of many of these practices – and to read too little 
into both their chosen strategies and to political outcomes.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As Shaw noted in his study of the Kinnock modernisation period, ‘rational choice 
theories that analyse political parties as aggregates of individuals pursuing their own 
goals fail to appreciate that the behaviour of their members is also shaped by 
organisational culture’.225 This insight has been insufficiently recognised and realised 
in literature on Labour’s modernisation.226 Why Labour’s modernising trajectory 
followed the particular route that it did – linear in some ways, zig-zagging in others – 
is not satisfactorily explained by either an avowed acceptance of a New Right 
paradigm nor a coldly electoral acceptance of a different social reality. Undoubtedly, 
as Kavanagh has argued, these factors are relevant to explaining Labour’s 
modernisation. ‘Changes in social structure… [and] the decline of manufacturing and 
globalisation of capital markets meant that parties of the left had to rethink their role,’ 
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while ‘the political choices and skills of Blair and Brown were also important’.227 But 
to see these in isolation from their interaction with Labour’s ethos – including the 
choices of Blair and Brown – is to ignore a factor which shapes both the agenda for, 
and outcome of change.  
 
In terms of the narratives around Blair, Brown and New Labour, the absence of ethos 
as a determinant of party change has led to two omissions. The first is the political 
strategy which the ‘modernisers’ adopted upon taking over the leadership of the 
party. Far from ignoring the party’s ethos – or even seeking to destroy it – this study 
argues that New Labour in opposition often worked within it. A focus in the literature 
‘on action rather than abstraction, reflecting New Labour’s typically pragmatic view 
that “what matters is what works”’228 is, perhaps, indicative of the New Labour 
Government, post-2001, which appeared to be (at times) ideologically unanchored. 
But it is not the lesson today’s ‘modernisers’ should take from Blair’s period as a 
leader on the way up. Second, and linked to the first point, is that in overlooking 
Blair’s strategies in opposition, one misses out on a very different characterisation of 
Blair as a leader. It has been said that there is ‘no New Labour, only New Labours’.229 
This study argues for seeing different phases of Blair and a distinct New Labour 
strategy in opposition with regard to the party and its ethos. 
 
This chapter has argued for an understanding of ‘ethos’ as shared and competing 
traditions, comprised of beliefs and practices. Ethos, based on Drucker’s concept but 
significantly adapted, is considered to be a distinct determinant of party change. It is 
not my objective, however, to reify ethos or traditions above other factors, whether 
they be ideational, material or institutional. Exploring the existing literature, this 
chapter has argued that both the presence and effect of Labour’s ethos is relatively 
absent from analysis of Labour’s modernisation. The next chapter presents what this 
study considers to be the substance of Labour’s ethos, before exploring – through 
case studies in subsequent chapters – how different interpretations of Labour’s ethos, 
both individual and dominant, shaped Labour’s modernisation. 
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Chapter 2 
Fault lines: different interpretations of Labour’s ethos 
 
‘There were six persons present, and consequently six sections of the party were represented.’ 
W. Morris, News from Nowhere and Other Writings 
 
 ‘This Moses was in no position furiously to break the tablets of the law when, on descending from 
Sinai, he found his followers worshipping the golden bull. On the contrary he was compelled to write 
worship of the golden bull into his script.’ 
Edmund Dell, A Strange Eventful History 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter is concerned with the substance of the competing traditions within 
Labour’s ethos. Conflicts and tensions were mentioned in early reviews of Drucker’s 
work, between the party’s ‘working class ethos’ and its ‘revisionist and 
parliamentary’230 elements, and between its parliamentary and non-parliamentary 
wings.231 Yet there is much more in Drucker’s Doctrine and Ethos which this study 
draws upon, building a distinctive analytical approach to analysing the actions of 
Labour Party people. From Drucker’s original insight, one can see the controversial 
and disruptive nature of competing and conflicting traditions. These enduring debates 
exist around what I call fault lines – divisive issues where differences of opinion 
exist, and with consequences for the direction Labour takes and the choices of its 
actors. 
 
There are four key fault lines considered here: debates surrounding Party Objects, 
with Labour being a party in need of a creed while simultaneously being antagonised 
by ‘doctrinaires’ (the fault line named ‘Objects’); controversy over emblematic and 
totemic policies, with their emblematic nature being defended by some and 
challenged by others (Emblems); the enduring factional warfare over internal 
democracy and who makes decisions within the Labour Party (Decisions); and the 
near-constant dispute between those Labour Party people who accuse their colleagues 
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and comrades of unrealistic idealism, versus those who level accusations of power 
without principle (Outsiders). This chapter roots the study’s fault line framework in 
Labour’s history, showing the enduring nature of the competing traditions which 
Drucker explored, or simply inferred. It presents a more systematic explanation of the 
content of Labour’s ethos, taking each fault line in turn. This provides the basis for 
understanding how political actors comprehend their party’s ethos, and how the 
competing traditions within it affect their actions. First, though, it’s important to 
address more recent observations of the validity of Drucker’s analysis – written and 
published in the late 1970s – for a more contemporary, more middle-class Labour 
Party. 
 
Different types of Labour Party people 
 
In their study of the rise and fall of the SDP, Crewe and King noted that, of those who 
broke from Labour, most ‘had not been all that tightly bound to it in the first place. 
Most of the defectors were MPs who happened to be Labour, rather than pillars of the 
labour movement who happened also to be MPs’.232 This is a familiar description, 
and one often offered up by different Labour Party people – ‘I was born into this 
party’ or ‘I chose this party’ – as to their ‘origins’ as a Labour Party person. 
Drucker’s 1979 book, and his concept of ethos, is one firmly based on the idea that 
Labour’s ethos emanates from the British working class, the trade unions and 
communities closely connected to that movement.233 Again, broadly two types of 
Labour Party people appear in Drucker’s thoughts: those who have a lived experience 
of the ethos of the organised working class, and those from other classes who seek to 
understand it, but can never relate to it in quite the same way. 
 
In their 2002 study looking at the views and associated activities of Labour Party 
members, Syed and Whiteley noted that while Drucker’s work suggested a ‘working-
class, trade unionist culture… [that] is very much the culture of the past. A 
contemporary study would not draw a similar conclusion. At its grassroots the Labour 
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Party is now neither a working-class nor a trade union party’.234 Syed and Whiteley 
concluded that the ‘party must have been recruiting large numbers of the middle class 
in the mid-1990s’,235 though they also noted that middle-class upsurges had been 
reported in the 1960s and 1970s, and that sufficient demographic data on the party 
membership for the pre-1990 period did not exist.236 Their data was clear, though, 
that the Labour membership in 1997 was less trade unionist.237 Syed and Whiteley 
were clearly right to revisit Drucker’s position that Labour’s ethos arises from the 
experience of the British working class, one of exploitation238 and the gradual 
building up of defensive institutions against both private capital and the state.239 Most 
obviously this claim seems questionable at the point when Syed and Whiteley were 
researching – and when two thirds of Labour Party members were not in a trade 
union.240 Yet there is also some confusion as to what Drucker meant about working 
class experience. On the one hand, as McKibbin noted, ‘the Edwardian Labour Party 
was overwhelmingly working-class in its social origins; it was one of the few 
European working-class parties where there was an almost exact social identity 
between its leadership and those likely to support it. Nothing suggests that middle-
class influence was important in its rank and file, and the parliamentary party was 
wholly working class’.241 This would reinforce one understanding of Drucker’s 
argument – that Labour, from its origins, was overwhelmingly rooted in the organised 
working-class and its people. 
 
Yet elsewhere McKibbin noted that, following the adoption of Clause IV in 1918, 
Labour began to follow two strategies: ‘One was to be unambiguously a party of the 
working class – to protect its interests and institutions before anything else. The other 
was to be a party of the useful classes, people of goodwill who by their productive 
efforts served the wider interests of society.’242 Such a dual approach meant that, 
from the very beginning, Labour brought together representatives of the organised 
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working class alongside ‘idealists’, intellectuals and committed socialist activists. 
Drucker argued that ‘the party allows middle-class intellectuals (of both right and 
left) to give voice to its ideas, but there can be little doubt as to whose ideas we 
hear’.243 However, in the case of Clause IV of the party’s constitution, the ideas of 
middle class recruits were heard, while trade unionists accepted a compromise. 
Drucker also suggested that Labour’s ethos ‘incorporates sets of values which spring 
from the experience of the British working class’.244 Such language – ‘spring from’– 
is more suggestive of values emanating from Labour’s working-class heartlands 
(heartlands which, for the most part, Labour continues to represent into the 21st 
century) and subsequently adopted, interpreted and then inscribed into the institution 
of the Labour Party. Being working class may not be open to recruitment, but being 
socialised into an institution inscribed with the values and traditions of working class 
communities is quite possible. Indeed, while the membership demographics in the 
Labour Party have undoubtedly changed, as they have in the constituencies voting for 
Labour MPs, the party remains rooted, through the constituency link, to ‘Labour’s 
heartlands’. In this sense, Drucker’s insights are not necessarily less pertinent simply 
because there are fewer trade union members in its membership ranks. 
 
Tony Blair provided a snapshot of both his constituency experience and his wider 
Labour Party experience in his memoir: ‘I would visit the Dun Cow pub in Sedgefield 
Village or the working men’s club. People were friendly but also respectful of the fact 
I was out for a pint or two and to relax… we [Blair’s friends and associates from 
Sedgefield Constituency Labour Party] would chat, go through the constituency 
problems, and I would take their temperature on the big issues of the day… 
Sedgefield was a “northern working-class” constituency, except that when you 
scratched even a little beneath the surface, the definitions didn’t quite fit… They 
drank beer; they also drank wine. They went to the chippy; they also went to 
restaurants… This was a different Britain, and one in which I felt at home.’245 Here, 
Blair perceived a ‘traditional’ Labour seat evolving, not fitting the ‘stereotype’ he 
imagined or deciphered from the media, yet still rooted in the traditions of the 
organised working class. That this perception reaffirmed his personal political stance 
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– that of a Labour Party out-of-touch with a newer, upwardly mobile working class – 
is perhaps not coincidental. Blair, in part, undoubtedly set about finding what he was 
looking for. Yet Sedgefield remained, for Blair the Labour MP and eventually party 
leader and Prime Minister, a connection to the values of Labour’s heartlands, and an 
experience of ‘practical’ knowledge and socialisation in particular traditions. 
 
In terms of Labour Party politics, Blair learnt early lessons in how political actors 
should speak and act, and the role Labour Party people were expected to play – 
particularly politicians. For example, the early Blair was critical of Tony Benn – ‘he 
was in love with his role as idealist, as standard bearer, as the man of principle 
against the unprincipled careerist MPs… he was the preacher, not the general’246 – 
but also awestruck by Benn’s capacity to speak. ‘I sat enraptured,’ he wrote, 
recollected a Benn speech, ‘absolutely captivated and inspired.’247 He was socialised, 
therefore, not in the traditions of speaking hard truths to a party out of power, but of 
‘speaking the language’. ‘There is no point,’ Blair wrote, ‘in being right about an 
organisation’s failings if you have lost the ability to persuade it of them. You have to 
speak the language in order to change the terms of the debate conducted in that 
language.’248 This was language steeped in the principles of loyalty, solidarity, and 
forging connections with working class communities along with their shared 
traditions and histories. 
 
This is all very much a part of Drucker’s original thesis. A wrong-headed attempt to 
‘speak frankly’ (which I return to in a later chapter) resulted, in Blair’s words, in an 
audience of ‘faces grimacing as if a thousand lemons had been forced down their 
throats’.249 Such a conclusion – one of continued relevance for Drucker’s original 
insights – is reinforced by the enduring nature of Labour’s competing traditions, from 
the period this study analyses to the present day. Drucker’s delineation of Labour’s 
ideology between doctrine and ethos remains, therefore, critical to our understanding 
of how and why Labour follows particular political trajectories. Despite significant 
shifts in the ‘type’ of person joining the Labour Party, the continued existence of fault 
                                                 
246 Blair, A Journey, pp.36-37. 
247 Ibid., p.37. 
248 Ibid., p.49. 
249 Ibid., p.45. 
 72 
lines in the party’s ethos – such as debates over party democracy – suggests that its 
traditions endure.  
 
Fault lines in Labour’s ethos 
 
Throughout Doctrine and Ethos, Drucker referenced tensions and points of 
disagreement within the Labour Party. He argued that there existed within Labour’s 
ethos a suspicion of parliament and government alongside an avowed acceptance of 
parliamentary sovereignty.250 That is to say that Labour’s ethos contains a tradition 
which questions, foundationally, whether parliamentary democracy enables a gradual 
shift to socialism or instead blocks the radical movement necessary to bring it about. 
Simultaneously there is the more classically liberal tradition, one that believes in the 
parliamentary model not only for the purposes of representation, but for the powers it 
holds to bring about social improvement. On the one hand, Drucker noted that Labour 
was ‘a very respectable party’,251 accepting the norms and democratic traditions of 
Britain. On the other, he suggested that some Labour people caution ideological and 
organisational suffocation from an ‘establishment’, as with Tony Benn’s arguments 
that ‘ministers become the servants rather than the masters of the machinery’.252  
 
Closely linked to the place of parliamentary democracy in Labour’s ethos are claims 
of ‘oppositionism’, a tendency that values being out of office. ‘It is not surprising,’ 
Drucker argued, ‘that we have in the Parliamentary Labour Party the last great 
defenders of parliamentary democracy. No other system offers such a prominent role 
to those who merely criticise and attack.’253 Prioritising parliament as the place to 
condemn and to campaign, then, means that for a ‘very large section of the party the 
most comfortable place to be is on the Opposition front bench’.254 Further, this 
oppositional ‘organisational glue’ means that, for Labour’s unity of purpose, ‘it has a 
real stake… in remaining out’.255 
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Suspicion of the system, and of Labour people who then enter the system, emanates 
from what Drucker called ‘an outsiders’ ideology’,256 one that dictates the need for a 
strategy for managing the strains of parliamentary democracy. This can be seen in 
what Drucker called manifestoism:257 an attempt to bind all of the Labour Party to 
doctrine agreed by conference, and to bind the instruments of the state to the 
democratic will of the Labour movement, should it be elected. A failure of 
manifestoism – due to its unworkable nature, which I return to below and in Chapter 
5 – is the generation of perennial accusations of betrayal. Failure to implement an 
aspect of the manifesto results in the placement of ‘all the blame for the failure on the 
minister or Ministry concerned. The Minister is said to have betrayed the 
movement’.258 For Labour, Britain’s democratic institutions and practices are at the 
centre of disagreements and retellings of the party’s past. 
 
The same applies to the nature of Labour’s objectives and strategies. Labour’s 
working class ethos has led to a ‘defensive’ character,259 yet alongside attitudes of 
practicability and gradualism is a sense that Labour is, too, at the centre of a struggle. 
Labour’s ethos contains within it a shared project, of sorts, in the negation of 
exploitation – and the struggle between the labouring classes and capital.260 Labour is 
distinguished from the Conservative Party in its pre-occupation with change and with 
purpose: how to refashion and reformulate ideas, or assiduously defend others, in 
order to amend society. This less generous view of Labour’s opponents sees a pre-
occupation with defending existing institutions and structures that are already 
powerful. It’s an all-together less frantic politics. It isn’t a ‘struggle’. Edmund Dell 
encapsulates this part of Labour’s mindset well when he says: ‘The Labour Party was 
the party of hope, the Conservative Party that of management.’261 This is not, 
however, an uncomplicated debate. The idea of Labour’s forward-thinking 
progressivism in contrast to conservatism being ‘backward-looking’,262 it has been 
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recently argued, is in itself ‘progressive, seeing time as a linear construct along which 
we must either progress or make a futile attempt to retreat’.263 
 
Regardless, among Labour people the form ‘the struggle’ should take is another 
tension in Labour’s ethos. The existence of competing, and indeed conflicting 
traditions within Labour’s ethos – in addition to the shared practices I noted in the 
introduction – springs from Drucker’s work. Yet what emerges is a collection of 
contradictions, dilemmas and paradoxes presented in an unsystematic way. Drucker 
did not explicitly draw out these competing traditions, nor did he expand upon them 
and consider their impact on Labour’s political trajectory over time. His stimulating 
work, therefore, invites an approach which draws out core themes and turns them into 
more systematic fault lines – divides within the party which help us understand 
conflict and change. My analysis of Drucker’s work draws out four key themes, 
which this chapter will now expand upon, categorising the tensions as fault lines.  
 
Fault line 1: Objects - clarifying Labour’s aims and values 
 
Drucker’s appraisal of Labour’s theoretical basis was a negative one. ‘The Labour 
Party’s ideology,’ he argued, ‘does not contain a sufficiently coherent theory of the 
state or of our politics.’264 Furthermore, Labour had ‘signally failed… to argue out 
what is meant by “achieving socialism”, and hence it has no guide for its 
representatives once they are in office’.265 This is a point made by other experienced 
observers and analysts of the Labour Party, who have noted Labour’s status as ‘a 
party of values, but often not of ideas’.266 Drucker argued for more analysis and 
consideration of Labour ‘ministers’ lack of a theoretical vocabulary in which 
satisfactorily to pursue their socialism and to explain their actions in this pursuit to 
their own activists’.267 Drucker did not argue that Labour’s problem was a mismatch 
of workers and their ethos, and intellectuals and their doctrines.268 Instead, where 
Gramsci wrote that ‘all men are intellectuals… but not all men have in society the 
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function of intellectuals’,269 Drucker posited that all people are intellectuals, but 
within the Labour Party they are subject to a ‘constraining’270 ethos which limits that 
function. This constrains what Drucker viewed as the need for ‘redefinition’.271 
 
This is not easily solvable, leading to a fault line in the party’s ethos between those 
who prioritise ideological clarity – typically through amended Party Objects found in 
the party constitution – and those who deem such activity to be divisive, unnecessary 
and out of kilter with the dominant ethos of the Labour Party. Commenting on Hugh 
Gaitskell’s failure to rewrite Clause IV, Drucker noted that Labour’s leaders must 
maintain an ideology which guides its view of socialism at the same time as 
maintaining ‘an ethos which keeps its activists at their task’.272 Gaitskell and his 
followers, according to Drucker, pretended ‘the second… does not exist’.273 
According to Drucker, Labour is a party in need of a doctrine while simultaneously 
being antagonised by ‘doctrinaires’.274 The dilemma posed to leaders by this fault line 
emerges repeatedly in Drucker’s work. Labour’s ‘catholicity’, we are told, is a ‘sign 
of strength’.275 To ask ‘what is the “real socialism” in the ideology is to ask the 
wrong question; it is also to demonstrate an intolerant temperament, a temperament 
out of harmony with the ethos of the party’.276 Yet without such questions, ‘the 
thinness of the [Labour] ideology’277 becomes an inhibitor to progressive change. 
 
Socialism, that ‘volatile creed which embraces the ideas and nostrums of prophets so 
dissimilar as Marx and Ruskin, Keir Hardie and Chairman Mao, Stalin and G. 
Orwell’,278 was one of the driving forces of the political dynamism, extremism and 
volatility seen in the 19th and 20th Centuries. The power of ideas, Tony Judt argued, 
meant ‘the twentieth century was the century of the intellectual’.279 Yet not in the 
Labour Party. As R. H. Tawney noted, ‘unlike some of the continental versions of 
Socialism, it [Labour’s] was not poured into doctrinal moulds prepared, when the 
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industrial revolution was still young, by political theorists... It developed as the 
product of a fusion between the experience of an already vigorous trade unionism and 
the work of organisations and individuals, like the Fabian Society and the Webbs, 
engaged in the empirical terre-à-terre investigation of capitalist diseases and the 
remedies for them’.280 This fusion bequeathed an uncertain ideological inheritance, 
where different interpretations of the party’s purpose result in varying levels of 
priority given to doctrinal debate. As Desai argued, the conditional allegiance of 
intellectuals to Labour was matched ‘by a conditional welcome on the part of the 
trade-unionist and working class Labour Party. Labour’s origins had been empirical 
and undoctrinaire’.281 
 
For the century that Labour’s ‘creed’ has featured in its constitution, two episodes are 
synonymous with controversy over Party Objects, under which the original Clause 
IV, part ‘d’ was presented. The first is Gaitskell’s doomed attempt at altering these 
objects in the period 1959-60. The second is Tony Blair’s successful reform of Clause 
IV, and the presentation of the party’s revised ‘Aims and Values’ in the months 
following his election as party leader in 1994. Political scientists and historians have 
analysed both the doctrinal connections between these two events, the contrasting 
political contexts of the time, the party’s attachment to ‘traditions’ and ‘myth’, and 
the ideological differences between Gaitskell and Blair. Yet academic work hasn’t 
considered why some Labour people prioritise reform of Party Objects, while others 
– still committed to change more broadly – shy away from it. And where attempts at 
doctrinal connections over decades have proven challenging to draw, similarities and 
differences in relation to ethos are overlooked. 
 
Building on Drucker’s approach, this study will argue that a fault line within 
Labour’s ethos means some Labour people prioritise revising statements of aims and 
values – to reinforce a vision for the party – while others consider such activity to be 
relatively unimportant in the political race of policy decisions and day-to-day 
victories and defeats. On the latter, this should not be taken to mean or imply that 
some Labour Party people do not believe in anything. Indeed, those who deprioritise 
internal ideological struggle often believe strongly in unity. They believe very 
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strongly in values and in notions like ‘fairness’. It is somewhat paradoxical that, as 
Orwell put it in Keep the Aspidistra Flying, one can be ‘socialist in a vehement but 
ill-defined way’.282 Orwell had in mind those like an ‘ardent Nonconformist who had 
transferred his allegiance from God to Marx, and in doing so had got mixed up with a 
gang of vers libre poets’.283 Yet the point stands not just for ‘muddled’ socialists, or 
those wrestling with strands of political philosophy (like equality) which have been 
debated for centuries, but also for those who ‘opt-out’ of debates on Party Objects, 
preferring the vagaries of Labour’s ‘practical socialism’. In addition, as Drucker 
noted, those who deprioritise theoretical revision consider such activity to be 
potentially divisive. Connected to these interpretations is a greater willingness among 
the former (those who prioritise revision) to challenge Labour’s doctrinal traditions, 
as well as to posit the significance of ideological clarity for both a party’s sense of 
purpose and its political identity. In a speech in Nottingham making the case for 
revision of the party’s constitution, Gaitskell argued that Labour’s aims and values 
were not ‘meaningless phrases about which it is fruitless to argue… it is not mere 
theology’.284 In Gaitskell’s sights were not fellow doctrinaires on the other side of the 
argument, but Labour people who did not think courting the controversy was a 
worthwhile endeavour. This is an example of the competing narratives associated 
with this fault line. 
 
In terms of my focus on Party Objects, I have consciously sought to more clearly 
define this fault line for the purposes of analysis. As Charlotte Riley has argued, 
‘principles are nebulous and hard to locate historically’,285 and this study does not 
attempt to analyse whether Labour people are principled or unprincipled, or to 
categorise people as socialist theoreticians or as being entirely unanchored to 
ideology. A focus on deciding whether or not to engage with Labour’s Party Objects 
offers a more consistent guide to differing views on the prioritisation of ideological 
clarification. Labour’s creed has featured in its constitution since 1918. It has been at 
the centre of ideological confrontation and offers a suitable basis for comparison, 
while allowing one to observe the different approaches to party change. As Roy 
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Hattersley noted of the Aims & Values process, which this study analyses, ‘the chance 
to construct the “ideological framework”, about which Tony Crosland and I had 
talked so often, was too good to miss. It was not until later that I realised… Neil 
[Kinnock] was less an ideologue than party manager’.286 On this basis I develop a 
typology for analysing the relative prioritisation given to Party Objects, which I use 
in Chapter 3. This typology presents three potential strategies for actions which seek 
to engage with the party’s creed: ‘substitution’, advocating the replacement of 
Labour’s existing creed with something different; ‘addition’, adding to existing 
political thought while simultaneously reaffirming existing objects; and ‘addition 
with silent substitution’, a blend of the two, giving greater prominence to the new 
addition to Labour’s creed.287 
 
Fault line 2: Emblems - deeply-rooted policies symbolic of Labour’s identity 
 
Connected to the absence of a coherent, formal creed to guide Labour’s politics, 
Drucker contended that there are some Labour Party policies which play a role in 
‘solidifying the ethos of the party’.288 Drucker was referring to nationalisation, which 
through its manifestation in the original Clause IV became a symbol for Labour 
people that ‘the party remains true to its ethos’.289 Gaitskell found to his cost just how 
strong such an attachment could become. To Drucker, Clause IV wasn’t only a 
symbol, it meant the party held ‘true to its past, true to what its originators wanted it 
to be: for labour and against capital’.290 In other words, it was distinctive and 
connected to a person’s socialist faith. For this fault line I am using the word 
‘emblem’, defined in the OED as a ‘heraldic device or symbolic object as a 
distinctive badge of a nation, organization, or family’ and ‘serving as a symbol of a 
particular quality or concept’. Many policies can be ‘symbols’ in the sense of 
politicians looking for a ‘symbolic’ policy to represent a particular narrative or policy 
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thrust – for example, a banker’s bonus tax to evidence a response to the financial 
crash. In choosing the word ‘emblem’, and referring to a policy’s emblematic and 
symbolic quality, I am seeking greater meaning than can be inferred from the word 
‘symbol’. An emblem, understood here, is a distinctive thing – in this case, a policy – 
which symbolizes identity and is connected to a mission or cause. 
 
Other themes from Drucker’s work, which I mentioned earlier in this chapter, are 
relevant here. Some policies connect with the idea of Labour’s struggle. They can 
also come to represent an idealised image of both past and future. Tudor Jones has 
used the term ‘political myth’ in his study of Clause IV and the party’s commitment 
to public ownership. Political myth, in Jones’ words, meant ‘a dominant, inspirational 
idea that motivates a political group, galvanizing its thought and actions’.291 He 
expanded: ‘This emotional, non-rational essence of myths carries with it, therefore, 
the implication that they are fundamentally matters of faith. Indeed, this is the source 
of their strength.’292 As well as the emotional strength and inspirational nature of the 
idea, Jones noted the interlocking nature of myth with an account of the past and a 
related vision of the future. ‘A political myth,’ he argued, ‘has two distinct 
dimensions. Looking back, it develops an account of the past; looking forward, it 
projects a vision of the future.’293 Jones did not see the word ‘myth’ as suggestive of 
fantasy or unreality.294 Indeed, he noted the work of Henry Tudor which depicts myth 
as always involving ‘a narrative of events in dramatic form’295 while also offering a 
‘complete reversal of a certain state of affairs within the world’.296  In seeking to offer 
a more general definition, Tudor wrote: 
 
‘A political myth, as I understand it, is one which tells the story of a political 
society. In many cases, it is the story of a political society that existed or was 
created in the past and which must now be restored or preserved. In other 
cases, it concerns a political society destined to be created in the future, and it 
is told for the purpose of encouraging men to hasten its advent….  
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‘Like all other myths, a political myth explains the circumstances of those to 
whom it is addressed. It renders their experience more coherent; it helps them 
understand the world in which they live. And it does so by enabling them to 
see their present condition as an episode in an ongoing drama… it may help 
strengthen the solidarity of the group in the face of a major challenge.’297  
 
Labour’s use of its past can be a powerful tool in internal debates and external 
presentation, as was noted earlier in this study. Jobson and Wickham-Jones have 
noted how the party’s attachment to nostalgia can ‘involve the mobilisation of visual 
representations and symbols, the use of traditions and rituals as well as appeals to 
norms and rules’.298 Jobson has argued that nostalgia – sentimental longing for the 
past – can provide ‘social, political and economic guidance’299 to a political party. 
This insight is very relevant to understanding how particular policies come to 
represent a Labour person’s socialist faith. An attachment to emblems involves a 
powerful retelling of both the Labour Party’s and Britain’s pasts. In the case of public 
ownership, the germ of the policy – while much disputed – is contained in the party’s 
constitution, forged at a moment where the labour movement had an opportunity to 
challenge the forces of capital through parliamentary representation. The policy’s 
‘heyday’ is often considered to be the first majority Labour Government, where 
Attlee’s administration built institutions of the welfare state and sought to nationalise 
selected industries. It is inextricably tied, therefore, to the party’s origins and creed 
(the source of Harold Wilson’s ‘taking genesis out of the bible’ comment) and to 
achievements which Labour people are particularly proud. These measures were 
achieved – importantly for Labour people – in the face of opposition from the 
Conservative enemy. Following the post-war Labour government, public ownership 
also became highly relevant to factionalism, between the Gaitskellites, the Bevanites, 
and their heirs.  
 
This leads me to the typology I use in this study to categorise a policy as emblematic 
within the Labour Party. Such policies fulfil four criteria: a strong socialist heritage, 
meaning the policy touches upon traditionally strong socialist themes, connected to 
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an element or elements of the party’s origins; a stark contrast with the Conservatives, 
meaning the policy creates a clear dividing line between Labour and their main 
opposition; an adhesive quality, meaning that – owing to evidence of significant 
support for the policy in the Labour Party – the policy has the potential to unite 
Labour people, even if it is on the basis that those opposed to the policy fear that 
changing it would create division. It becomes part of the party’s ‘glue’, something 
that can be particularly important when other parts of the party’s programme or 
organisation are undergoing changes; and finally relevance to factionalism, meaning 
the policy is connected to groups of Labour people who identify in opposition to one 
another. I apply this typology to nuclear weapons policy in Chapter 4. These 
characteristics combine to make a policy both symbolic and emblematic, and are at 
the centre of this fault line in Labour’s ethos: between Labour people who accept that 
some of the party’s policies are symbolic and untouchable, and those who see such 
attachments as either an ideological shortcoming or an obstacle to ‘common sense’ 
pragmatism. 
 
Fault line 3: Decisions - the parliamentary party and internal democracy 
 
As I noted earlier, the double problem of concern with democratic control300 on the 
one hand, and the (some would perceive) dilemma of principles and power on the 
other, led the Labour Party to conceive of what Drucker called ‘manifestoism’, a 
practice that ‘is about representation first of all and only secondarily, and indirectly, 
about governing’.301 The reason for the resort to manifestoism is, according to 
Drucker, the absence of a guiding political theory, a fault line I explained above. 
Manifestoism’s undoing is its fundamental clash with parliamentary democracy, and 
the fact that Cabinet government perceives and engages the political world in a 
fundamentally different way to ‘how it appears to the majority of delegates at party 
conferences’.302 Manifestos are, in Drucker’s view, a blunt instrument with often 
vague formulations. However, he suggests some sympathy for the motivation behind 
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such an approach, noting a history of ‘barely trusted elected leaders’303 and decrying 
the absence of accountability to the party’s annual conference – something ‘badly 
lacking… and what a high price the party pays for it’.304  
 
While Robert McKenzie’s classic British Political Parties was mildly scolded by 
Drucker for an under appreciation of Labour’s ideology, both authors arrived at 
similar conclusions as to how leadership power within a party is exercised. 
McKenzie’s landmark study concluded, from a detailed historical critique of 
assumptions fed by Conservative and Labour Party narratives, that neither was 
controlled by their extra-parliamentary parts, nor did party leaders wilfully ignore 
their supporters inside and outside of parliament. Instead, party leaderships exercised 
final authority so long as they retain the confidence of their parliamentary party. The 
‘views of their organized supporters outside Parliament must inevitably be taken into 
account’,305 but this is more akin to the presence of ‘a highly organized pressure 
group with a special channel of communication’.306 If the question is whether or not 
the leaderships of political parties – even those who proclaim themselves to be 
democratic, as the Labour Party does – ultimately wield the greater authority, 
McKenzie arrived at the same answer as Robert Michels who, in his ‘oligarchy’ 
thesis, noted the ‘high degree of independence’307 political leaders have. 
 
Yet McKenzie’s conclusion centred on the British system of cabinet government and 
parliamentary democracy. All the while parties accept this system, McKenzie argued, 
power will unfailingly gravitate to those in cabinet making decisions, with the 
support (if they can hold it) of their colleagues in parliament.308 This leads to the 
difference between Michels and McKenzie on the role of democracy in parties and 
parties in a democracy. 
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As McKenzie noted: 
 
‘Michels appeared to assume that a “democratic” political party ought ideally 
to be under the direction and control of its mass membership… [but this] 
never proves feasible in practice because of the operation of his law of 
oligarchy. But in the British context there is another reason of greater 
importance: the conventions of the parliamentary system… require that 
Members of Parliament, and therefore parliamentary parties also, must hold 
themselves responsible solely to the electorate and not to the mass 
organisation of their supporters outside Parliament… The mass organizations 
may be permitted to play some part… but if they attempted to arrogate to 
themselves a determining influence with respect to policy or leadership they 
would be cutting across the chain of responsibility from Cabinet, to 
Parliament, to electorate.’309 
 
Drucker arrived at much the same place, noting that when the party ‘spends much of 
its time and energy electing governments… it cannot complain if its ministers then 
govern. To deny these ministers this right would require reopening the entire question 
of whether a socialist movement has any business forming a political party to contest 
parliamentary seats’.310 The difference between the two lies in Drucker’s appreciation 
of ideology (something he believes should be better developed and understood by 
Labour people) and his arguments regarding the importance of Labour governments 
moving towards goals that Labour people share – issues McKenzie did not address in 
his study. Both McKenzie and Drucker were disdainful of suggestions that activists 
could ‘control’ political parties and both evidence Labour’s survivability as a party 
that can live with its own democratic contradictions. In a later essay, published in 
1982, McKenzie took issue with Clement Attlee’s proclamation that ‘the Labour 
Party Conference lays down the policy of the Party, and issues instructions which 
must be carried out… The Labour Party Conference is in fact a parliament of the 
movement’.311 McKenzie viewed this as part of a misleading pattern on the left of 
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grouping political parties and trade unions as if they ‘constituted a single species of 
social aggregate’.312 
 
While trade unions – rightly, in McKenzie’s view – are there to aggregate the views 
of their mass membership and represent them, as one, to employers and other 
concentrations of power, political parties are there to sustain ‘political leaders who 
offer themselves as potential governors’313 of a polity far wider than their party. Yet, 
while McKenzie viewed the Attlee position as unworkable intra-party democratic 
purity, it does something of a disservice to Attlee’s observations of the Labour 
constitution. Later in the same book chapter as that quoted by McKenzie, Attlee 
argued that ‘action’ in parliament is a matter for the PLP, which can ‘decide on the 
application of Party policy’, meaning ‘in its own sphere the Parliamentary Party is 
supreme’.314 What ‘action’ is, how stretchable ‘application’ of policy can be, and the 
use of the word ‘supreme’ all demonstrate the opacity of Labour’s intra-party 
democracy, even in the mind of a famous proponent. 
 
McKenzie concluded his study with a nod of agreement315 to Joseph Schumpeter’s 
analysis of classical democracy and his competing theory of competition for political 
leadership. Schumpeter critiqued ‘classical’316 accounts of democracy by questioning 
how the ‘will of the people’317 can be disaggregated from disagreement and 
irrationality among an electorate, and how, therefore, political decisions can be vested 
in the people. Instead, Schumpeter offered a theory ‘truer to life’ in seeing ‘the role of 
the people... [as] to produce a government’318 with the definition of the democratic 
method as the ‘institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
peoples’ vote’.319 To McKenzie, this helped substantiate the argument that ‘initiative 
in the formulation of policy cannot possibly come primarily from the several millions 
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of party supporters or from the electorate as a whole’.320 Instead they elect a team, 
who while needing their support to get elected, must themselves be the drivers of 
political decision-making. Schumpeter’s model recognised ‘the vital fact of 
leadership’ instead of attributing an ‘unrealistic degree of initiative [to electors] 
which practically amounted to ignoring leadership’.321 This is a good definition of 
one interpretation of this fault line in Labour’s ethos – the interpretation which posits 
the leadership role of the Parliamentary Labour Party. The other key interpretation 
regards Labour MPs as more akin to delegates of the Labour movement, elected to 
parliament to implement the party’s manifesto and to respect the will of the party’s 
annual conference. 
 
Fault line 4: Outsiders - ‘expressive’ and ‘instrumental’ politics 
 
Drucker argued that there existed within Labour an oppositional tendency – in other 
words a disposition which valued protest, and in Drucker’s mind meant that, 
institutionally, Labour had a stake in remaining out of government.322 Yet, with 
ambitions to govern Britain, and with Labour people experiencing terms in office and 
feeling pride in governing achievements, any hint of ‘oppositionism’ can be seen as 
crass, indulgent and destructive. Labour’s politicians have utilised these competing 
traditions in their political strategies and arguments, concretising a construction that 
sees Labour people regularly accused of being incapable of putting principles into 
practice, either because they have no principles or because they have no strategy for 
putting them into practice. Tony Crosland argued that within the Labour party were 
people ‘who would remain in opposition for thirty years rather than risk one tittle of 
his doctrinal purity’.323 Richard Crossman suggested that a different kind of Labour 
person becomes ‘obsessed by electoral considerations and succumbs to the 
temptations to jettison its radical policies for the sake of office’.324 
 
Naturally, both expressed their belief in a blend of governing competence and 
principled radicalism, while maintaining an opposition to a more extreme position 
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that only believes in one of them. As Shaw noted, this is a ‘perennial feature’325 of 
Labour Party conflicts – both between Right and Left and between Labour’s leaders 
and its activists. In the case of the former, the conflict is doctrinal and strategic: how 
much to compromise on principles and at what pace to proceed. In the case of 
Labour’s leaders and activists, Shaw argued its leaders have ‘their eyes fixed both on 
the immediate burdens of government and on winning the next election’, while 
activists ‘fear than in the process party ideals may be sacrificed’.326 Dennis Kavanagh 
has argued that, out of government, Labour ‘developed an opposition mentality, a 
liking for “resolutionary socialism”’, while ‘in government the restraints of the 
situation and exposure to other viewpoints sometimes meant that policy priorities 
shifted’.327 
 
Similarly, Marquand argued two broad positions from the Labour Right and the 
Labour Left were evident: that the Right believed that all that was necessary ‘was to 
play the parliamentary game by the familiar rules, to fight elections at the appropriate 
times in the approved manner, and by the display of statesmanship and moderation to 
win over a sufficient proportion of the floating vote to gain a parliamentary 
majority’.328 The Left, too, believed in parliamentary democracy, but wanted ‘a more 
aggressive, and above all a morally more intransigent, form of parliamentarism’329 
which Marquand judged was ‘justified… where it failed was in clothing that demand 
in marxisant phrases, the logic of which contradicted the logic of the demand 
itself’.330 Underlying these practices are real dilemmas that have long been subject to 
both academic and political analysis of the Labour Party, and of social democratic 
politics more generally. Recent work has argued that for social democratic parties 
across the board, ‘the tension between principles and pragmatism… is of particular 
resonance’.331 
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Max Weber, in his lecture ‘Politics as a Vocation’, argued that ‘the ethics of intention 
and the ethics of responsibility are not diametrically opposed, but complementary: 
together they make the true man, the man who can have the vocation of politics’.332 
Further, he argued that ‘politics is a matter of boring down strongly and slowly 
through hard boards with passion and judgement together. It is perfectly true, and 
confirmed by all historical experience, that the possible cannot be achieved without 
continually reaching out towards that which is impossible in this world’.333 It is from 
Weber’s distinction of ‘intention’ and ‘responsibility’, and his advocacy for a blend, 
that Parkin arrived at his analysis of expressive and instrumental politics – something 
he saw as core tension of Labour Party politics.334 ‘The tensions between these two 
political orientations’, Parkin agued, ‘has been at the root of many of the conflicts 
within the Labour Party from its foundation until modern times.’335 Roy Jenkins is 
put forward as one example by Parkin. Jenkins, writing during the Clause IV 
controversy under Gaitskell’s leadership, took aim at what he called ‘the inherent 
defeatism of the left’,336 arguing: 
 
‘The will to power has always been much stronger in the Conservative Party. 
There it is something to be pursued at almost any cost. The Labour Party has 
quite rightly had a different order of priorities, but its danger is that of going 
too far in the other direction and thinking that it is unsocialist and even 
immoral to desire power. One effect of the election result [the 1959 defeat] 
was to encourage that aspect of the party’s outlook which has always both 
expected and accepted defeat.’337 
 
The risk, Jenkins argued, was of a party committed to parliamentary politics, but 
ashamed of seeking power. This argument has not only been advanced by the Labour 
Right. Harold Wilson, according to Dennis Kavanagh, ‘suspected it [Labour] had 
developed an opposition-minded mentality’.338 Counter arguments, typically from the 
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Left of the party, posited the risk of a party committed to socialism, but ashamed of 
its own beliefs. Eric Heffer, writing nearly three decades later, but also after 
consecutive election defeats, warned: 
 
‘[The media] will… claim that Labour’s policies are full-blooded socialist, 
even when they have been watered down. If these claims will be made 
anyway, what point is there in trimming our policies in a vain attempt to suit 
the opinion polls and the media? … We have no need to be ashamed of our 
beliefs.’339 
 
Parkin is not alone in having used the language of ‘expressive’ and ‘instrumental’ in 
considering Labour Party politics. The philosopher Charles Taylor also drew a 
contrast between socialists who present an ‘expressivist critique of capitalist society’ 
and those who adopt a style more akin to ‘utilitarians who had discovered the 
superior efficacy of collective instruments’,340 a description commented upon 
favourably by Bernard Williams.341 In a similar way to my understanding of the fault 
lines within Labour’s ethos, and the positions Labour Party people take, Taylor saw a 
‘spectrum within socialism… in that some have been far more concerned with one 
goal than the other’.342 Taylor offered William Morris as an example of someone 
more inclined towards an ‘expressive’ orientation, evoked by Morris’ biographer as 
an approach focusing on ‘social agitation and education’.343 
 
I noted earlier that the expressive and instrumentalist traditions within Labour are 
often furthered in adversarial debates, where each side seeks to define the other 
negatively. In reality, I think there is some exaggeration in these claims, and that – as 
Parkin noted – most people adopt a blend. However, I do believe there are competing 
traditions within Labour’s ethos which have a more expressive, or a more 
instrumental interpretation of this fault line. Those with an identity closer to 
expressive Labour politics put an emphasis on longstanding political philosophy, are 
defensive of the party’s historic identity and – where possible – seek contemporary 
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connection with it. They stress the scale and necessity of transformation in 
government and they advocate for extra-parliamentary activity, considered to be 
complimentary to electoral activity. Instrumental Labour politics has an emphasis on 
the kind of values that must be endorsed to achieve power. It includes a stress on the 
status of being a ‘natural party of government’, which is often prioritised in argument 
before policy and ideals-based language. It includes a focus upon reaching beyond 
Labour’s class-based politics and on reassessing the party’s trade union relationship. 
 
Jobson’s work on nostalgia is also relevant here. Nostalgia, when connected to a 
group, can lead to ‘nostalgia identity’, something ‘dependent on the relative 
generational stability of a collective identity, the passing down of nostalgic memories 
from generation to generation and the ability of a nostalgia-identity to adapt to, 
incorporate or repeal contestations’.344 This can be utilised by Labour’s politicians. 
Indeed, it’s an important part of Labour’s expressive tradition and one Labour’s 
political actors must engage with. As Jobson has argued, those who seek to ‘reorient 
Labour… must, firstly, engage with the significant relationship that the party holds 
with its past’.345 Jobson’s conclusion that Blair, despite his criticisms of nostalgia, 
‘seemed to exhibit an understanding of the way in which the past could be 
mobilised’346 to legitimise his party reforms is, I think, correct and an important 
example of how Labour’s expressive traditions can be invoked by actors with a more 
instrumental orientation. 
 
Applying the fault line framework 
 
The final part of this chapter engages with an issue flagged by Drucker in Doctrine 
and Ethos: that the effect of ethos was difficult to identify with precision, in contrast 
to doctrinal traditions which can be traced and analysed through the resolutions and 
policy documents debated within the party.347 This study flips Drucker’s conclusion 
on its head. I contend that it is possible to take the same sources which Drucker listed 
and use them to analyse the impact of Labour’s ethos. For example, the fault line 
about Party Objects can be analysed by immersion in a process which considered 
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altering them. Such immersion uses many of the same sources – documents, 
resolutions, conference debates – though adds further sources. These include archival 
material to analyse paths considered, but not taken (often documented in drafts and 
memorandums), and through interviews to understand an actor’s strategic 
calculations. This study takes each fault line individually (though interactivity 
between them is discussed throughout) and analyses the effect of Labour’s competing 
traditions using a case study from the period 1983-1997. 
 
My case selection followed three stages: identifying the type of practice or action 
being studied when examining a fault line (for example, for ‘Objects’, activity that 
significantly engaged with Labour’s Party Objects); selecting cases from Labour’s 
opposition years (1983 to 1997) where relevant activity occurred; and then finally 
choosing one case for each fault line. In addition to the type of activity considered, 
case selection also required consistency in the actors involved. As this study seeks to 
understand the effect of Labour’s ethos on the party’s political trajectory, I have 
focused on the actions of elite actors – principally the party leadership and their close 
advisors and allies – as those who most readily and regularly affect that trajectory. As 
Labour had three leadership teams during this period, I identified cases across the 
four fault lines from all three leadership stints. To trace the effect of ethos, such elite 
actor activity also had to be accessible to a researcher – in other words, cases needed 
to have enough potential research material accessible through public documents, 
archives or from interviewing those involved. Table 2 includes cases meeting the 
criteria across those years. 
 
Table 2: Potential cases 
Fault line Potential cases 
Objects The Aims & Values process under Neil 
Kinnock 
John Smith’s engagement with Clause 
IV 
Tony Blair’s rewriting of Clause IV 
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Emblems Public ownership and nationalisation 
policy during Kinnock’s leadership. 
Unilateral nuclear disarmament during 
Kinnock’s leadership 
National Health Service policy during 
Blair’s leadership 
Decisions The Policy Review process during 
Kinnock’s leadership 
One member, one vote (OMOV) during 
John Smith’s leadership 
The promise not to raise income taxes 
during Blair’s leadership 
The decision to make the Bank of 
England independent during Blair’s 
leadership 
Outsiders Kinnock’s campaign for the 1983 
Labour leadership election. 
Kinnock’s strategy and rhetoric during 
the Miners’ Strike, 1984-85. 
The Commission on Social Justice, 
during John Smith’s leadership. 
Blair’s campaign for the 1994 Labour 
leadership election. 
 
Analysing the effect of ethos requires interpretation of an actor’s motivations and 
strategic considerations when taking political decisions and when speaking (in both 
private and public). With that in mind, the third and final stage of case selection 
involved choosing one principal case to analyse each fault line. Focusing on one case 
allowed for this study to go sufficiently in-depth: seeking to unearth the motivations, 
objectives and strategies of those elite actors around a given activity. This required 
not only a thorough understanding of the context, but a high level of detail in tracking 
 92 
the actions of the actors involved. As well as selecting one case for each fault line, I 
also wanted to understand any differences, should they exist, between different 
Labour leaders – not only to show the existence of different individual interpretations 
and perceptions of the dominant interpretation, but to understand how and why those 
different interpretations of Labour’s ethos affected the trajectory of Labour’s 
modernisation. In other words, to what extent were there different periods of 
modernisation, and different kinds of ‘moderniser’? 
 
This raised the question of which leaders to analyse over the four fault lines. My 
decision was to select two cases from the Kinnock period, and two from the Blair 
period – drawing contrasts within those analyses between each other and with John 
Smith’s leadership. I judged this to be a better approach to comprehending 
differences in modernisation, and to draw both contrasts and similarities between the 
Kinnock and Blair strategies. As previous studies have noted, Smith’s tenure was ‘all 
too brief’.348 Smith was a towering figure during Kinnock’s leadership, and his 
political legacy continued to affect the strategic contexts of both Blair and Brown. 
Yet, due to his sudden death, his leadership forever remained only a beginning. While 
we know Smith had planned a supplement to Clause IV,349 and had reacted with 
anger to Jack Straw’s proposal to rewrite the infamous clause,350 we do not know 
how his engagement with Labour’s Party Objects could have concluded. Nor do we 
know how Smith would have responded to the final report of the Commission on 
Social Justice, which Blair launched in October 1994 nearly six months after Smith 
died. Both of these cases are, therefore, incomplete.  
 
Within the Kinnock and Blair periods, there remain a number of potential cases, 
raising the question as to whether the findings of this study would have been different 
had different cases been selected.  There are two relevant points here. First, in relation 
to the effect of ethos, I judge all of the cases to offer consistency in terms of ethos 
having the potential to shape the motivations of the actors involved and the outcomes 
of the cases. This is based on this study’s argument that all Labour Party people are 
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socialised in the shared and competing traditions within Labour’s ethos, meaning they 
have a view on the four key fault lines which the possible cases engage with. 
 
Secondly, and importantly, this does not mean the outcomes themselves would be the 
same in every case. Such consistency would, in effect, disprove one of the central 
thrusts of this study: that different Labour people have different interpretations of the 
party’s ethos, thereby having the potential to affect their motivations and decision-
making in different ways. For example, analysing Neil Kinnock’s approach to 
engaging with Labour’s Party Objects would (and does in the next chapter) show the 
effect of Kinnock’s interpretation of Labour’s ethos and his perception of the 
dominant ethos at the time. Similarly, analysing Blair’s approach to changing Clause 
IV would also help us understand the effect of his interpretation of Labour’s ethos. 
Yet, both cases saw different outcomes: in the case of the former, change was limited; 
in the latter, Blair achieved his full reform. In part, this was down to interpretations of 
the party’s ethos.  
 
Where consistency of outcome is important is in case selection within a fault line for 
the same actor. Here my approach was to select cases that were not ‘one-offs’ but part 
of a consistent interpretation of Labour’s ethos which can be seen in other cases. As 
an example of these considerations, take Fault line 3: Decisions. In opposition, New 
Labour was notoriously risk-averse in making policy. The 1997 manifesto was slim, 
and much of it – including the constitutional programme – had been inherited. Yet a 
small number of important policy decisions were made, all of which showed the same 
interpretation of Labour’s ethos when it comes to decision-making. An important 
policy decision made during this period was to not increase rates of income tax, nor 
to waver from Conservative spending plans for two years. The decision was made in 
a secretive way between Blair and Brown, with even Blair and his closest aides not 
knowing about Brown’s intention regarding the timing of the announcement until the 
night before.351 The same can be said of the policy on a utilities windfall tax352 and on 
the decision – considered now to be of great importance – to make the Bank of 
England independent. 
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In each instance important policy measures were decided upon by Blair, Brown and 
their aides. Their approach is demonstrative of an interpretation of Labour’s ethos 
which believes policymaking is a matter for the leadership of the party, particularly 
when close to an election and on matters of economic and political importance. Table 
3 shows my final case selection.  
 
Table 3: Case selection 
Fault line Case study 
Objects Aims & Values (1986-1988) 
Emblems Unilateral nuclear disarmament (1983-
1989) 
Decisions Bank of England independence (1995-
1997) 
Outsiders Blair leadership campaign (1994) 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the substance of the four key fault lines in Labour’s ethos. 
The four fault lines are controversial issues where divergent narratives exist as to the 
beliefs and practices Labour Party people should adhere to. These differences are 
significant. They are connected to a Labour Party person’s understanding of what it is 
to be a Labour Party member, activist and politician. They represent competing 
traditions within Labour’s ethos, giving rise to aspects of the movement’s pluralism 
(there is much doctrinal pluralism too) as well as to divisive episodes in the party’s 
past. 
 
As I noted earlier, an actor’s beliefs, derived from Labour’s competing traditions, 
represent their individual interpretation of the party’s ethos, including on these 
contentious points. The dominant interpretation represents the beliefs which are 
considered to be the prevailing narrative. This chapter has also explained the case 
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selection for the chapters which follow, including why this study omits – as a focus of 
a case study chapter – John Smith’s leadership period, and how I have checked for 
consistency in seeking to show how distinct interpretations of Labour’s ethos affect 
an actor’s choices. The next chapter takes the first fault line, that of Party Objects, 
and focuses on how Kinnock’s individual interpretation of Labour’s ethos, and his 
perception of the dominant interpretation of the time, affected a project of ideological 
clarification known as Aims & Values. 
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Chapter 3 
Objects: Labour’s Aims & Values under Kinnock 
 
‘Between the myopic attitude of the purely “practical man” and that of the “intellectual”, who sees 
society merely in terms of ideas, lies a fertile terrain ready to be cultivated by all who are prepared to 
recognise that political intentions are secular, always limited, but nevertheless frequently dynamic.’ 
Nye Bevan, In Place of Fear 
 
‘Those who effect a revolution ought to know wither they are leading the world. They have need of a 
social theory – and in point of fact the more thorough-going apostles of movement always have such a 
theory.’ 
L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism and Other Writings 
 
‘As Europeans go, the English are not intellectual. They have a horror of abstract thought, they feel no 
need for any philosophy or systemic “world view”. Nor is this because they are “practical”, as they are 
so fond of claiming for themselves.’ 
George Orwell, The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius 
 
Introduction 
 
The question ‘what is the big idea’ would rankle John Smith, according to one of his 
former aides. ‘Isn’t it a really big idea to lift pensioners out of poverty? To say no 
children should live in poverty?’353 Smith asked during one of the periods where this 
question was floated by his colleagues and others. Smith was regarded as ‘a man of 
ruthlessly sharp intelligence’ who ‘favoured “playing the long game”, that is a calm 
and measured approach to rebuilding support for Labour’.354 He was dismissive, 
however, of ideological moves which could antagonise one section or another of the 
party, reacting angrily to attempts to open up debates about Clause IV and suspicious 
of one ‘big idea’ trumping Labour’s pragmatic head and its social justice heart. The 
same is said of another former Labour Leader, Jim Callaghan, who Roy Hattersley 
recollected ‘would say about ideas, “what we need to do is obvious, you don’t need to 
have theory”’.355 Some Labour people, however, disagree, leading to a fault line in 
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Labour’s ethos. Some posit the importance of ideological clarity to reinforce a 
‘vision’ for the party – and what some Labour politicians refer to as the ‘basis of 
socialist theory’.356 Others consider such activity to be relatively unimportant in the 
political race of policy decisions and day-to-day victories and defeats, in addition to 
being potentially divisive. This is not a fault line between ‘intellectuals’ and ‘non-
intellectuals’, but between those who see the merit in a Labour tradition of ‘clarity 
about the framework of values and principles within which and against which our 
politics is conducted’357 and those who put greater emphasis on the policies and 
programmes that readily spring from Labour’s shared values. The latter position, in 
relation to Party Objects, lends itself to a strategy of non-engagement. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand how the competing traditions within 
Labour’s ethos – in this case, regarding the fault line ‘Objects’ – affected the strategic 
calculations of the actors involved in a process called Aims & Values. It looks at how 
individual interpretations held by decision-makers, and how perceptions of the 
dominant interpretation within the party, affected the strategies and actions of the 
actors involved. The Aims & Values process took place in the years 1986-1988 under 
Neil Kinnock’s leadership, culminating in the publication of the document 
Democratic Socialist Aims and Values. I argue this reform process was affected by 
the leader’s own interpretation of the party’s ethos, one he perceived as being widely 
shared by the Labour movement at the time: that ideological renewal through 
alterations to Party Objects (or something close) was divisive, and something that had 
to be managed carefully. This interpretation contributed to a conscious decision, 
taken as part of the leadership’s wider strategy, to give greater priority to 
organisational and policy change and to avoid a confrontation over Party Objects. 
 
Such an approach, Shaw has noted, limited the extent of Labour’s transformation. 
While Thatcherites had always grasped ‘the importance of carefully thought-out 
ideological formulae and idioms in the bid to forge a new common sense’ Labour 
under Kinnock ‘had never grasped this’.358 While on policy change, the Policy 
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Review process oversaw extensive changes, this chapter argues that its precursor 
process – Aims & Values – was a limited restatement of the party’s mission, leading 
to eventual criticism of ‘opinion survey-driven’ policy change rather than being based 
on an ‘analysis of society and a vision of the future’.359 This differentiates the 
Kinnock period of modernisation in a significant way from the New Labour period 
which followed, one where Tony Blair did, during his period as Leader of the 
Opposition, prioritise revision of the party’s aims and values. Applying this study’s 
typology of possible strategies for engagement with Party Objects – ‘substitution’, 
which advocates the replacement of Labour’s existing creed with something different; 
‘addition’, which adds and simultaneously reaffirms what currently exists; and 
‘addition with silent substitution’, a blend of the two, which advocates giving greater 
prominence to newer additions to the party’s creed, yet without reaffirming what 
existed beforehand – I explain how and why Kinnock consciously opted for a strategy 
of addition. The story of Aims & Values is of a process initiated unwillingly and of a 
more ambitious approach to change abandoned. This chapter reveals a leader 
reluctant to prioritise debate about overarching political thought at a time when his 
pragmatism was considered to be politically expedient.  
 
Controversy over Party Objects  
 
For the earlier part of the 20th century, what became known simply as ‘Clause IV’ 
was the Labour party’s creed – in so much as it was the sole ideological statement in 
the party’s constitution.360 It was a compromise. It sought to give Labour’s theoretical 
socialists a degree of ideological certainty, while retaining ambiguity for the more 
liberally minded or non-doctrinal Labour people. Yet the perception of Clause IV 
evolved, becoming an object of socialist loyalty through the Labour Left’s 
commitment to common ownership, and aligning with Labour people who were 
happy existing within the vagaries of Clause IV socialism. As I noted earlier, to 
Drucker, Clause IV wasn’t merely a symbol. ‘The special position of Clause IV,’ he 
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wrote, ‘is that it is a statement of principle which has policy implications and yet one 
which ensures that the party remains true to its ethos.’361 
 
This position, if not the doctrine contained within the Clause itself, came under a 
sustained assault by Hugh Gaitskell following Labour’s 1959 election defeat. 
Douglas Jay’s infamous Forward article argued: ‘The myth that we intended to 
“nationalise” anything and everything was very powerful in this election… we must 
destroy this myth decisively; otherwise we may never win again.’362 Jay focused on 
two arguments. The first was that the party’s position on common ownership was 
anything but clear, leading to misinterpretation among the electorate and the 
emergence of a myth. The second point, and something used by opponents of change 
to evidence cynicism, was the electoral imperative – that if Labour appeared to be for 
nationalising everything, it would win nothing. Jay’s solution was ideological 
restatement.363 Reflecting on Gaitskell’s eventual attempt to amend Clause IV, Jay 
suggested he considered the plan unwise: ‘It was the very fact of laying hands on the 
Creed itself, not the suggested re-wording, which outraged the fundamentalists.’364 
Adding to the creed, even publishing clarifications to the creed, was one thing – that 
could evidence pluralism, giving everyone something to believe. Seeking to replace 
what everyone believed, and substitute it for something else, was quite another. In 
other words, the act of revising itself was seen as divisive, even setting aside the 
actual content of any revision. 
 
Gaitskell’s view – one which he eventually retreated from – valued ideological 
renewal and invested it with sufficient importance to take a risk with party unity. He 
argued: 
 
‘It has also been said that we should not get involved in a “theological” 
argument, because it merely gives rise to fruitless discussion without really 
mattering at all. For my part, I cannot agree that the Constitution is or should 
be a collection of meaningless phrases about which it is fruitless to argue. The 
statement of our aims does matter. It is not mere theology. And here I must 
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add that I have been surprised by the attitude of others who say in private that 
the Constitution is hopelessly out of date and they don’t really believe in it but 
in public urge us not to touch it because to do so might be controversial.’365 
 
On the choice between unity and discordant debate, Gaitskell opted for debate: ‘There 
are some who argue that, whatever the merits of the case, we must not proceed 
because there is disagreement about it in the Party. This puts a veto on making any 
change at any time unless we are all agreed on it at the start. I can think of nothing 
more fatal to the future of the Party. Certainly internal discord is bad and unity is 
desirable. But it must be real unity and it must not be achieved at the cost of 
permanent stagnation.’366 
 
Yet Gaitskell’s appetite for ‘substitution’, fatally for his attempt, was not shared even 
by some of his allies. Tudor Jones has argued that Gaitskell also failed to appreciate 
Clause IV’s ‘deeper significance as an expression of Labour’s socialist myth’,367 
including antagonising trade unionists who – regardless of their views on policy – 
valued tradition and its symbolic importance.368 Gaitskell’s interpretation of Labour’s 
ethos and the party’s mission, when it came to altering its political direction, was not 
shared by the majority of Labour people, and his strategy was rejected across the 
spectrum. Following the convulsions of 1960, Labour returned to a silent truce, at 
least on Clause IV. Yet the result of Gaitskell’s efforts had been ‘an unsatisfactory 
and provisional settlement, concealing deep differences over the nature and future 
extent of public ownership, as well as over the essential meaning and purpose of 
democratic socialism. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that bitter policy and 
doctrinal conflicts resurfaced within the party during the 1970s and early 1980s’.369 
 
By the time Kinnock was elected to the Labour leadership, changing the party’s 
organisational structures and its policies were at the top of his agenda. Revisiting the 
battle over Party Objects was not. While Kinnock did not perceive Clause IV to be 
representative of the ideology of most Labour people, and considered it a meaningless 
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anachronism, he did not have an appetite for a modernising ‘substitution’ strategy. In 
their avowedly partisan appraisal of the Kinnock leadership period, Heffernan and 
Marqusee present the Aims & Values process as a ‘typical Kinnock’ project, with the 
leader ‘raising the stakes at every turn’ and aiming to convince the media that he ‘was 
surreptitiously dropping Clause Four socialism’.370 While they accept this ‘was a far 
cry from the kind of ideological confrontation Hugh Gaitskell had courted’,371 
Kinnock’s actions were portrayed as clinical, and his strategy as clear-sighted. The 
analysis I present in this chapter disagrees with these conclusions. Kinnock sought to 
avoid confrontation over reform of Party Objects. He displayed hesitancy, and 
eventually pulled back from the suggestion that the leadership should seek to disavow 
the party’s existing creed. 
 
The Kinnock leadership: ‘If we give up what we believe, everything is gone.’ 
 
Kinnock had been elected as the candidate of the ‘soft’ Left, beating the Labour 
Right’s Roy Hattersley after the convulsions of the disintegrating Callaghan 
government, Michael Foot’s troubled leadership, and the emergence of the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP). The MP for Islwyn beat Hattersley comfortably across 
Labour’s electoral college – the PLP, constituency parties and trade unions – winning 
71% of the total votes.372  Kinnock regarded the absence of Tony Benn (who had lost 
his seat in the 1983 general election defeat after a productive, tumultuous period as a 
standard bearer for the Labour Left) as something which affected his mandate as 
Leader. Kinnock did not see the leadership result as a rejection of Bennism, because 
Benn had been unable to stand following the loss of his seat. Nor did Kinnock see it 
as a rejection (from the selectorate) of Labour’s 1983 programme and the Labour 
Left’s certainty of its socialist platform. Indeed, Kinnock’s message during the 1983 
leadership election was typified by language pressing the need ‘to win support for its 
[Labour’s] policies – to educate, persuade and convert’.373 The new Leader believed 
his mandate was ‘for change, but it was also a mandate for affirmation. I was the Left 
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candidate. People had an interpretation of that which was only partly true. Benn’s 
candidature would have made it possible for me to be much more direct’.374 
 
In the judgements of Kinnock and his team, principally his chief of staff, Charles 
Clarke, the impediments to being ‘direct’ were many. The organisational strength of 
Labour people to the Left of Kinnock was identified as a persistent challenge, along 
with the threat of continued organisational infiltration from ‘Militant’ – the Trotskyist 
group seeking ‘the recruitment of the vanguard’375 through Constituency Labour 
Parties (CLPs). The burning and then exploding confrontation between Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservative government and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) 
was another challenge, one that would have troubled any Labour Leader, though one 
particularly difficult for Kinnock. He came from a mining family, represented mining 
communities, yet had absolute contempt for Arthur Scargill and his strategy.376 In 
particular, Kinnock judged the strike to have so dominated the minds of Labour 
people that, when it came to political change and debate within the party about its 
purpose: 
 
‘Nobody’s listening… it utterly preoccupied the thinking and action of the 
whole Labour movement. The miners and the communities themselves, the 
fundraising, the frustration with Scargill, the unreserved sympathy for the 
miners… the hatred for Thatcher because of the encroachment on civil 
liberties… there were things about the miners’ strike that moved them 
[Labour people] and enraged them… so taking policy issues head on in those 
circumstances ensured failure partly because people’s attitude was, literally, 
“God if we give up what we believe, everything is gone”.’377 
 
This assessment of the miners’ strike is an important indicator of Kinnock’s 
perception of the mood of the Labour movement as a whole – focused, firmly, on the 
attack on mining communities and the importance of solidarity in the face of the 
assault. In terms of the party’s ethos, Kinnock perceived a movement uncomfortable 
with any alteration connected with the party’s other traditions, particularly (and 
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somewhat paradoxically, one could argue) in the face of the New Right’s ideological 
zeal. Hattersley’s recollection of this period is similar. He noted that ‘the miners, on 
strike for a year, were the tragedy that haunted us day after day’.378 Linked to 
Kinnock’s perception of the wider movement was his own interpretation of Labour’s 
ethos. Charles Clarke considered Kinnock to be a representative of ‘authentic Labour’ 
and that his ability to modernise the Labour Party owed much to the fact ‘he came 
from the organised working class’.379 Marquand has argued of Kinnock that ‘the 
tribal language of “our people”, which can so easily sound false or patronising, came 
naturally to him because they were his people’.380 Kinnock began his tenure 
conscious, perhaps more so than previous leaders, of the centrality of solidarity to the 
Labour movement – a movement which perceived itself as besieged by Thatcherism. 
In Marquand’s analysis, this gave Kinnock an opportunity. Thatcherism was so 
unpopular with the rank and file, he argues, that when convinced of their electoral 
unpopularity, policy changes would be accepted by the party as a necessity to defeat 
Thatcher.381 
 
However, on issues where Kinnock perceived the party’s dominant ethos to be on 
collision course with a given strategy – in this instance, a reluctance to revise the 
party’s creed – Kinnock stepped back from potential confrontation with his party. 
Kinnock’s view of his political inheritance, and of his reluctance to risk internal 
defeat attests to this early hesitancy in altering Labour’s direction: 
 
‘What Charles and I knew was, from the outset, that any sudden efforts to 
change policy would crash, this was a tanker that was going to have to be 
turned around in a very measured way. What I never said was with icebergs 
all around and in the middle of a force ten gale. The tanker would have 
snapped in half, there’s no doubt about that, and we had that proved. The first 
effort at one-member, one-vote was 1984. We lost by 153,000 in conference, 
which is a small defeat, but a savage bloody defeat. That evening I said to 
Charles “we will never take any major change to conference again, on 
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anything, without being bloody sure we were going to win”. And we never 
did.’382 
 
This was what Clarke called a ‘judgement call about the culture of the party’.383 This 
decision, informed by considerations of the party’s ethos, led to a cautious strategy of 
‘addition’ when it came to the party’s aims and values, stressing what Kinnock saw 
as the priority areas of concern for Labour and informed by values that unite Labour 
people, but not explicitly revising Labour’s creed. Setting out this approach in a 1985 
autumn lecture to the Fabian Society, Kinnock argued the party required ‘a shift in 
attitudes and presentation, not a change in principles’ to ‘join-up’ the instincts of the 
upwardly mobile, ‘modern working classes’384 with the policies of the Labour Party. 
This had to be communicated to the Labour Party and movement more widely 
through a message that focused on a changing world and the need to progress with 
the times.385 It was not, at least explicitly, an approach which posited the need for a 
change in Labour’s core aims and values. Instead, Kinnock sought to promote a 
socialism with the explicit aim of enhancing the cohesion and unity of the Labour 
Party. 
 
In his Fabian lecture, Kinnock argued for the interdependence of freedom and 
collectivism. He stressed the need to defend this from ‘the stale vanguardism of the 
ultra-left and from the atavistic and timid premise of social democracy’.386 The 
political context of Kinnock’s words are important here. Quite separate from any 
doctrinal critique of the ‘ultra-left’ or of ‘social democracy’ was Kinnock’s existential 
concern to attack both ‘Militant’ and the rise of the SDP-Liberal Alliance. ‘Militant’ 
was threatening his attempts to modernise Labour’s image, while the SDP-Liberal 
Alliance was threatening, albeit to a lesser extent than under Michael Foot’s 
leadership, Labour’s position as Britain’s main opposition party. His rhetoric was less 
about theoretical disputes, and more about securing the future of Labour’s tradition as 
a moderate, democratic socialist and electorally competitive political entity. 
Repeating the need for a change in image, not of ideational or doctrinal renewal, the 
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1985 Fabian lecture argued for a move away from the ‘re-examination’ of ideology 
and towards the ‘strategy, attitudes and style’387 of socialist politics. It is in these 
areas, Kinnock argued in his lecture, where constant adjustment was required – 
arguments more compatible with an approach that leaves Party Objects alone, and 
focuses more on management and day-to-day politics. Kinnock recognised too that 
Labour’s tradition was one that had shunned ‘rigid, codified, or disciplined theories 
characteristic of European continental socialism’.388 Instead, Kinnock saw Labour’s 
socialism as ‘a tapestry’ with the ‘thread that runs through the weave… above all a 
deep concern with fellowship and fraternity; with community and participation’.389 In 
a section on equality, Kinnock again asserted that ‘the problem is not with our 
objectives but with the institutions and patterns of provision, produced by past 
policies’, which he deemed ‘insufficient, inconsistent and uncoordinated’.390 
 
Kinnock also put forward what he considered to be a key difference between 
socialism and social democracy – which, while read in light of the SDP-Alliance 
threat, had harsh words for 1950s Labour revisionism. Suggesting that values such as 
equality could belong to differing political philosophies, Kinnock contended that 
socialism’s uniqueness lay in its ‘economic and social analysis… [of] the structural 
economic and social problems of capitalism, and the commitment to radical but 
realistic methods and objectives’.391 Social democracy, Kinnock argued, ‘knows 
nothing of this’.392 Indeed, he accused 1950s social democrats of ‘complacency’ 
when they ‘misused’393 a period of good economic times with social amelioration. 
With his words now targeting those who left the Labour fold, Kinnock characterised 
this view as for some, ‘a sad descent to lower common denominators with 
conservatism. For others it was merely the public expression of their private contempt 
for a democratic socialist movement which had given them everything they 
possessed’.394  Kinnock concluded the 1985 lecture with a tribute to his interpretation 
of socialism, of Fabianism, and of the role of theoretical debate in Labour politics. 
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‘Freedom, justice and equality are meaningless as abstractions,’395 he argued. They 
could only be ‘translated into living reality through the interaction of men, women 
and children in the everyday world… Diagnosis and prescription is only the starting 
point. The next two years will prove, as the Webbs might have said themselves, that 
“there is no substitute for hard work”. We must revive our faith and energy in that 
public process of education which worked in 1945’.396 
 
Kinnock’s imagery was of grafting to educate the people in the principles of 
socialism rather than of revising the party’s creed. Undoubtedly this lecture was an 
intervention in the long debate regarding the role of ideas in the Labour Party, yet this 
lecture was one of the more anti-theoretical moments, positing a Webbian (though 
less theoretical than much of early Fabianism) focus on ‘practical policies’ and 
practice, rather than reform or clarification of Labour’s ideological framework. The 
1945 government was used by Kinnock as a symbol of what socialist ‘education’ 
could achieve. Yet, through an analysis of both Kinnock’s words and his context, the 
lecture must be seen as a reaction, albeit one complimentary to Kinnock’s own 
interpretation of Labour’s ethos. 
 
Kinnock’s ‘traditional’ socialism is what he himself called a ‘third way’397, 
attempting to escape two political philosophies that had given more radical 
alternatives a bad name: ‘complacent’ social democracy that sought to bargain with 
capitalism; and Trotskyite ultra-leftists. In expressing this interpretation, Kinnock 
was setting himself against the arguments for persistent, even constant restatements 
of Labour’s political philosophy, albeit within his reformist frame of pragmatism, and 
voter-friendly policies. In what he assessed to be a politically dangerous, even 
existential period for the Labour Party, he also showed a keen attention to the 
importance of myth and an appreciation of Labour’s hostility to debates about 
altering the party’s creed and clarifying its objectives. 
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Starting to ‘backfill’: moves towards a statement of principles 
 
By 1985, ‘a clear soft-Left current’398 had emerged in the Labour Party. As Kinnock’s 
first parliament entered its second half, the Bennite Left had weakened and the trade 
unions were moving towards their more familiar role as a centre-right, leadership-
supporting block.399 Kinnock had jettisoned some of what he considered to be 
Labour’s misguided and unpopular policies, including the party’s opposition to 
membership of the European Economic Community and ‘right-to-buy’ council house 
sales. Yet this period also marked unease among Labour people about the party’s 
direction and vision. David Blunkett, who wouldn’t be elected to parliament till 1987 
but who had a seat on the NEC during this period, recalled:  
 
‘We were busy shovelling out all the things we thought were an impediment, 
but we weren’t back-filling with things that we thought were the vision of the 
future.’400 
 
Shaw has written that in this first parliament, Kinnock paid ‘due regard to those 
values and ideological tenets which helped cement the party’,401 yet seeking unity and 
the avoidance of conflict had stymied the process of modernisation.402 He also judged 
Kinnock’s first parliament as important for ‘laying the groundwork for the Policy 
Review’403 and not simply a period that focused on presentation and campaign 
agility. While I agree with this conclusion, the attempt to clarify the party’s aims and 
values towards the end of the first parliament, involving the political theorist (and 
Blunkett’s former university tutor) Bernard Crick, has not been sufficiently factored 
in to analysis of Kinnock’s period as leader. Here, the process of modernisation was 
stymied not only by Kinnock’s cautious party management strategy, but also the 
leader’s own interpretation of the divisive potential of debating the party’s objectives. 
In April and May 1986, Crick corresponded with Clarke regarding a document of 
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‘ideals, principles, values’ with a view to releasing it publicly as a ‘leaflet’. 404 Crick 
had followed a structure provided by Geoff Bish, the then head of the party’s policy 
unit. 
 
The strategy behind the planned document, as outlined in Crick’s letter to Clarke, was 
to provide a coherent theoretical basis for the ‘soft-Left’. Crick noted: 
 
‘The more I thought about it, the more I concluded that the real audience to 
read such a thing are [sic] the party itself; so that there is on record an answer 
to what we think the mainstream is, to release many of the Left centre from 
the belief that we, yes, have to be tactical (for a bit) but the real ideas are to be 
found far leftwards.’405 
 
Crick’s argument was very much reminiscent of the revisionist challenge in the 1950s 
and the silent truce that followed Gaitskell’s death. As Susan Crosland recalled from 
a conversation between Hattersley and Tony Crosland, the then Foreign Secretary 
argued ‘we have got to keep making the point that the far Left are not the only people 
who can claim a socialist theory while the rest of us are thought to be mere 
pragmatists and administrators’.406 The same thrust can be seen in Crick’s language – 
that all the while Labour people believe the ‘moderates’ are ideologically empty and 
the Labour Left ideationally confident, any modernisation in the party will be seen as 
tactical, rather that ideational. Any moderate project’s relative longevity, therefore, is 
open to question, along with its legitimacy in socialist thought more generally. The 
argument deployed by Crick in this 1986 letter is, unsurprisingly, consistent with a 
fuller treatment on the significance of theory in his 1984 Fabian pamphlet Socialist 
Values and Time. ‘We need thought, thinking and re-thinking, reviewing and re-
forming old thoughts as well as forming new, quite as much as we need research 
groups on policies – perhaps at the moment more,’407 Crick argued. ‘Theory will 
guide what policies and priorities to select.’408 
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Crick had in his sights two ‘schools of thought’ in socialism that ‘seem unwilling to 
discuss what values we should hold, and often seek to avoid talk of values at all’409 – 
these were ‘determinist Marxism and managerial pragmatism’.410 The former was 
considered uninterested in talk of ‘values’ because of an acceptance of ideology being 
a product of the dominant economic paradigm. The latter, the managerial pragmatists, 
were subject to a fuller treatment by Crick. Here pragmatists and ‘social democrats’ 
would ‘make a cult of being purely practical and of accepting the present system, if 
administered with decency and humanity’.411 Crick used Harold Wilson, as others 
have done, as an example of this kind of interpretation of Labour’s ethos, accusing 
Wilson of having no interest in ‘theories, doctrines or values of any kind’.412 While 
others have noted Wilson’s prioritisation of both party and state ‘management’,413 
Crick’s attack on the absence of any interest in socialist theory went much further. 
Another revisionist tussle also featured in Crick’s letter, namely the strategic 
judgement of how far any restatement should challenge Labour’s 1918 creed. Crick 
noted: 
 
‘I will send about a dozen “great quotes”, ranging from William Morris 
through Tawney, Bevan to the Leader’s recent speeches on aims and values 
and including Clause 4 in toto, [sic] which I see as being “boxed” in a 
pamphlet, possibly with pictures, as part of the design [Crick’s own emphasis] 
of the leaflet, not as part of the text’.414 
 
Crick’s recommendation, ultimately, stood the test of time – as this chapter will later 
reveal. Yet what is important here is while Crick was advocating a clear restatement 
of Labour’s aims and values, coming from an interpretation of Labour’s ethos that 
valued clearer aims and objectives for the party, he was also mindful of the party’s 
traditions. He was, at this early stage, already envisaging a compromise with 
interpretations of Labour’s ethos that are either uncomfortable or uninterested in such 
work, and suspicious of ‘attacks’ against the party’s identity. One must also be 
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mindful of Crick’s audience. He was working, albeit voluntarily, for a Leader who 
was approaching party change cautiously and incrementally, and who had made it 
clear he did not believe in ditching the parts of Labour’s creed associated with its 
economic and social analysis. As the only part of Labour’s constitution that did 
associate with this analysis was Clause IV, its centrality remained a key feature of 
any theoretical position.  
 
In a second letter, Crick included a tidied-up version of his ‘values and goals’ 
document. Pitched as a ‘simple restatement of our values and goals’,415 Crick’s paper 
followed a very similar argument and structure to his earlier Fabian tract. It argued 
that policies ‘must be informed by values not merely by practicality and expediency, 
otherwise policy dwindles’.416 Doctrinally, Crick’s paper was cautious. It reaffirmed 
Clause IV as a commitment with words ‘chosen carefully’ and posited a goal of 
elected officials having the ‘final decision about control of the means or production, 
distribution and exchange’.417 Occasional nods to a mixed economy – ‘competition 
has its place’418 – were overwhelmed by statements arguing for ‘public control in the 
public interest of all forms of economic activity which affect the public interest’.419 
This was not Kinnock’s view of Clause IV, nor of the future for Labour’s political 
economy. He had long-considered it ‘vague’ and drafted to say ‘absolutely bugger 
all’.420 Understanding this apparent contradiction – Kinnock’s lack of belief in Clause 
IV, but deciding to leave it untouched – requires an appreciation of the role of the 
party’s ethos in the leader’s strategic context. In short, ethos trumped his doctrinal 
objection. Kinnock’s individual interpretation, coupled with his perception of the 
dominant interpretation of Labour’s ethos at that time, meant that he considered 
clarification around Labour’s Party Objects a risk to party harmony, a risk to his own 
stature as leader (because of the danger of a wounding defeat) and an unnecessary 
exercise when considered alongside his organisational and policy-focused priorities.  
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While Crick noted in a second letter to Clarke that he had been unable to work on a 
‘press release version’,421 a lack of assent from Kinnock was also addressed in the 
letter. ‘Will do over next weekend,’ Crick wrote, ‘if [Crick’s emphasis] I get a 
confirming signal from you that Neil thinks this a good enough-for-the-moment 
version on which to proceed.’422 As Hughes and Wintour have noted, ‘Kinnock 
rejected them all [the papers] as too abstract and wordy. None of the offerings chimed 
with his sense of Labour’s main purpose’.423 That the Crick project did not proceed 
was also partly down to the lack of support for a document written by Crick in the 
Labour hierarchy. Peter Mandelson, then Labour’s director of communications, did 
not support the Crick paper.424 Patricia Hewitt recalled that there was ‘not much’425 
interest from Kinnock’s office in the submissions coming in from Crick, notably 
because of the strategic imperative of organisational reform and the construction of a 
modern campaigns infrastructure.426 As Kinnock had indicated in his 1985 Fabian 
lecture, theoretical renewal was not his priority. In private, as the party increasingly 
geared up for a more professional approach to the 1987 election, the exercise to 
renew Labour’s aims and values was seen as unwanted and unnecessary.  
 
Failing to proclaim our purpose 
 
In the January of 1987, prior to the general election, Labour’s Deputy Leader and 
then Shadow Chancellor, Roy Hattersley, published his book Choose Freedom. There 
were two broad thrusts to Hattersley’s text. First, to defend Labour against charges of 
being illiberal, arguing for the necessity of equality to bring about true liberty, and 
second to pursue an argument with his party: 
 
‘We have failed to proclaim our purpose and describe our destiny largely 
because of intellectual reticence – the lack of self-confidence which prevented 
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us from moving liberty out of our opponents’ ground by insisting that their 
definition of that ideal condition is prejudiced, and perverse.’427 
 
Having considered Crosland a mentor and leader in socialist thought, for some 
observers Hattersley’s aim appeared to be ‘to don the master’s mantle in the late 
1980s’.428 Choose Freedom was partly a eulogy to Crosland, taking a conversation 
between the two men – which included the then Foreign Secretary’s credo of ‘the 
pursuit of equality and the protection of freedom’429 – as its ideological launch pad. It 
took aim at Clause IV for being ‘the most inadequate… shibboleth’430 which the 
party as a whole no longer believed, while decrying those ‘powerful voices [who] 
have always insisted that to define the philosophical framework within which its 
policies could be assembled would only lead to trouble’.431 The dual audiences 
targeted here were both those committed to Clause IV as an approximation of 
economistic socialism and those Labour people who simply have little time for 
‘theology’.  
 
In a brief interplay with Thatcherism, Hattersley also set out the basis for his 
agreement that the new Conservative administration represented the end of 
consensus.432 However, for this moment, Labour’s tradition of being openly cautious 
about ideological clarity left it highly vulnerable to irrelevance in an ideological 
conflict. 
 
‘For the first eighty years of its existence, it was possible for the Labour Party 
to stumble along unencumbered by ideology, openly sceptical of ideas… But 
pragmatism is no longer enough. The old coalition of objectives, which shared 
aims without worrying about motives, has disappeared for ever. To become, 
once more, the dominant force in British politics, Labour has to win converts 
to the philosophy of socialism.’433 
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This argument stood in stark contrast to the approach Kinnock had taken in his 
Fabian lecture in 1985, which held the practical implementation of Labour’s ideology 
to be the problem. Peter Mandelson reflected that Hattersley wanted to be seen as 
Labour’s ‘philosopher king’,434 putting down on paper – at long last – what a modern 
Labour Party should stand for. In many ways, Kinnock shared the interpretation of 
Labour, expressed by Sidney Webb, that more important than a theory or programme 
was ‘the spirit underlying the programme, that spirit which gives any party its 
soul’.435 While acknowledging and sharing in that spirit, Hattersley believed it was 
subject to misrepresentation by both friend and foe – and the remedy was theoretical 
clarity, subject to permanent revision. Reflecting on Crosland’s worldview, 
Hattersley noted: 
 
‘The simple doctrine of Croslandism, revisionism, that we should have a set 
of basic principles and we should continue to revise them, not just one 
revision, but continual revision, was anathema to the Labour Party. “We 
believed it all our lives, why should we change now”.’436  
 
The timing of Choose Freedom became a source of regret to Hattersley. Anxious to 
publish his book prior to the 1987 election, in the hope that ‘it might influence policy 
for the election. Of course it didn’t’,437 Choose Freedom could not act as both a 
reflection and a call to action following defeat. Yet its core argument was set for a 
rebirth.  
 
‘Second-rate reasons’: Labour’s Statement of Aims & Values 
 
While Kinnock did not share Hattersley’s interpretation of Labour’s ethos when it 
came to theoretical work, a project to restate Labour’s purpose recommenced 
following the 1987 election defeat. While Labour’s campaign apparatus drew many 
plaudits following the 1987 campaign, Kinnock and his team believed that the party’s 
policies needed a radical overhaul to shift the electoral dial. The main vehicle for this 
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became the Policy Review, yet prior to any substantive rethinking on policy being 
unveiled, the Aims & Values process got underway, stimulated by Crick and Blunkett. 
Hattersley himself, while committed to the tradition of restatement and revision, had 
rarely pushed the topic with Kinnock: ‘I was writing articles for the Guardian and the 
Observer about it… in a sense I was caught up in the practicalities,’438 he reflected. 
Instead, the process of writing the document which would become Aims & Values got 
underway for the purposes of political management. 
 
According to Hattersley, while Kinnock and his team did not believe in prioritising 
such a process, they wanted to own it if such a process was inevitable. 
 
‘Neil and I thought about revising Clause IV, but then decided it was too 
much of a struggle. Nobody took any notice of it anyway… We then heard 
that David Blunkett and [Bernard] Crick were preparing something for the 
National Executive [NEC]. We decided the only way we could frustrate them 
was getting ours in first. So Aims & Values was written for very, very typical 
Labour Party second-rate reasons.’439 
 
On the leader’s personal commitment to the process, his then Deputy did not pick up 
much enthusiasm: ‘Neil was committed to not having a paper written by Blunkett… 
that was it. I don’t know whether Neil believed in a theoretical basis for our party or 
not. In a sense he had one, in a very archaic, very old-fashioned sort of way. But he 
wouldn’t verbalise it, he wouldn’t describe it.’440 
 
Kinnock asked Hattersley to write a version, primarily because of Hattersley’s recent 
Choose Freedom and Kinnock’s view that Hattersley was a good writer.441 When 
Hattersley said all the leader should expect was a precis of Choose Freedom, Kinnock 
replied that was exactly what he wanted.442 In addition to Hattersley’s ability to turn 
around a document quickly, Kinnock’s office also foresaw a useful additional piece 
of political management in keeping Hattersley happy and meeting his request for 
                                                 
438 Hattersley, interview. 
439 Ibid. 
440 Ibid. 
441 Clarke, interview. 
442 Hattersley, interview. 
 115 
more theoretical substance. ‘I always remember Aims & Values as being something 
that Roy Hattersley wanted to do,’443 Patricia Hewitt, then Kinnock’s press chief, 
recalled. Hewitt described the process as having two main goals: first, reassuring the 
party that the policy change to come did not mean ditching Labour’s values; second, 
‘keeping Roy happy’.444 Hattersley’s recollection is very similar, noting: ‘They did it 
very kindly because they felt they owed me something.’445 
 
The Blunkett and Crick paper which provoked this activity relied a great deal on the 
latter’s previous submissions to Kinnock and Clarke. Prior to its substance, the 
document – now titled The Labour Party’s Values and Aims: An Unofficial Statement 
– carried a foreword clarifying its purpose. Blunkett and Crick claimed: 
 
‘Any rethinking of policy, and presentation of it to the public and the party 
also needs a reasoned statement of our values and aims. We decided to try our 
hands at putting together such a statement… we have attempted a synthesis 
and a summary, a restatement with modern examples, but not a new statement 
of principles… our aims and values are, we believe, a widely shared common 
ground – if all too rarely made explicit. Democratic socialism in Britain has a 
clear and distinctive doctrine which needs stating.’446 
 
As with Crick’s earlier paper, it followed a reform strategy of ‘addition’ – not 
seeking, therefore, to ‘substitute’ an existing creed for a new one, but adding to the 
party’s canon of aims, values and principles. It attempted to refocus on more 
contemporary themes, while balancing Labour’s competing traditions. It reaffirmed 
Clause IV, though interpreting its vagueness as a deliberate ambiguity to foster 
pluralism and diversity in forms of ‘social ownership’.447 It sought to reject 
‘revolutionary socialism’ but favoured ‘revolutionary change’,448 though through 
gradual economic and social reform. The document displayed one new element, 
showing the effects of Blunkett’s co-authoring: a significant amount of material on 
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local democracy, devolution and citizen participation, which Blunkett had 
emphasised as leader of Sheffield Council. ‘Community is also about participation… 
localities and regions, like ethnic and religious communities, will exercise their 
freedom in different ways,’ the document read. ‘A democratic socialist state will lay 
down national minimum standards and guidelines, but it will cheerfully allow, indeed 
encourage, local discretion and variations.’449 
 
Showing some overlap with Hattersley, Blunkett and Crick also argued: 
 
‘Sometimes it might have been better if at least we [Labour] had been more 
explicit about our basic aims and values. For we have a common ground of 
ideals which are often overlooked or understated because they seem so 
obvious and because they are found less often in books than in the beliefs and 
behaviour of ordinary party members, indeed in the whole experience and 
ethos of the Labour movement.’450 
 
Blunkett and Crick assessed Labour as being cohesive on values, yet interpreted 
Labour’s dominant ethos as one comfortable with Labour Party people finding what 
they wanted to find in its aims and objectives. In other words, it showed a perception 
of Labour’s dominant ethos as one where Labour people display a lack of interest in 
clarifying the party’s formal creed. Blunkett and Crick argued from an interpretation 
of Labour’s ethos which was more assertive about debating Party Objects and in 
favour of greater clarity – through a published restatement of aims and values – of 
what theoretical basis informs Labour’s policies, something shared with Hattersley. 
The difference, at this early stage of the Aims & Values process, lay between the 
Blunkett and Crick strategy of ‘addition’, and the Hattersley position – suggested in 
Choose Freedom and from an initial agreement between Kinnock and his deputy – of 
something closer to ‘addition with silent substitution’. Another decision-maker at the 
top of the party furthered a strategy more clearly of ‘substitution’. Peter Mandelson, 
according to Hattersley, ‘wanted a Bad Godesberg-style rejection of extremism. I 
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reminded him that Bad Godesberg rejected Marxism, we never needed to reject 
Marxism because we hadn’t been a Marxist party’.451 
 
The Bad Godesberg Programme of the German Social Democrats (SPD) – the ‘most 
famous ‘revisionist’ manifesto of social democracy’ in the mid-20th Century452 – was 
the SPD’s response to successive election defeats and the associated ideological 
‘baggage’ revisionists believed the party was dragging around. The SPD’s new 
programme dropped mentions of nationalization, accepted the market and, in 
Sassoon’s words, delivered ‘the symbolic representation of the abandonment of 
socialism as an “end state”’.453 In the minds of some in the Labour Party during the 
electoral nadir of the 1980s, including Hattersley, Bad Godesberg had been a clear 
shedding of unpopular ideological elements.454 Mandelson included a copy of the Bad 
Godesberg programme in correspondence with Patricia Hewitt about the policy 
review process455 and wanted a statement of revisionist intent.456 While Mandelson 
knew that, were such a revisionist statement put forward, ‘people would contest it, 
and contest it hard’,457 he remained a critic of the Aims & Values process underway. 
He reflected: 
 
‘It wasn’t coming out right. It wasn’t sufficiently original. It wasn’t 
sufficiently different. It wasn’t sufficiently clear.’458 
 
As Hughes and Wintour have noted, after Hattersley picked up the pen for Aims & 
Values, ‘Kinnock and his deputy exchanged endless alternative drafts. The party 
leader changed little of substance: most of his additions were subsequently erased, as 
were Hattersley’s more prolix bouts of self-indulgence’.459 Yet an analysis of the 
drafts shows something else: a document with far starker language about the 
weakness of Labour’s existing creed, the risk of (sometimes wilful) 
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miscomprehension of the party’s constitution, and the need for ideological 
restatement. This language was gradually removed as the document went forward. 
The Aims & Values process moved from a strategy of ‘addition with silent 
substitution’ to one of purely ‘addition’, reaffirming Party Objects and language to 
avoid confrontation. This was the strategic role Kinnock played, not wanting to 
antagonise Labour people who were committed to the party’s traditions, yet at that 
moment were expected to accept significant programmatic change through the Policy 
Review. 
 
Kinnock’s role in this regard has been commented on critically. Kinnock’s biographer 
Martin Westlake, for example, suggests that it was ‘symptomatic that the one 
opportunity Kinnock had to set out his vision of Britain’s socialist future he chose to 
delegate to a leading figure of the old social democratic right’.460 Kinnock, so the 
argument goes, was not an intellectual. Indeed, he was aware that some accused him 
of being, in his words, ‘intellectually lazy’.461 This study presents a different picture. 
While acknowledging Kinnock’s preoccupation with party unity, the story here is of a 
leader who had thought about Labour’s theoretical basis and concluded that Labour’s 
socialism did not require such debates, indeed he thought they could undermine the 
cohesiveness of a movement already jolted and twisted by different shocks. The 
somewhat paradoxical conclusion is of a leader who engaged to urge disengagement. 
In other words, it’s not that he didn’t care, or had no views – he did. Instead, 
Kinnock’s strong view, as expressed in his lecture to the Fabian Society in the first 
parliament, was of a Labour ideological tapestry that didn’t have an easy label, and 
more importantly should not have one thrust upon it. This was a significant part of 
Kinnock’s interpretation of Labour’s ethos, and it affected greatly this period of 
theoretical re-examination. As Hughes and Wintour have noted, ‘Kinnock… believed 
that politics was not so much visionary utterance, as a matter of what you could win, 
today and tomorrow’.462 
 
An analysis of the early drafts for Kinnock’s introduction to Aims & Values reveals a 
document that initially argued: (i) the absence of a guiding statement of theory, aims 
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and values was a problem for the Labour Party and; (ii) an additional statement of 
aims and values, silent on Labour’s existing constitutional creed and omitting 
language from the constitution and other earlier publications, would help clarify the 
party’s intentions in the eyes of the public. While the introduction from the leader 
printed in the published version of Democratic Socialist Aims & Values was only four 
short paragraphs, earlier drafts were far more substantial. One such introduction 
began: 
 
‘I have always felt that the absence of a Statement of Aims & Values was a 
disadvantage for the Labour Party. It meant that our enemies could 
misrepresent what we stood for, and our members and friends were forced to 
fall back too often on sentimental and often selective versions of history. It 
has inhibited our confidence and our campaigning.’463 
 
In a slightly longer draft version of the introduction, a similar passage was present, 
with some corrections by hand (included in the below): 
 
‘The absence of a Statement of Aims & Values has always been a 
disadvantage for the Labour Party. It meant that our enemies could 
misrepresent what we stood for. Our members and friends were forced to fall 
back too often on sentimental and often selective versions of history. The 
publication by the Labour Party’s National Executive Committee of this 
Statement of Aims & Values corrects that omission.’464 
 
Yet in the copy of this longer draft in Kinnock’s papers, the content is scored through 
with a pen and replaced with the line ‘we are democratic socialists’ before proceeding 
to the aspirations of the Labour movement which, when the document eventually saw 
the light of day, was the format for Kinnock’s short introduction.465 The drafts of 
Kinnock’s introduction also contained a more developed message on Labour’s 
political economy. The published introduction from Kinnock does not mention 
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markets, alluding only to a state ‘under the feet of the people, not over their heads’.466 
An earlier draft included the phrase ‘markets where they can: governments where 
they must’,467 which bears a strong resemblance to the Bad Godesberg language of 
‘planning where necessary, the market whenever possible’.468 During the drafting 
process, there was clear back and forth on market language. A letter from Patricia 
Hewitt read: ‘As you asked, I’ve redone the Introduction to embrace upward 
mobility. I’ve also reinstated material on ‘the market’ – partly because Aims & 
Values itself isn’t really satisfactory on the economy.’469 Much of the substance of 
these introductions survived into March 1988, the month prior to the National 
Executive Committee meeting to approve Aims & Values. 
 
In both Kinnock’s speech to be delivered to the Parliamentary Labour Party, and in 
the accompanying press notice, the argument that an absence of such a statement was 
a problem, including for Labour people falling back ‘on sentimentality’, was 
retained.470 However, the language on markets was longer and less clear than the Bad 
Godesberg-style statement highlighted above. At an earlier meeting of the Shadow 
Cabinet and NEC, ‘John Smith, Bryan Gould and Robin Cook all said the document 
was too enthusiastic about the advantages of the market’.471 Kinnock’s speech, 
therefore, put forward a statement which has been criticised as ‘typically vacuous’.472 
He argued: 
 
‘In essence it [Aims & Values] says that no socialist sensibly proposes that 
markets are abolished any more than any socialist holds that markets should 
be absolute. The question is therefore what do we do [NK’s emphasis] about 
markets. And the answer is… from some areas (health, education, social 
security, for example) we seek to exclude the market… in other areas, we seek 
to establish social ownership, varying from complete public ownership to 
                                                 
466 N. Kinnock, Democratic Socialist Aims & Values, (London: The Labour Party, 1988), p.2. 
467 Neil Kinnock, draft introduction prior to full paper of Aims & Values. 
468 P. Diamond, ‘Permanent reformism: the social democratic challenge of the future?’ in Where Now 
For European Social Democracy? (London: Policy Network, 2004), pp.31-39 p.32. 
469 Patricia Hewitt to Neil Kinnock, 1988, Churchill Archives Centre, The Papers of Neil Kinnock, 
KNNK 2/2/5 
470 Neil Kinnock, Statement to PLP and accompanying press release, 1988, Churchill Archives Centre, 
The Papers of Neil Kinnock, KNNK 2/2/5. 
471 Hughes and Wintour, Labour Rebuilt, p.70. 
472 Ibid., p.74. 
 121 
public share participation… in other areas we want to subject the market to 
regulation and control.’473 
 
Pithy it was not. Kinnock’s penchant for more words rather than fewer was a factor 
here, as was the surprise opposition on market language from those close to Kinnock 
and Hattersley. So too was Kinnock’s clear view that what could be described as a 
‘clarifying’ or a ‘focusing’ of Labour’s political economy would ignore the 
complexities of Labour’s thought. Complexity continued to be added as the 
leadership pursued its strategy of taking everyone possible along with the document – 
though, according to the then General Secretary of the party, Larry Whitty, the Aims 
& Values process was already failing to stimulate much debate. Whitty wrote to 
Kinnock in mid-March, noting: 
 
‘We have now reached the deadline for comments on the Document. I have 
only just received one from the NEC (from Ken Livingstone) which has been 
sent across to your office. We have also received one from Eric Heffer 
following the PLP meeting. I had anticipated more… This poor response 
concerns me. Expressions of view at the NEC/Shadow Cabinet meeting, at the 
PLP meeting, up and down the Regional Conferences, and informally from 
affiliated unions do not seem able to be transferred onto paper! There is 
undoubtedly unease at aspects of the draft as it stood.’474 
 
The absence of significant engagement through written responses left Whitty to 
interpret the mood of the party at large, noting there had been ‘no consultation on the 
document’ and leading him to call for an expression of the ‘market issue’ that was 
‘more acceptable to the party’.475 This was the first sign of a lack of engagement and 
interest in the Aims & Values process in the party, including the parliamentary party, 
alongside the perception of those in leadership roles that too much change would 
adversely affect the movement mood. One explanation put forward on this was the 
apparent lack of controversy. As Hughes and Wintour noted, ‘politics is most exciting 
when it appears innovatory. Anyone who leaps up and down shouting “we think 
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markets are sometimes good, sometimes bad, on the one hand efficient, on the other 
hand not”, is hardly likely to excite much attention’.476 By the very nature of 
Kinnock’s strategy of seeking to accommodate, and to take people along with the 
document, signs of success would include MPs allocating very little time to thinking 
about it. Yet it also speaks to differing interpretations of Labour’s ethos. To 
Hattersley, even moderate engagement with Labour’s political economy was 
deserving of attention. Yet to others, restatements of the party’s political economy, 
even when tinkering, did not engender much emotion.  
 
An act of sabotage 
 
The April NEC meeting to discuss Aims & Values was notable for a move which led 
to the inclusion of Clause IV of Labour’s constitution in the document, brought about 
by ‘the Left group on the NEC [who] proposed at the end of the meeting that the 
words of Clause IV… should also be included in the text’.477 Mandelson later 
reflected: ‘Dennis [Skinner] proposed this… Neil looked at me with a face of horror 
… we both knew it was an intended act of sabotage. Neil tried to find an immediate 
reason why we shouldn’t do it.’478 Mandelson wrote a note to Kinnock during the 
meeting saying that he must resist the move at all costs, and ‘winced’479 when 
Kinnock agreed to include Clause IV in the publication. Mandelson omitted Clause 
IV from the copy of Aims & Values distributed to the media,480 and the clause 
eventually appeared on the inside cover of the final document,481 though one might 
add it took up considerably more space than Kinnock’s slimmed down introduction. 
Alongside more nuanced market language, arguing that ‘it is not possible to lay down 
any strict and simple rule which governs the way in which the output of the mixed 
economy be distributed’,482 the inclusion of Clause IV acted as an early warning 
signal that Aims & Values would fail to shift the dial towards ideological renewal. 
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As with the General Secretary’s early warnings about a lack of engagement, 
Hattersley reflected that the party was: 
 
‘Blasé about it… Conference Arrangements Committee allocated forty 
minutes for debate on it all, twenty minutes from me, twenty minutes’ 
discussion. Neil and I didn’t believe that was long enough and begged them to 
do more. They agreed to one hour. In fact, debate collapsed after twenty-five 
minutes, my twenty minutes and two speakers… went down at party 
conference like a lead balloon… Frankly nobody ever heard of it again… it 
was disappointing to me, not because I had written it, but because I thought it 
was essential to the Labour Party’s success.’483 
 
Dell has commented on the ‘tranquil surface of traditional party philosophy’484 being 
entirely unaffected by Aims & Values. Like Gaitskell’s Labour’s Aims, ‘there was 
nothing in it that would give it a shelf life of even a few years. The electorate seemed 
to want rather stronger evidence of a real transformation in Labour than a statement 
of the meandering thoughts of a passing leader’.485 In Hattersley’s address to 
Labour’s 1988 Annual Conference, which voted to approve Aims and Values on a 
card vote by 5,086,000 for to 1,072,000 against,486 the deputy leader presented a 
strategy of addition. While arguing that a debate on the principles of democratic 
socialism was ‘a rare event in the history of Labour Party conferences’,487 he went on 
to affirm that he believed ‘absolutely and without qualification that we will not build 
a more equal society until we extend and expand social ownership in this country; but 
social ownership not in one form, but in all its many and varied forms as stipulated 
and expressed in the full clause IV of our constitution’.488 Some ‘shibboleths’, as 
evidenced by this speech, were still useful to unite the conference hall and generate 
some applause. 
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A strategy of addition, this chapter’s analysis suggests, was not Kinnock’s only 
option. An alternative strategy, one of substitution or – to a lesser extent – addition 
with silent substitution, would have challenged what successive leaders have 
perceived as the dominant ethos of the party: one comfortable with the vagaries of 
Clause IV socialism, and one both unused to and suspicions of leadership-initiated 
debates about the party’s aims and values. It was this approach that was pursued by 
both Gaitskell and Blair. With regard to the latter, Blair ‘seized the opportunities 
provided by the political defeats of the 1980s and accompanying social change to 
orchestrate a break with many of the traditions particular to Labour… in many ways 
he is challenging the ethos and traditions of the party in a way no previous leader has 
attempted’.489 While I agree with Kenny and Smith that Blair and Gaitskell existed in 
a ‘different ideological universe’490 in matters of doctrine, in terms of their 
interpretations of the party’s ethos the leaders were much closer. Both leaders 
believed altering Labour’s Party Objects was integral to changing how people saw the 
Labour Party, both externally (voters, opposing political parties) and internally 
(communicating to party members that their party had changed). In doing so, both 
leaders were prepared ‘to extend the boundaries of modernisation beyond all that was 
formerly sacred within his own party’.491 If Blair was far from ‘Gaitskell writ 
large’492 in doctrine, in terms of ethos, their interpretations of what it was to be 
Labour were far closer.  
 
Such differences in intent and motivation do not, of course, fully explain the 
outcomes of these engagements with Labour’s Party Objects. While Gaitskell and 
Blair began with a strategy of substitution, and the clear intent to alter their party’s 
aims and values, only the latter succeeded. Gaitskell did not prepare the ground for 
his challenge to Clause IV, and his attempt – while doctrinally nuanced on the matter 
of public ownership – was seen as part of a revisionist plot. Some Labour people who 
did not ardently oppose Gaitskell still believed his attempt was foolhardy, 
representing the view that ‘any squabble over “theology” should have been avoided 
by silence in opposition until the same ends could be attained, still silently, in practice 
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after coming into power’.493 The outcome Gaitskell was forced to accept was one of 
‘addition’; a document which ‘reaffirms, amplifies and clarifies Party Objects’494 
following the reprinting of the original Clause IV at the beginning of the paper. 
Blair’s attempt was made in more favourable circumstances, and with a less 
outwardly antagonistic aura. At the time, ‘the Left was marginalised and leaderless, 
the unions were greatly weakened’495 and much policy change had occurred under 
Kinnock. 
 
With the Kinnock approach, Hattersley began the process of Aims & Values with the 
goal of addition with silent substitution, something Kinnock went along with for a 
while, but then gradually moved away from. Even prior to the NEC meeting which 
introduced the original Clause IV into the document, Kinnock had stepped back from 
the arguments that substantiate either substitution, or addition with silent substation. 
Language was finessed to the point of vacuity. Arguments positing the importance of 
ideological clarity, juxtaposed with the existing weakness of Clause IV, were 
dropped. And language suggestive of an attack on tradition, nostalgia and 
sentimentality was removed. Mandelson’s efforts to communicate Aims & Values – 
minus, and contrary to the NEC’s decision, the original Clause IV – were unlikely to 
have succeeded with or without Kinnock’s concession. Kinnock’s strategic context – 
the picture he had in his mind of the ideational, institutional and environmental 
factors affecting his position – was not as favourable as Blair’s. The shock to the 
Labour Party of the 1992 defeat was yet to occur, and Kinnock’s political capital was 
being expended on policy change, having centralised much of the policy-making 
machinery in his first parliament. Yet differences in both motivation and in 
interpretations of the party’s ethos were significant in seeing Labour’s Party Objects 
remain unchanged for a further six years.    
 
Conclusion 
 
In Heffernan’s account of the origins of New Labour, the period from 1987-1994 is 
considered to be one of ‘transformation’.496 On the basis of Kinnock’s confrontations 
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with the Militant Tendency, Heffernan concluded that Kinnock ‘appeared to relish 
taking on the various sacred cows of the Left’.497 Yet this judgement is coupled with 
a description of Kinnock, particularly during his first parliament, as a leader 
‘reluctant to go where the party may not follow’.498 Considering a Labour person’s 
behaviour in the context of Labour’s ethos provides a fuller picture of Kinnock’s 
leadership. Kinnock did not relish slaying sacred cows when he believed doing so 
risked a clash with what he perceived to be the party’s dominant ethos. This chapter’s 
analysis of the Aims & Values process shows a leader who did not prioritise reform of 
Party Objects for this reason, alongside his own view that Clause IV socialism was 
vague – bordering on meaningless – but solidifying for his party. 
 
Kinnock decided that at a time when he was asking his party to accept significant 
doctrinal change through the Policy Review, he had to work with, rather than against 
his party’s ethos. Returning to Drucker’s dilemma on Party Objects, where ‘any 
ideology which attaches to an organisation has to face two ways. It must guide policy 
by posing a concept of what the party is about, and it must provide the party with an 
ethos which keeps its activists at their task’,499 Kinnock’s response was to leave Party 
Objects undisturbed. Instead, he prioritised the organisational imperative ‘to hang 
together, not to clarify the [party’s] concepts’.500 Kinnock emerges, therefore, as a 
figure less inclined to challenge the party’s dominant ethos, and holding an individual 
interpretation which sought to avoid strife. Despite Kinnock’s lack of belief in Clause 
IV, his individual interpretation of the party’s ethos, coupled with his perception of 
the dominant interpretation, meant that he judged reform of Party Objects to be an 
unnecessary risk: unnecessary because of his prioritisation of organisational and 
policy change; and a risk because of its divisive potential. This frustrated the efforts 
of others – who held a different view – to affect Labour’s modernisation and clarify 
Labour’s objectives. 
 
While Kinnock’s Policy Review process oversaw extensive changes, this chapter has 
argued that its precursor process – Aims & Values – was a limited restatement of the 
party’s mission. In terms of doctrinal change, I agree that the post-1987 Policy 
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Review process ‘represented a much more systematic effort to resolve the ideological 
crisis of revisionist social democracy’.501 However, the Policy Review was just that – 
a review of policy – rather than a broader, theoretical revision sitting within a 
recognisably different intellectual project. Considered in this way, Kinnock’s process 
of renewal appears less systematic than some analysis focusing on the Policy Review 
suggests. 
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Chapter 4 
Emblems: unilateralism as ‘deep religion’ in Kinnock’s Labour Party 
 
“If Socialists desert the arena of morals the Conservatives may seek to occupy the forsaken territory.” 
Michael Foot, Another Heart and Other Pulses 
 
“They say that we have got to have Trident… because human nature is such that if you do not have a 
big stick to hit back with then you will get hit. I will tell you this about human nature; if it really is as 
the Tories say it is… there is not going to be any human nature left – because there will be no human 
beings left.” 
Neil Kinnock, 1983 Labour Party Conference Speech, Brighton 
 
“I am very worried about the press speculation ... I don’t believe a word of it.” 
David Blunkett, letter to Neil Kinnock, 1989 
 
“Unconditional abandonment of nuclear weapons by Britain would, at best, mean that the possibility of 
securing reductions by others was severely limited… I do not believe – as a matter of reality, not of 
pessimism – that the Labour Party could get a mandate to govern with a policy of unconditional 
unilateral nuclear disarmament.” 
Neil Kinnock, letter to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 1989 
 
Introduction 
 
In his memoir, Denis Healey recounted a story from a visit to Allerton Bywater 
colliery, outside Leeds, during the 1983 general election campaign. ‘Again and 
again’, Healey recalled, ‘I was lectured by these Yorkshire miners, who were militant 
followers of Arthur Scargill on industrial issues, that neither they nor the voters 
would put up with unilateral nuclear disarmament.’502 Like many senior Labour 
politicians, Healey believed that ‘our defence policy certainly cost us the votes of 
many traditional Labour supporters’,503 as Labour crashed to defeat. While the true 
extent of any electoral damage from Labour’s defence policy was much debated at 
the time, it is undeniable that Labour people, from the very top to those in local 
parties throughout the land, believed unilateral nuclear disarmament was an electoral 
liability. Despite this, those same Labour people struggled to change this policy. The 
perception of Labour Party people’s deep commitment to unilateralism, and its 
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emblematic and symbolic status in the party, greatly affected the Labour leadership’s 
direction in this policy area throughout the 1980s and the early period of Labour’s 
modernisation. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to show how individual interpretations of the party’s 
ethos, and the dominant interpretation, affected the strategic calculations of the actors 
responsible for devising Labour’s policy on nuclear weapons. The question this 
chapter seeks to answer is why, when so many policies come and go, do others 
engender such strong feelings and a sense of attachment, tantamount to faith, in the 
Labour Party? And how does the emblematic status of a policy affect a political 
actor’s strategic calculations? In this chapter I present a typology of policy 
characteristics to help answer the first question. The characteristics are: a strong 
socialist heritage; a stark contrast with the Conservative opposition; an adhesive 
quality which can bind Labour people together; and relevance to internal 
factionalism. In relation to the second, this chapter shows how ‘emblems’ can appear 
unchangeable, significantly affecting an actor’s strategy, but that their interaction 
with the external environment, and the agency of political actors, can provide an 
opportunity for change. 
 
Neil Kinnock’s perception was of strong support from some at the top of the party, to 
most at the bottom, for unilateralism. It was perceived as so deeply rooted in the 
party’s psyche as to make it incredibly difficult to change. In Shaw’s words, ‘an 
attempt to discard it would have probably incited mass rebellion’,504 such was the 
strength of feeling in the mid-1980s. This was reinforced by Kinnock’s own long-
standing commitment to unilateralism. The policy had become a powerful symbol 
within Labour’s ranks, and one which generated great loyalty and fervour: in short, it 
had become an emblem for Labour Party people and for their distinctive identity in a 
tumultuous domestic and global political period. This chapter explains how a leader 
holding a different interpretation of Labour’s ethos to that they perceived movement-
wide – in this case, Kinnock’s pragmatism versus what he perceived to be his party’s 
dogmatism – managed Labour’s competing traditions, and achieved change in the 
process. 
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On matters related to Labour’s political economy, a number of academic studies have 
portrayed a path towards acceptance of the market economy, moves away from public 
ownership,505 and greater care given to the prioritisation of public spending 
commitments. Viewing Kinnock’s changes to the Labour Party as a whole, the first 
parliament was undoubtedly a slower, more cautious beginning. And on matters more 
clearly linked to reform of Party Objects, as the previous chapter argued, Kinnock’s 
approach prioritised unity over transformation throughout his tenure. Yet, on 
economic policy, Kinnock’s path to a more market-friendly destination was relatively 
linear. In other areas, including the party’s fractious stance over the European 
Community, or on the sale of council houses, Kinnock moved swiftly to change 
Labour’s policy in his first parliament. On the party’s nuclear weapons policy, 
however, Kinnock’s journey was more complicated. Despite the recognition that 
‘defence could never be a vote-winner’506 and a campaign prior to the 1987 election 
to reassure the electorate that Labour believed in ‘stronger defence’,507 the party’s 
commitment to unilateral disarmament remained strong until the late 1980s – in some 
ways, even less ambiguous than Michael Foot and Denis Healey’s compromise for 
the 1983 general election. 
 
Definitions: Unilateralism and multilateralism 
 
While the 1980s policy of unilateral disarmament has been described as a symbol, the 
temporal nature of Labour’s nuclear weapons policy is important to note, not least for 
clarity about what it was the Labour Party was attached to. Labour’s 1980s 
‘unilateralism’ – which will be referenced a great deal in what follows – was very 
similar to Hugh Gaitskell’s policy from 1960 onwards, referred to as being 
multilateralist.508 
 
Labour’s policy in 1983, outlined by Michael Foot, was as follows: 
 
‘Britain at the United Nations should reverse the decision of the previous 
December and agree to a freeze on the production, deployment and testing of 
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nuclear weapons, and to a comprehensive test ban… as another first step, we 
should make clear our refusal to site Cruise missiles on our soil… in addition, 
we should cancel the Trident programme. These steps were to be the 
immediate ones, but others would follow soon – steps towards a change in 
NATO’s strategy, towards accepting the doctrine of no first use of nuclear 
weapons, towards finding ways in which no-nuclear zones could be 
established in Europe, towards the inclusion, as the negotiations proceeded, of 
Britain’s Polaris force in the nuclear disarmament negotiations – in which 
Britain should participate.’509 
 
In 1959, Labour’s stated policy rejected unilateralism, and built on the important 
bond between ‘Mr Gaitskell and Mr Bevan’ who had ‘both emphasised… the next 
Labour Government must be free, in view of facts which are not available to a party 
in opposition, either to modify or to reject altogether the nuclear strategy and the 
defence priorities which it will inherit’.510 This was based on the view that there was 
‘not the slightest evidence that, if we were to take this step [unilateralism], it would 
induce America or Russia to follow suit’ while any moves to abandon nuclear bases 
in Britain ‘would be tantamount to a British withdrawal from NATO’.511 However, a 
year later, the future of Britain’s nuclear weapons policy was in question. Harold 
Macmillan’s Conservative Government announced the cancellation of Blue Streak, 
the British, land-based missile delivery system which was the basis for Britain’s 
strategic deterrent.512 While this cancellation did not remove Britain’s nuclear 
capability – it retained airborne bombers – the cancellation reopened the necessity, or 
otherwise, of an ‘independent nuclear deterrent’, or in other words, a missile system 
capable of striking another nuclear power’s mainland. 
 
With Gaitskell having never believed ‘in the independent nuclear deterrent as a 
matter of principle’,513 the Labour leadership accepted that Britain ‘should cease the 
attempt to remain an independent nuclear power, since this neither strengthens the 
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alliance nor is it now a sensible use of our limited resources’.514 The document which 
contained this position – Policy for Peace – agreed on the mantra of ‘no first use’ by 
the West of nuclear weapons, and sought the banning of nuclear weapons 
everywhere, while committing Britain to membership of a nuclear-armed NATO.515 It 
was accepted as Labour Party policy by the 1961 annual conference. While both 
positions contain an element of fudge – Foot was silent on what would happen to the 
Polaris missile system if talks ceased to exist, while Gaitskell’s position was silent on 
existing nuclear weapons – both were, in programmatic terms, quite similar. The 
difference between the two is, rather obviously, the context of the time. Both terms 
have, like public ownership, often been relative within the Labour Party in the sense 
that while two Labour people could be in favour of unilaterally eradicating Britain’s 
own nuclear weapons, a Labour person could be ‘more’ or ‘less’ unilateralist 
depending on their position on NATO, or U.S. naval bases in the UK. 
 
With Blue Streak abandoned, and Gaitskell’s long-held concern over the economic 
case for Britain to develop or purchase a missile system, the closest position Gaitskell 
felt he could take to the Conservatives was to remain in a U.S/NATO nuclear force. 
This led to the characterisation of, ‘in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the core 
participants in the British nuclear weapon debate… [being] the left-wing anti-nuclear 
movement on the one side and the Labour leadership along with the Conservative 
government on the other’.516 Foot’s policy was, unlike Gaitskell’s, in stark contrast to 
Margaret Thatcher’s policy of updating an established U.S. missile delivery 
programme which had been long-shared with the U.K. Similarly, the context of 
NATO was also markedly different. Gaitskell was confronting what he perceived as 
the ‘neutralism’ of the peace movement – though, as discussed later in the chapter, 
this was far from accepted within that movement – and Britain’s place as an ally of 
the United States and a partner in a U.S.-led alliance in opposition to Soviet 
aggression. 
 
By the 1980s, Labour’s ‘unilateralism’ accepted NATO membership, focusing on 
reform from within. Therefore, the ‘unilateralism’ referred to throughout much of this 
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chapter refers to the 1980s unilateralism which Kinnock inherited and endorsed. That 
was the pre-eminence (in policy terms) of the UK taking two crucial unilateral (that 
is, taken by Britain without the conditionality of a multi-nuclear state commitment) 
steps: a) the eradication of a British independent nuclear deterrent, which in the 1980s 
was the submarine-launched Polaris system, to be succeeded by the Trident system; 
b) the removal of U.S intermediate range missiles from Britain, known as Cruise 
missiles. The use of the term ‘multilateralism’ refers to the policy Kinnock eventually 
adopted, and which had been previously promoted by Labour people from the first 
Attlee Government onwards: that Labour believed in a non-nuclear world, but that 
depended on an international process of eradication achieved through diplomacy, 
which unilateral action would undermine.  
 
Emblems: what makes a policy so distinctive and deeply-rooted? 
 
Table 4 presents the typology for an emblematic policy which I introduced in Chapter 
2. Unilateralism spoke to Labour’s traditions of peace, if not pacifism, and a moral or 
ethical socialism. It also connected to retellings of Labour’s past, for instance in 
Labour people’s sense of the party’s historic relationships with other countries, such 
as the United States and the Soviet Union. There was a strong dividing line with the 
opposition around nuclear weapons policy, approaching some of the central cleavages 
between Conservative neo-liberalism and Labour’s democratic socialism. 
Unilateralism had been, meanwhile, an incredibly factional policy area, with the 
capacity to divide and to bind, depending on the make-up of the parliamentary party 
in particular.  
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Table 4: Emblematic policy typology 
Characteristic Effect 
Socialist heritage Debates around the policy touch on 
strong socialist themes, such as 
economic power, democracy and 
morality. These debates also relate to 
the history of the Left, including its 
historic allegiances. 
Stark contrast with Conservatives The policy represents a stark contrast 
with opposition parties and ideologies. 
Yet that stark contrast, when 
considering the views of those rejecting 
a particular policy, can also be 
considered damaging – both electorally 
and strategically. 
Adhesive quality Both proponents of the policy, and more 
neutral Labour people, believe that 
changing such a policy would lead to 
division. While other things may be 
changing, this particular policy has the 
capacity to bind factions together. 
Importantly, this requires evidence of 
substantial support in the Labour Party. 
Relevance to internal factionalism The policy speaks to narratives 
regarding the record of Labour 
governments, and the identity of 
different factions within the Labour 
movement. This interacts with another 
key fault line in Labour’s ethos: 
Outsiders. 
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CND’ers and the characteristics of emblems 
 
Before turning to Kinnock’s own journey in detail, a short consideration of the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) – an organisation Kinnock had been 
closely associated with – can add to our understanding of the role ‘emblems’ play as 
an expression of political identity. Established in 1958,517 CND rapidly gathered 
momentum in the context of atmospheric nuclear tests by Britain, the U.S and Russia 
and the development and build-up of nuclear weapons in Europe. It called for Britain 
to immediately renounce the production and use of nuclear weapons, and in 1960 
agreed that Britain should withdraw from NATO.518 The nature of CND as a pluralist, 
mass campaign presented both the promise of change and the threat of division and 
incoherence. As Taylor and Pritchard noted, for the majority of the movement 
‘political considerations… were not the main motivating force’, with activists instead 
attracted to a message presented in ‘clear, simple, urgent and couched in straight-
forwardly moral terms’.519 In particular, a tension between political engagement and 
moral protest revealed itself in the CND’s links to the Labour Party. 
 
The CND connection with the Labour Party was unsurprising. Frank Parkin’s survey 
data of CND marchers found half of adult respondents to be members of a political 
organisation or party, predominantly the Labour Party.520 CND’ers coalesced around 
ideological viewpoints often found on the Left, including critiques of capitalism and 
arguments in favour of constitutional and democratic reform, making CND 
membership not necessarily dependent on detailed analyses of ‘the Bomb’ but on an 
‘individual’s ideological position generally’521 – evidenced by the involvement of, for 
example, New Left intellectuals who diverged from some CND’ers on defence 
policy. Figures from the Labour Left were involved with the organisation from its 
very beginning, notably Michael Foot.522 Membership of CND remained a feature of 
political life for a substantial number of Labour people, with Syed and Whitely 
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recording 18.9% of Labour members surveyed in 1989/90 as CND’ers,523 a far 
greater proportion than Labour people in the various socialist societies or specialist 
groups. The CND agreed early on in its existence – in the late 1950s – to seek to 
affect the Labour Party’s policy on nuclear weapons, as well as working on public 
knowledge and building a wider campaign. With ‘most of its [the campaign’s] 
upholders… drawn from the Labour Party’,524 both committed and persuadable 
connections could be found on the Labour Left. How significant the CND was to 
Labour’s own political course is a matter of debate – and one that this study does not 
attempt to engage with. Suffice to say there is disagreement. Frank Cousins, the 
unilateralist-backing general secretary of the Transport & General Workers Union 
(TGWU), once told the philosopher and CND’er Bertrand Russell ‘that it did not 
matter one way or the other’525 what Russell said. It was union votes which switched 
Labour’s policy at the Scarborough Conference of 1960 from Gaitskell’s 
‘multilateralism’ to unilateralism. Yet other Labour people, like Michael Foot, have 
noted how the CND changed ‘the political atmosphere world-wide and not merely in 
isolated Britain’.526 
 
In relation to the party’s socialist heritage and drawing a contrast with the 
Conservatives – two characteristics of emblematic policies – CND lacked a 
comprehensive ideology. Instead, it offered a ‘focus of opposition to the 
“Establishment” by concentrating on a single major issue which could be presented as 
a straightforward choice between good and evil’.527 In the wake of widespread 
disenchantment on the Left with Soviet communism, this sat well both among the 
wider Left and with Labour people. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the 
Labour Party lacked a comprehensive creed too, and often embraced moralistic 
causes. Indeed, the existence of emblematic policies within Labour’s ethos can be 
partly explained by ideological ambiguity, leaving Labour people to find the true 
cause of Labour’s socialism in particular policies. With the CND campaign, Labour 
people had an opportunity to be ‘expressive’528 in their politics – an important 
tradition within Labour’s ethos, and analysed more fully in Chapter 6 – which Parkin 
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argued saw ‘protest against the Bomb… as an expression of protest against other 
more fundamental ills of society, even though this connection was not always 
explicitly made’.529 This also spoke to a contrast with Conservatism, not just on the 
basis of nuclear weapons policy, but as a political outlook more generally. The lack 
of intellectual coherence, however, caused friction with other parts of the British Left, 
notably the New Left, which I touch upon below. 
 
Another feature of emblems, and a topic of debate in work on the CND, is the 
relevance of the organisation to factionalism within Labour. Parkin argued that 
CND’s relevance to Labour Party people in the 1957 to 1961 period was on the basis 
of its utility in the fight between the Labour Left, which sought collaboration with 
CND, and the Gaitskellite revisionist tendency. Much to the chagrin of non-Labour 
CND’ers, Parkin noted, the Labour Left saw the anti-NATO, nuclear free campaign 
as ‘not merely the case for ridding the country of the Bomb, but for ridding the party 
of Gaitskell’.530 Parkin attributes the switch of union votes in favour of the CND 
position to the appetite to attack Gaitskell, and notes how both the subsequent 
multilateralist victory at the 1961 Labour Conference and the waning enthusiasm for 
unilateralism in the years that followed can be accounted for by Gaitskell’s death. 
‘With the closing of the gulf between Left and Right, and a leadership more sensitive 
to the traditional values of the rank and file, the discontents which had provided the 
footholds for unilateralism insider the party were suddenly smoothed away,’531 he 
concluded. On the relationship between the CND and the Labour Left, Taylor and 
Pritchard challenged Parkin’s argument, placing greater emphasis on ideological 
connections over factional motivations. Here, ‘the Labour Left’s opposition to 
Gaitskell… [was] intensified by his reaction to CND’s policy and activity on 
perfectly genuine ideological grounds’.532  
 
Finally, some of those associated with the New Left sought to furnish the CND with a 
fuller, more complex worldview. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, Stuart Hall 
argued for a ‘programmatic approach’ which would enable the peace movement ‘to 
confront directly [original emphasis] the decisions which political and military 
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establishments make’.533 Hall set out a multi-stage set of aims,534 encouraged the 
continuation of ‘the political struggle’535 in the Labour Party and around the world, 
and argued for a more holistic approach to setting out an ‘independent foreign policy’ 
which could involve a number of unilateral steps, including the UK abandoning 
nuclear weapons, but not limited to that aim.536 ‘While we stand on the side-lines 
waving our slogans hopefully,’ Hall argued, ‘with the best will in the world, the 
nuclear parade is passing us by.’537 As Foot noted, what was required was ‘a new 
kind of politics… to bring it [the bomb] under control’.538 Greater complexity, 
however, carried the risk of sacrificing the simple, moral cause the CND (and Labour 
unilateralists) had long been associated with. Such complexity opened the door to 
more nuanced debates, all highly affected by the international political context. Both 
types of argument, the moral certainty and the ‘new kind of politics’ arguments, 
formed a part of Kinnock’s policy inheritance as Leader of the Labour Party. 
 
Kinnock’s inheritance 
 
Throughout Labour’s post-war history, both the veil of secrecy and the apparent lack 
of public confidence in arguing for multilateralism caused suspicion within the 
Labour Party, particularly on the Labour Left. Labour’s commitment to nuclear 
weapons, and to an internationally-agreed, or multilateral disarmament policy, was 
agreed at a meeting of Ministers on the 10th January 1947. The first majority Labour 
Government agreed to undertake research and development of atomic weapons,539 
keeping the budget under departmental spending, and the development programme 
secret. The then Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was recorded as having said: 
 
‘In his view it was important that we should press on with the study of all 
aspects of atomic energy. We could not afford to acquiesce in an American 
monopoly of this new development. Other countries also might well develop 
atomic weapons. Unless therefore an effective international system could be 
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developed after which the production and use of the weapon would be 
prohibited, we must develop it ourselves.’540 
 
The ‘pride of leading ministers in the Labour Government [which] made them 
reluctant to be overwhelmingly dependent on, and thereby subject to, Washington’,541 
also played a role, while the secrecy of the decision meant multilateralists ‘lacked… 
the legitimacy of a choice generated by the normal process of decision-making 
involving public debate in the party’.542 Multilateralists could not begin to foster a 
sense of mission, so important to the Labour Party, when the movement was unaware 
of its policy. By the time Labour returned to office nearly two decades later, Britain 
had an agreement with the U.S to buy the technology for its submarine-based Polaris 
missile system. The manufacture of the submarines was underway, and while Wilson 
had committed to a review of this agreement, the new Labour Government continued 
with it – albeit building four ‘boats’ instead of five.543 The arguments from the 
multilateralists were very similar to Bevin’s, with Labour’s then Defence Secretary, 
Denis Healey, noting: 
 
‘One reason why I decided we should after all keep Polaris, was that there was 
little chance of influencing McNamara’s [U.S Secretary of Defence] nuclear 
strategy if we had renounced nuclear weapons ourselves… I did not think it 
was wise to entrust the future of the human race to the mathematicians in the 
Pentagon.’544 
 
All of this leant an air of ‘business-as-usual’ to Labour’s multilateralists, despite the 
tumult experienced under Gaitskell’s leadership. The case was pragmatic, and 
showed continuity with previous governments, whatever their colour. By contrast, the 
Labour Left worked up the case for unilateralism along socialist themes. Tony Benn’s 
Arguments for Socialism and Arguments for Democracy, published between 1979 and 
1981, showed a reaction against Labour’s past. Benn argued that nuclear arms were 
‘eroding our domestic democracy and liberty in a fundamental way without a shot 
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being fired’,545 and noted that Britain had ‘developed nuclear weapons secretly 
without parliamentary knowledge or approval’.546 Benn was not only making a point 
about Britain’s early development of nuclear weapons, but also providing a contrast 
with the most recent Labour Government – where the then Prime Minister, Jim 
Callaghan, had authorised the ‘Chevaline’ programme to enhance Britain’s Polaris 
missile system without disclosing it; indeed, it took the Conservative Government to 
make that action public.547  
 
The election of Ronald Reagan in the United States, the deployment to Britain of U.S 
Cruise missiles, and the British Government’s decision to replace the Polaris missile 
system with the Trident missile system reopened the public debate on nuclear 
weapons policy in Britain, and re-energised both the peace movement and Labour’s 
unilateralists. Writing in 1981, Lawrence Freedman noted that, having been rejected 
by the main opposition parties, ‘resented by the military and with slight support in the 
opinion polls, Trident is now looking remarkably friendless’.548 In relation to Cruise, 
‘the Labour Party had found the embrace of the anti-nuclear movement irresistible, 
and was tempted to exploit the evident popular hostility towards hosting American 
nuclear bases’.549 However, he also noted that public hostility ‘did not extend to 
unilateral British nuclear disarmament and this became the Opposition’s Achilles’ 
heel, to the point where for most of the 1980s the ‘defence’ issue in British politics 
was the future of the country’s nuclear deterrent’.550 
 
The 1983 election, and to a lesser extent the 1987 election, saw the Labour Party put 
a stark contrast on nuclear weapons policy directly into Britain’s electoral contest. 
During the 1983 campaign, Michael Foot spoke regularly and extensively on nuclear 
weapons policy. He was intensely irritated by the Thatcher government’s insistence 
that Britain would have a say over the use of Cruise, instead arguing the deployment 
merely brought Britain and Europe into the chosen battlegrounds of the super-powers. 
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He argued:  
 
‘They’re going to be controlled by, in the control of, the President of the 
United States. Even if the dual key, so-called, were obtained, we would still 
be opposed to their deployment here, but it is a matter of major significance 
that this question has been concealed from the British public. We think it 
ought to be brought out in the open; those missiles will be under the control of 
President Reagan.’551 
 
However, while Foot personally believed Britain should unilaterally disarm, he 
showed flexibility in public statements to preserve unity with his Deputy, and 
stalwart of Labour’s nuclear debates, Denis Healey. This was a fudge that Benn had 
seen coming, noting in his diary in 1982 that ‘the thing will rumble on and create 
terrible difficulties’.552 Following news reports about a split in the leadership over the 
future of Polaris – the US, submarine-launched missile system purchased by Britain 
in the 60s – Foot and Healey discussed a clarifying statement which emphasised 
Labour’s position of what Foot called ‘step-by-step’553 action to disarm. While 
committing to the cancellation of Trident (the replacement for Polaris due in little 
over a decade) and a refusal to host Cruise, the statement read: 
 
‘Labour will put Britain’s Polaris force into the nuclear arms talks at Geneva, 
so that Britain can take its proper seat at the negotiating table. Nuclear arms 
negotiations are too important to be left to President Reagan and Mr 
Andropov. Our aim at the talks will be to reduce nuclear arms on all sides 
[Foot’s emphasis]. Phasing out our Polaris force will be part of that process. 
We will, after consultation, move to the removal of existing nuclear bases… 
we want to see NATO’s defence strategy shifted entirely away from the idea 
of using nuclear weapons first.’554 
 
When asked whether Britain would still have Polaris were Foot to be Prime Minister, 
the Labour Leader stuck closely to the line, answering ‘no… we will have carried 
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through the negotiations’,555 leaving open to interpretation whether Polaris would 
remain for its lifetime if something-for-something negotiations failed. As Healey 
noted, this fudge meant he and Foot ‘were continually asked what we would do if 
Russia refused such an agreement [something-for-something]. Michael and I had 
agreed to answer that this would be a new situation, to be considered if and when it 
arose. There was no chance of getting away with such a formula when the manifesto 
also committed us to unilateralism’.556 Foot bargained with Healey because he knew 
too well how factional nuclear weapons policy in the Labour Party could be. Prior to 
1960, the Bevanite faction had fractured on the topic of nuclear weapons, leading 
Foot and Nye Bevan to, at one point, come to blows.557 Factionalism partly defined 
Labour’s nuclear policy in the late 50s and early 60s (as noted above in relation to 
Gaitskell and CND). During the early 1980s it was a factional issue too, pitching the 
Bennite Left against the Healey Right, and leaving the Foot Left and the emerging 
‘soft Left’ holding a unilateralist line. By the 1983 election, the multilateralist Right 
which hadn’t left the Labour fold showed itself willing to adapt for the sake of party 
unity. While undoubtedly the views of Healey meant that Foot’s unilateralism had to 
bend, it was clear which side had shown the greatest flexibility. 
 
Fudge withstanding, the contrast with the Thatcher/Reagan axis was clear and 
became a core part of the ‘choice’ between Labour and the Conservatives, a choice 
closely linked to the identity of the two parties in the minds of Labour people: 
monetarism vs investment and social amelioration; investment in nuclear arms vs 
disarmament and a commitment to global talks. This contrast helped to bind the Left, 
it spoke to a very different world view, and had intellectual roots that gave great 
prominence to nuclear weapons as a social and economic system. Indeed, when 
looking for such confidence in multilateralism during this period, it can be found only 
in those multilateralists who left the Labour fold. As Roy Jenkins observed of his 
successor as Leader of the SDP, David Owen, ‘Owen set off on a course which led to 
the destruction of a successful Alliance… Owen was not merely an anti-
unilateralist… he was something of a nuclear fetishist… constantly looking for motes 
of nuclear weakness in the eyes of his colleagues’.558 Such dogmatic multilateralism 
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clashed with Labour’s ethos. Indeed, Labour’s multilateralists had acquiesced on the 
issue of Britain’s deterrent, rather than forming a powerful counter argument, such 
was the strength of unilateralism as an emblem. Those in favour of multilateralism 
had not fostered an emblem, they had instead demonstrated a belief in the pragmatic 
tradition within Labour’s ethos of adopting policies based on their perceived 
advantages alone. 
 
Kinnock and unilateralism 
 
Unilateralism offered a unifying organisational glue for Neil Kinnock when he 
became leader – a useful tool when he foresaw strife in other areas. The strength of 
Kinnock’s own moral objections, coupled with his suspicion and hostility to 
increased US armament in Europe, was mirrored in the views of Labour’s members. 
The former Prime Minister and Labour Leader, Jim Callaghan, had been denounced 
at Labour’s 1983 Conference for having criticised the party’s nuclear weapons policy 
in an election cycle. Callaghan spoke from the platform in response, arguing fiercely 
for a multilateralist policy, and calling out what he believed was the ‘fundamental 
mistake… [of] believing that by going on marches and passing resolutions without 
any attempt to try to tell the British people what the consequences were… you lost 
millions of votes’.559 Shouts rang around the hall, emphasising the continued 
relevance of the policy to the factional disputes between Labour’s Left and Right, as 
well as debates about the ‘betrayal’ of previous Labour Governments in the wider 
movement – multilateralism was associated with the increasingly bleak view of the 
Wilson and Callaghan years. To many Labour people, the Reagan/Thatcher nuclear 
axis continued to represent something which had to be opposed – and the rough 
treatment meted out to Kinnock personally (by both) only added to this frame.  
 
Indications of the movement’s attachment to unilateralism can be found in some 
survey work from the time, which I discuss below. In addition, analysis of annual 
conference decisions can provide a useful barometer for the ‘big debates’ being had 
within the party. Table 5 presents data from an analysis of conference decisions on 
nuclear weapons policy from 1979 to 1989 – the period of direct relevance to 
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Kinnock’s leadership, encompassing his inheritance, decision-making context and 
final policy destination. Conference decisions which mentioned nuclear weapons, as 
recorded in Annual Conference Reports, were analysed and then categorised into 
‘unilateralist’, ‘multilateralist’ and ‘other’. This analysis inevitably involved some 
judgement, and I note any ambiguities in the notes for Table 5. The analysis shows 
that Labour’s Annual Conference recorded 44 decisions on nuclear weapons policy – 
with the nuclear issue a consistently busy area of debate every year from 1980 to 
1989 (the 1979 conference focused on the immediate record of the previous Labour 
Government and the election defeat). This was also the case from the mid-50s to the 
end of the 60s, studied by Minkin, who recorded disarmament, public ownership, the 
Common Market and Vietnam as being ‘emotive’ conference topics.560 Conference 
support for unilateralist and multilateralist measures preceded Michael Foot’s 
leadership, yet success for multilateralist arguments ended from 1981-1988. 
Following Foot’s election, and continuing into Kinnock’s first and second 
parliaments, annual conference consistently supported unilateralist composites and 
resolutions, with 14 carried between 1980 and 1988. In the same period 3 
multilateralist composites and resolutions were put forward and lost. 
 
However, while the moral objection to Britain’s nuclear weapons did unite the 
majority of delegates, one issue consistently resulted in unilateralist motions being 
defeated: the inclusion of NATO withdrawal. The vast majority of Labour’s 
parliamentary leaders – and, as shown by this analysis, conference delegates – did not 
support a policy of neutralism in the 1980s, nor of actions being taken to obstruct the 
Alliance’s non-nuclear, conventional methods of warfare preparation. As with the 
divisions in CND, the impact of broader, more developed foreign policy arguments 
that took nuclear weapons issues quite some distance from the safer realm of morality 
had less of an impact with Labour people. Labour’s unilateralism was predominantly 
a moral and ethical expression, with the political track focusing on a contrast between 
Labour’s disarmament versus Thatcher and Reagan’s escalation – but not neutralism. 
Survey work asking for the views of Labour’s members during Kinnock’s tenure is
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Table 5: Conference decisions on nuclear weapons policy 
Labour Party Annual Conferences 1979-1984. Sources: Labour Party Annual Conference Reports, 1979-1984. 
Conference No. of 
decisions  
NEC 
statement 
approval 
Unilateralist 
carried561 
Unilateralist 
lost 
Multilateralist 
carried 
Multilateralist 
lost 
Other 
carried  
Other 
lost 
1979 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1980 5 0 2 1*562 2 0 0 0 
1981 5 1 1 1* 0 1 1 0 
1982 4 0 2 1* 0 0 1 0 
1983 5 1 2 1563 0 1 0 0 
1984 3 1 1 1564 0 0 0 0 
                                                 
561 Categorising each composite and resolution inevitably involves some judgements. Any composite or resolution which stated support for ‘unilateral’ disarmament, 
or reaffirmed and added to previous decisions / Labour’s policies supporting unilateral disarmament was selected. 
562 * denotes composite or resolution which included NATO withdrawal – a policy not supported by Labour’s unilateralist leaders – or, in the case of one composite 
in 1987 – hostile language towards NATO. 
563 Included a commitment to nationalise the arms industry. 
564 Included a commitment to expel US military bases, without the specificity of US ‘nuclear bases’. 
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Table 5 (cont.) 
Labour Party Annual Conferences 1985-1989. Sources: Labour Party Annual Conference Reports, 1985-1989. 
Conference No. of 
decisions  
NEC 
statement 
approval 
Unilateralist 
carried 
Unilateralist 
lost 
Multilateralist 
carried 
Multilateralist 
lost 
Other 
carried  
Other 
lost 
1985 5 1 1 2* 0 0 1 0 
1986 5 1 1 2* 0 0 1 0 
1987 5 0 2565 2* 0 0 0 1566 
1988 3 0 2 0 0 1567 0 0 
1989 4 1 0 1* 1 0 1568 0 
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broadly in line with the conference analysis presented here. 1991 survey data shows 
majority support (both 72%) for the statements ‘Britain should have nothing to do 
with nuclear weapons’ and ‘Britain should continue in NATO’.569 Similarly, data 
from 1986 shows majority support for Britain unilaterally renouncing nuclear 
weapons, but disagreement in two constituencies over whether Labour should 
withdraw from NATO.570 
 
Kinnock’s struggle over nuclear weapons 
 
In the view of Ben Pimlott, Neil Kinnock had made his way within Labour ‘on the 
basis of a sixth sense for the Labour Movement’s sensibilities, an instinct for its 
values and a keen judgement of its byzantine procedures’.571 Such a grasp of the 
party’s dominant ethos, and its competing traditions, this argument suggests, meant 
Kinnock was truly a man for the moment. He could reform the party at a pace it was 
comfortable with, a pace that did not risk significant splits within the party 
mainstream. Others have taken a dimmer view of Kinnock as a power-grabber, thin-
skinned, forcing through an agenda he may or may not have believed. Kinnock, 
according to this position, was a man who with ‘ease… changed his mind on virtually 
every major political question of the last quarter of a century’.572 Owing to its focus 
on Kinnock’s understanding of the party’s ethos, his own interpretation of it, and how 
these things affected his political judgement, this study is closer to the Pimlott 
conclusion. The next part of this chapter will explore Kinnock’s recognition of 
policies becoming emblems – akin to articles of faith, in his view – though it was not 
an interpretation he held himself. It will then analyse the impact this had on his 
approach to Labour’s policy on nuclear weapons, coupled with his personal and long-
standing commitment to unilateralism and a nuclear-free strategy. Finally, this chapter 
will then draw conclusions about the strategy Kinnock and his team employed to 
move Labour’s policy from unilateralism to multilateralism, including how Kinnock’s 
approach was affected by his understanding of Labour’s ethos. 
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As the previous chapter noted, Kinnock’s interpretation of his mandate was a fine 
balance between change and continuity. This understanding owed much to his own 
background and political identity, coming from the Left and having been a rebel on 
the backbenches before coming to prominence on the frontbenches. In addition, the 
absence of Tony Benn from the 1983 leadership contest – following Benn’s defeat in 
Bristol at the 1983 general election – left Kinnock conscious, still, of the power of 
Bennery and its programme – including on nuclear weapons. Kinnock noted: ‘By 
Benn not being there it was difficult to show that the Party had rejected Bennery. In 
the election [had Benn stood] I could then have been much more direct and assertive 
about the policy changes we had to make.’573 
 
However, Kinnock’s view is that, even had Benn stood, he would not have attempted 
to challenge the party’s policy on unilateral nuclear disarmament. ‘I don’t think I 
would have done unilateral disarmament,’ Kinnock recollected, ‘because that was 
deep religion.’574 Previously Kinnock has also noted that, of the modernisation 
process, ‘most challenging… were policies with particularly deep roots that were, in 
themselves, benchmarks of political disposition within the Labour Party. Chief 
amongst those policies was, of course, the whole issue of defence and nuclear 
weapons’.575 These are interesting recollections from Kinnock. First, and more 
briefly, there is some debate around whether Kinnock wanted to move away from 
unilateralism in his first parliament as Leader. Some have indicated that, in his first 
years as Leader, Kinnock wanted ‘a new accommodation with the Labour Party’s 
Atlanticist right wing’576 on defence issues, and that by the time of the second 
parliament aides were surprised that on ditching unilateralism they found ‘they were 
knocking on an open door’.577 Other accounts suggest Labour ‘fought the 1987 
election on a defence policy [unilateralism] in which Neil Kinnock no longer wholly 
believed’.578 
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As the analysis that follows in this chapter will reveal, this study falls closer to the 
latter, though stressing the word ‘wholly’. Kinnock was not in favour of renouncing 
unilateralism when he became Leader, for strategic and party management reasons. 
Documents from Kinnock’s leadership campaign, including correspondence and 
memorandums from allies, show how he was advised that ‘unilateralism must be held 
to unequivocally’,579 and in letters and policy pitches to union colleagues and MPs, 
Kinnock presented a clearer unilateralism than had ultimately emerged in 1983. 
Policies, he wrote, ‘must involve cancelling Trident, banning Cruise missiles and 
other US nuclear weapons based in Britain, withdrawing our arsenal of tactical 
nuclear weapons and phasing out Polaris, demanding an equivalent Soviet response as 
already indicated in the Andropov proposals [the offer to Foot and Healey to destroy 
an equivalent number of weapons from the Soviet armoury]’.580 The second, more 
pressing point in relation to emblematic policies, is Kinnock’s language around 
unilateralism being deep religion. 
 
The use of religious metaphors and associated terms are not uncommon among 
Labour people. A common phrase about the Labour coalition is that it is a ‘broad 
church’, Labour people have argued they are ‘inspired by Methodism more than 
Marxism’,581 and suggested Labour’s socialism ‘combined its therapeutic properties 
with many of the characteristics of religion’.582 Roy Hattersley, Labour’s Deputy 
Leader during Kinnock’s tenure, recollects how, with Labour, ‘it’s like things in the 
Church… things which are part of the past, part of the history which you can’t touch 
even though you don’t believe them anymore’.583 Kinnock saw unilateralism as being 
in this vein. In an interview for this study, Kinnock said: 
 
‘What we [Kinnock and his team] understood the difficulty was, is, that policy 
adopted through struggle, and achieved, and retained for some years take on a 
quasi-religious significance… 
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‘Changing our policy on nuclear disarmament was an uprooting of canonical 
belief… that’s the difficulty.’584 
 
In Kinnock’s mind, this made the process of policy change on nuclear weapons 
necessarily gradual, with attempts – often through tweaks in language – to pursue the 
same principles, but through different policies and strategies that didn’t cause a revolt 
among the believers. The core ‘believers’, in Kinnock’s mind, didn’t necessarily 
mean the rank and file, and the movement as a whole. 
 
Continuing the religious imagery, he noted: 
 
‘Like all religions, it has got priests, high priests and priests, and then it’s got 
the flock…. 
 
‘Positions had been taken by the high priests and couldn’t be relinquished 
without acknowledging, or seeming to concede that they’d been wrong 
before.’585 
 
While Kinnock could himself be understood as one of these ‘high priests’, having to 
concede that a past policy needed to be changed (though not, necessarily, conceding it 
was wrong), his own interpretation of this fault line – rather than his comprehension 
of the dominant ethos of the time – was of the need for pragmatism. ‘Your 
convictions must be very, very shallow if you can’t compromise,’ he noted. ‘If 
compromise is good enough for Bevan, it’s good enough for me.’586 How did this 
affect Kinnock’s approach to nuclear weapons policy? His own interpretation owed 
more to compromise and realism than to the significance of emblems. If one considers 
the frame of ‘ends and means’ in relation to ideological objectives and policies, 
Kinnock’s position saw policies (whether unilateral measures or multilateral talks) as 
means to an end (a nuclear-free world) rather than unilateralism being an end in itself. 
An electoral imperative for policy change could – and did – provide a motivation for 
reform, but it did not directly lead to an outcome. 
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Instead, Kinnock balanced this motivation with others, including party unity, the level 
of commitment to a policy (including his own), the external environment, and internal 
processes that had to be respected. Kinnock believed the party’s ethos necessitated a 
process that treated the Labour Party, certainly in his first parliament as Leader, as a 
movement that needed to be persuaded, not cajoled. Both he and Charles Clarke 
simply did not believe in any attempt to bypass the party or to rely on Kinnock 
diverging from the wider movement.587 The ‘head’ of Kinnock had to be attached to 
the ‘body’ of Labour. Kinnock’s interpretation of the party’s ethos more widely, 
including the prevailing ethos of the time, was of Labour people committed to 
emblematic policies, seriously limiting scope for compromise and change. He was not 
alone in this view. The Party’s then International Officer, Mike Gapes, called 
unilateralism a ‘quasi-religious totem’.588 
 
This understanding of the effect of ethos is not the only explanation for the difficulties 
Kinnock – and other Leaders – found when trying to reform the party policy platform. 
Organisationally, as was noted in the previous chapter, Kinnock did not feel secure 
nor guaranteed to win close votes on party change. As leader, he did not feel 
unassailable. And the external context, during the deployment of cruise missiles and 
the antagonisms between East and West, provided evidence in support (Kinnock felt) 
of his long held commitment to disarmament. However, as this chapter argues, the 
party’s ethos was highly relevant to Kinnock’s strategic calculations. Ethos is 
particularly pertinent when considering the place of the Kinnock leadership in the 
‘politics of catch-up’ thesis during Labour’s modernisation. While it has been argued 
‘the period 1982-8 were the years’589 of Thatcherism’s political advance, and 
Thatcher’s policy on nuclear weapons was one of rearmament and encouragement for 
U.S steeliness, the first Kinnock parliament actually saw the removal of some 
ambiguities in Labour’s unilateralism, for instance the full commitment to 
decommissioning Polaris. In other words, Kinnock’s first parliament drew a starker 
contrast with the Thatcherite ‘consensus’ on nuclear weapons – a divergence – rather 
than gravitating towards this centre – a convergence. In part, this was because of the 
potency of the policy within the party. 
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A strategy to convince 
 
In his 1984 Labour Party Conference speech, Kinnock drew attention to what he 
considered to be a list of Conservative failures, in which he included: ‘This was the 
year in which Cruise arrived. This was the year in which the cost of Trident soared 
past £12,000 million.’590 Kinnock was well aware that ‘nuclear defence policy had 
become both sign and symbol that not all the Left’s gains of the previous years had 
yet been forfeited’.591 The retention of unilateralism was seen as important for holding 
the party together, and crucially helped to foster ‘a disposition in much of the soft-
Left to give him [Kinnock] the benefit of the doubt’592 in his wider leadership 
strategy. Undoubtedly, Kinnock’s first parliament was an uncomfortable one on the 
issue of nuclear weapons, just as it had been for Michael Foot and Denis Healey in the 
previous parliament. Heffernan and Marqusee noted Kinnock was attempting to 
‘square a circle’ with ‘the balance of political forces inside the Party… [making it] 
impossible to jettison the non-nuclear defence policy; yet the Party leadership was 
convinced it was an electoral liability’.593 This leads them to the conclusion that 
Kinnock ‘was convinced that the unilateral abandonment of nuclear weapons would 
never be tolerated by the British establishment. It was fear of confronting that 
establishment… that prevented Labour from ever launching the real campaign on 
defence for which conference kept asking’.594 
 
This study takes a different view. Undoubtedly certain figures that could be included 
in the ‘establishment’ hated Labour’s policy. Yet it was not so much fear as a 
realisation of the difficulty in escaping the frame of unilateral surrender that defined 
the early Kinnock leadership. Both Kinnock and the party apparatus knew they would 
be sticking with a unilateralist policy at the next general election. To limit the damage 
the policy was perceived to cause, and to seek to persuade, the leadership adopted a 
dual strategy: a proactive defence campaign which sought to reposition a non-nuclear 
strategy as logical and strong, following on from headline attack on Cruise missiles 
earlier in the parliament; and weakening the moral imperative, in favour of a more 
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pragmatic case based on the diplomatic and military context, by the time of the 
party’s manifesto in 1987. Gapes saw the early Kinnock strategy as one that ‘tried 
very hard to get somewhere with the policy that we had’.595 As with Foot before him, 
Kinnock was a candidate from the Left, with a commitment to unilateralism, coupled 
with a clear desire to unify Labour’s soft Left and moderate centre. Both had had 
reputations as firebrands, both believed in the soul of the Bevanite Left. Yet, unlike 
Foot, Kinnock represented a clear determination to be less collegiate with the Hard 
Left (though Foot had overseen NEC inquiries into Militant), as well as adopting an 
openly ‘modern’ outlook, introducing Labour to the kinds of organisational and 
political methods usually associated with the Conservative machine. 
 
On unilateralism, this thirst for a more modern, presidential style included a strategy 
that was less avowedly moralistic, and more empirical. Coupled with a determination 
to contest the nuclear issue with the Conservatives, this strategy in the first parliament 
would prove hugely important when Kinnock entered his second. Kinnock thus began 
to strip away some of the Foot-style moralism, while taking the fight to the 
Conservatives on tactics for disarmament, including their bilateral and multilateral 
views. This first parliament saw Kinnock committed to unilateralism, yet with a 
strategy that also began to gradually dilute its potency within the party. From a 
campaigning perspective, the view of some Labour candidates was of continuity from 
1983, though with more practicality thrown in. In 1983, the party had adopted: 
 
‘a moral high ground… do we have cruise missiles, do we have Trident 
missiles, you can’t possibly want to buy your council house can you?’596 
 
Following Kinnock’s election, campaigning on the issue remained prominent – ‘we 
put a leaflet out… with a fist breaking a Trident missile’597 – yet with language that 
attempted to move Labour more towards stronger conventional defences. ‘Labour and 
socialists throughout Europe believe it’s possible – and vital – that we call off the 
nuclear arms race, and start to build sensible defences based on conventional 
weapons,’ literature for the 1984 European election read. ‘Most British people support 
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us. Every new missile just makes Europe a sitting duck as the super-powers square up 
for confrontation.’598 In November 1985, Kinnock’s leadership team – Clarke, Hewitt 
and Mandelson – began discussing the substance and output for a defence campaign. 
The context for this move was talk in the party and the movement that such a 
campaign would never happen, despite it being one ‘the Party had been demanding 
for so long’.599 In a memo from Hewitt to Clarke and Mandelson, Kinnock’s Press 
Secretary wrote: 
 
‘The fact is that we have to get across the message about our defence and 
nuclear disarmament policies – during the election campaign and in the two 
years or so before it starts. We need to consider how [Hewitt’s emphasis] we 
do that – and this note makes some suggestions – but whether we do it cannot 
be in doubt.’600 
 
The campaign strategy was typical of the Kinnock team’s focus on modern and 
effective communications – rather than a campaign pack and some posters, the 
strategy sought to educate the party, motivated by the 1983 election performance: ‘It 
was quite clear at the last election that many party members simply did not know the 
arguments... They could turn up on the doorstep wearing a CND badge, but had no 
idea how to answer the challenge of increasingly worried voters.’601 
 
The solution was a question-and-answer sheet, with ward-level political education 
sessions, and the suggestion of a party political broadcast (PPB) to communicate the 
party’s policy.602 Materials were to be slim and to-the-point, while the involvement of 
Kinnock in contesting the battleground was also set out at this stage. For example, the 
need to sell Labour’s policy to a U.S audience in preparation for ‘the Tories and the 
Libs/SDP to whip up anti-Labour statements from American leaders’.603 Overall, 
there was little sign of Kinnock’s team trying to run and hide from the unilateralist 
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policy. Instead, ‘making progress on one of our essential election tasks’604 was 
stressed, and work was done to try and win seats at the next election through boosts to 
domestic defence spending, rather than nuclear investment.605 Labour’s language 
during this period contrasted the Conservatives ‘running down real defence’606 with 
Labour’s approach of investment in conventional weapons rather than in developing 
Trident.607 This approach was echoed in Kinnock’s words, when he told the 1986 
Labour Party Conference: 
 
‘I hold it to be self-evident that it is the first duty of any government to ensure 
the security of the country over which it governs… Meeting that obligation 
requires that we defend ourselves effectively by land, sea, and air and that we 
participate properly in the Alliance of which we are full and firm members… 
It is now plainly the case that, by pursuing a nuclear-dependent defence 
policy, the present government is diminishing the conventional defence of our 
country.’608 
 
Kinnock still noted the catastrophic destructive potential of nuclear weapons, as 
Labour’s unilateralists long had, to evoke emotion and commitment. Yet this 
language too was shaped to project, where possible, a more conventional ‘strength’ 
from the Labour Party, rather than the rhetoric of ‘peace’. Following assurances to his 
audience, at home and abroad, that non-nuclear U.S assets and bases would be 
welcome in Britain, Kinnock approached the end of his speech with this section: 
 
‘It must mean that people face that fact of the existence of weapons of 
obliteration and how we control, reduce and abolish… squarely and honestly. I 
face those questions as the leader of this party… I tell you in no casual spirit, 
no bravado, that like most of my fellow citizens I would if necessary fight and 
die, fight and lay down my life for my country and what it stands for. I would 
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fight and die for my country, but I tell you I would never let my country die 
for me.’609 
 
As the 1987 election approached, neither Kinnock, his team, nor other senior party 
figures were in any doubt that the policy of unilateralism had the potential to be 
electorally costly. Indeed, they were told in January 1987 that following the ‘Modern 
Britain’ campaign, there had been a significant jump in the number of people polled 
disagreeing with a non-nuclear strategy for Britain. The polling memo noted that ‘the 
politically volatile C2s (skilled working class) have swung considerably on this issue 
over the past few months, with the current figures of 36% agreeing [with a non-
nuclear policy], 57% disagreeing replacing September’s of 48% agree, 42% 
disagree’.610 
 
Yet Kinnock stood firm, knowing that change could not be foisted upon Labour. A 
note from a meeting between Kinnock and Healey – then Shadow Foreign Secretary – 
two months later reveals the ongoing concern senior figures had about Labour’s 
policy. According to the note of the meeting, Healey suggested to Kinnock ‘the party 
should drop its commitment to the removal of Cruise missiles from Britain, on the 
grounds that this Labour pledge jeopardises the zero-option talks’.611 The so-called 
‘zero option’ involved the removal of intermediate-range missiles from Europe, and 
following the 1986 Reykjavik summit between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev this 
option had been revived, culminating in the 1987 INF Treaty.612 In other words, 
Healey was appealing for Labour to drop a clear-cut, unilateral commitment in favour 
of allowing a bilateral process between the U.S and the Soviet Union to come to pass. 
Healey added that he thought ‘90% of the party would breathe a sigh of relief if we 
dropped the commitment to get rid of Cruise missiles’.613 
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Kinnock responded ‘that he did not agree with Denis’s view of the attitude of the 
party, or with the view that Labour’s policy on Cruise was, in any respect, an 
inhibition to the INF talks’.614 However, the note does say that Kinnock and Healey 
agreed ‘we should express our delight with the progress that had been made in the 
INF talks and our view that if a speedy superpower agreement secured withdrawal 
that was a very satisfactory way to proceed’,615 thereby suggesting Labour could hold 
off from demanding the immediate withdrawal of Cruise if it appeared an agreement 
was possible. Healey’s version of this claims he ‘took advantage of the impending 
agreement to persuade Neil Kinnock that the Cruise missiles should be removed from 
Britain as part of the INF, rather than unilaterally’.616 In the manifesto, this was 
indeed where Labour ended up – with some conditionality. While noting Labour’s 
strong support for the INF talks, the manifesto read: 
 
‘We naturally, therefore, want to assist that process in every way possible. If, 
however, it should fail we shall, after consultation, inform the Americans that 
we wish them to remove their cruise missiles and other nuclear weapons from 
Britain.’617   
 
This was the only real move away from unilateralism in the manifesto. The 
commitment to decommission Polaris was clearer than the Foot and Healey 
statements from 1983. At the 1986 Annual Conference contributions from the 
platform applauded the absence of 1983’s ‘divisions and disunity’ and one of ‘the 
most radical policies this party has ever presented to the British electorate’.618 Healey 
believed this left Labour, once again, with the ‘uneasy amalgam between dogmatic 
unilateralism and a commitment to support the alliance [NATO] while seeking 
multilateral disarmament’.619 Labour’s defeat at the 1987 election was not, certainly 
not unanimously within Labour circles, put down to a weak defence policy. While 
Kinnock had been left in little doubt about how the policy landed – both at home, and 
crucially abroad in the U.S – he had fought on the platform of unilateralism and 
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pursued the arguments with his typical blend of energy and rhetorical flourish, with 
positioning mindful of the ever-changing diplomatic and military context. 
 
Yet post-Reykjavik, with the INF talks and the increasing confidence in Gorbachev’s 
leadership, the thawing of the Cold War coincided with the jettisoning of Labour’s 
moral imperative on nuclear weapons. Its replacement with an argument largely based 
on the efficient use of military resources, and a far greater commitment to super-
power talks, meant policy presentation that was far more context-specific. At the time 
of the 1987 election, Polaris was nearing its natural end and Trident had not yet been 
delivered. By the time of the 1992 general election, Trident submarines would be 
coming into operation and the money would have been spent. Super-power talks 
would have progressed, with the potential for further moves. Some of the socialist 
arguments for unilateralism, which I noted earlier, were largely removed from 
Labour’s messaging. As the race slowed, and Reagan’s early aggression receded into 
the past, the contrast offered by unilateralism weakened. Kinnock’s moves from the 
soft Left to the moderate centre also lessened the factional relevance of unilateralism. 
His willingness to have contested the issue showed a clear difference with the secrecy 
and habit of ignoring the party, shown by multilateralists in the past. The conditions 
were right for Kinnock, if he so wanted, to begin efforts to change the policy with the 
party, following a traditional, bureaucratic, rules-based approach to policymaking. 
 
The journey to multilateralism 
 
Following the 1987 defeat, Kinnock was buoyed by the news that Tom Sawyer, of the 
National Union of Public Employees, was in favour of a root-and-branch review of 
Labour’s policies. The Policy Review process that followed covered every policy 
area, including nuclear weapons. Mike Gapes, who as the party’s lead on international 
policy felt unsure where Kinnock would land after 1987, believed: ‘He was grappling 
with the issue, he was trying to move it, he knew what he had to do, but he was going 
to determine his own style of doing it, and it was all about managing the party and 
keeping it together.’620 Kinnock and his office steered the Policy Review carefully, 
and controlled many aspects of it tightly. Secretaries to the various Policy Review 
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Groups (PRGs) were based in Kinnock’s office. They compiled reports as the review 
passed through phases, with Kinnock reading, annotating and amending them. 
However, while it was undoubtedly gripped by the Labour leadership, the process had 
the potential to wriggle out of their control, particularly when it came to controversial 
issues where big personalities had long-held views. 
 
On the composition of the ‘Britain in the World’ PRG, Kinnock reflected: ‘Ron 
Todd… irreducible as a unilateralist, was definitely on the defence and foreign affairs 
[group]. All I had to ensure was, that at the end of the review group there’s a good 
chance he’ll be in the minority.’621 As with Kinnock’s overall strategy, now four years 
in, the process could not – in his view – be rushed. Policies would not be imposed by 
the Leader without the review process having made them official: ‘Inch by inch, 
slowly, slowly, moving the party,’622 Gapes recollected. The International Officer 
authored a note for Kinnock and his team soon after the 1987 defeat with thoughts 
that were ‘essentially my own’,623 though seeking some response from the leader on 
where Labour’s policy on nuclear weapons should go next. Gapes’ tone was 
diplomatic, noting that Labour’s policy had not been ‘in all aspects (Polaris) an 
asset’.624 His paper pointed out that very soon the world would have changed, with 
Cruise missiles departed, talks for potential cuts in warheads progressing, and Trident 
nearing completion.625 In other words, some unilateral options would be off the table 
and no savings from Trident to spend on other defence equipment would be possible. 
 
Gapes also offered some strategic options, arguing that a non-nuclear defence policy 
could continue, albeit with disarmament seen not as a principle but as a tactic, and 
offered in the context of multilateral and bilateral negotiations.626 Most importantly, 
this would mean accepting that – if negotiations to remove Trident were not 
successful – ‘we will keep it and continue it in service if the negotiations should fall. 
Are we prepared to grasp this nettle?’627 In a memo from Charles Clarke to the 
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convenors of the PRG, the Leader’s Office set out a clear view for a slower start when 
it came to the nuclear issue. Clarke wrote: 
 
‘I would suggest that we target our Defence work for the 1989 Labour Party 
Conference, and for the 1989 trade union conferences which precede that. It 
will not be feasible to make a real assessment about the potential effectiveness 
of multilateral progress until after the Reagan/Gorbachev summit in Moscow 
on START [arms reduction talks] and until after the election in November 
1988 of the next U.S President.’628 
 
This the group agreed to,629 though the internal battleground over the policy was not 
suspended. As noted in the analysis of annual conference decisions (Table 5, above), 
unilateralist composites were successful at the 1988 conference, while a rather more 
ambiguously worded multilateralist effort (calling for reflection on how best to 
achieve world disarmament) was defeated. Kinnock, meanwhile, ‘blew a hole in their 
decision not to open up any debate on defence inside the party during the first phase 
of the policy review’,630 through a lunch with The Independent implying change for 
Labour on nuclear weapons.631 A further interview, on This Week, Next Week, saw 
Kinnock say that Labour’s policy ‘doesn’t have to be something for nothing – the fact 
is now that it can be something for something. Now I say that now, even before the 
first paragraph of a strategic arms reduction treaty has been drawn up’.632 As Hughes 
and Wintour note, the question of whether decommissioning Trident was absolutely 
conditional was not asked in the interview,633 meaning the words ‘something for 
something’ could simply refer to a bilateral arrangement where British disarmament 
saw a reciprocal reduction in weaponry by the Soviet Union – an offer that had been 
made to Labour Party delegations in Moscow for many years. 
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However, in the context of the leadership challenge from Eric Heffer and Tony Benn 
(albeit one the Leader’s Office was untroubled by, confident of a comfortable 
victory),634 and following concerns and attacks from the Left, Kinnock wobbled. A 
letter from David Blunkett to Kinnock, dated 13th May 1988, read: 
 
‘I am very worried about the press speculation and the impact it’s having in 
the Party. I don’t believe a word of it, and have spent much time in many 
meetings saying that the one thing I was sure about is our commitment to a 
non-nuclear strategy in a non-nuclear world… To be quite frank, I have heard 
of leading right wing multilateralists saying exactly what The Independent 
newspaper was saying last Tuesday.’635 
 
A month later, Blunkett issued a further press release (and sent a copy to Kinnock) 
noting that abandoning a non-nuclear defence policy would ‘fly in the face of current 
events’ and that ‘“something for nothing” does not equal existing Labour Party 
policy’.636 ‘If an unnecessary and devastating split in the Party is to be avoided, the 
Leader needs to make it clear that his words were not an abandonment of his long-
standing commitment on which so many of his allies have placed their trust’,637 he 
added. To Blunkett, the glue of unilateralism still held the party together, while the 
softer tones from the U.S and the Soviet Union were seen as making unilateralism 
easier to sell.  Kinnock, troubled by the coverage and the response, duly swallowed 
his words in a further interview with The Independent.638 This ‘wobble’ can be seen in 
two ways, both of which have some truth. Firstly, and as will be seen in the remainder 
of this chapter, doubts from Kinnock over the presentation of Labour’s moves 
towards multilateralism were to be expected – principally because of his long-
standing commitment to the eradication, without conditions, of nuclear weapons, his 
identity as a man of the Left, and his priority of unity. Secondly, those working 
around Kinnock considered it a tactic of his to venture beyond his usual – and closely 
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guarded – rhetoric to test the response. ‘He would push things out, and see what the 
reaction would be,’639 Gapes noted. 
 
On a matter so delicate, as the nuclear deterrent was, it was a risky tactic that could 
occasionally blow up in Kinnock’s face. Around the same time as The Independent 
furore, Hugo Young recorded some notes from a Kinnock visit to the Guardian on 21st 
May 1988. When Kinnock was quizzed on defence, Young recorded the following 
from Kinnock: ‘He virtually said there would be no change in policy. Noted that the 
scene was changing fast, and was quite interested in the [Peter] Preston suggestion 
that he should say nothing until just before the election… Re the British deterrent, he 
specifically rejected my suggestion that Labour would simply put Trident into 
SALT.’640 
 
Yet, the rhetoric from Kinnock, and the Labour Party hierarchy more generally, 
including the executive, had been changing in important ways for some time. Part of 
the strength of the unilateralist cause was the call to action that it represented. While 
multilateralism seemed passive, waiting for talks that never seemed to succeed, 
unilateralism was a jolt to the system, a way of advancing Labour’s mission to a more 
peaceful world through its own actions. Crucial to moving the party on was 
presenting multilateralism in a similar vein, and Kinnock knew he had to press the 
advantage that Gorbachev and the optimism of the Cold War thaw provided him with. 
Prior to the 1987 general election, the NEC had agreed a statement in response to 
disarmament proposals from Gorbachev, noting its belief ‘that these proposals are 
extremely important and significant’.641 
 
Following a meeting in November 1987 between the U.S and the Soviet Union, 
Gerald Kaufman spoke of the ‘best news for humankind for nearly half a century’642 
with the two super powers agreeing to weapon reductions. ‘This decision transforms 
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the history of arms control and the prospects for it,’643 he added. Following the 
signing of the INF Treaty, Kinnock made the following statement: 
 
‘It is a good deal between the super powers and a good day for the human 
race. Indeed, the only bleak aspect is that resulting from Mrs Thatcher’s 
obvious intention to replace land-based intermediate missiles with sea and 
airborne missiles, so nullifying the fine efforts made by the US and Soviet 
negotiators. This is an agreement on which to build. Mrs Thatcher thinks it’s 
an agreement to bypass. She is wrong and events and the impetus for 
continued nuclear disarmament will prove it.’644 
 
This statement acted as a useful guide for Kinnock’s approach to questioning 
unilateralism as an emblem, and in boosting multilateralism. A contrast is still drawn 
with the opposition, with Kinnock noting his willingness to embrace talks to disarm, 
and Thatcher’s apparent indifference. The reference to the INF being a ‘good day for 
the human race’ was – in addition to being true if one wanted to see the removal of 
land-based nuclear missiles from Europe – a rhetorical flourish to demonstrate the 
opportunities and potential of further multilateral talks. Success in the U.S-Soviet 
context meant Kinnock could begin to knock down the factional walls that separated 
Labour into disarmers and armourers – because if the U.S and the Soviet Union could 
be disarmers through talks, why couldn’t Britain too? Following a meeting with 
Gorbachev in April 1989, shortly before the NEC meetings to decide upon the content 
of the Policy Review reports, Kinnock reiterated these messages, placing particular 
emphasis on the change Gorbachev represented: 
 
‘Mr Gorbachev made it clear… that Mrs Thatcher still holds to the argument 
of the permanency of nuclear weapons. His view is that even though the world 
is changing, her stance isn’t... He clearly believes that governments need to 
participate more vigorously in the process of disarmament, and particularly in 
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relation to the questions of tactical nuclear weapons. Naturally I concurred 
with that view.’645 
 
While Kinnock emphasised the new opportunities of U.S-Soviet détente, the 
administration of the Soviet Union helped in other ways too. While Kaufman’s 
management of the ‘Britain in the World’ PRG was notorious for secrecy, one higher 
profile event was a visit to Moscow, where the review group met with senior Soviet 
officials. Gapes recollected a breakthrough moment: 
 
‘[The] most important essence of it was our visit to Moscow… we met some 
top people… this General said that the Soviets would prefer that Britain put its 
weapons into multilateral negotiations rather than act unilaterally. Gerald’s 
light lit up and [he] seized on this.’646 
 
Following this, Kaufman ‘chose the centre of Red Square in mid-afternoon to give his 
final briefing to the travelling British press. Surrounded by curious and bemused 
Russian passers-by, Kaufman buried Labour’s unilateralism a few yards from Lenin’s 
tomb’.647 This combination – Gorbachev’s leadership and the new Soviet position – 
was a powerful proposition in challenging unilateralism. It gave the leadership what 
could be considered to be more ‘socialist’ arguments: a modernising socialist leader 
in the Soviet Union showing what a different world could look like, along with a 
diplomatic change from a country seen as less antagonistic to Labour and its 
objectives, in contrast to the United States. Kaufman noted the importance of this 
moment in his speech presenting the review’s report at the 1989 Annual Conference: 
 
‘The Soviet deputy foreign minister, their nuclear disarmament expert, stated 
his government’s view. He said “we want all five nuclear powers to work out 
the machinery of nuclear disarmament” …Our Soviet hosts said that Labour 
would be good partners in disarmament.’648 
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Kaufman had been utilising the changing context in the Soviet Union for some time, 
having stressed earlier in the Policy Review process to the 1988 Annual Conference: 
 
‘In a few weeks, I will be going to Moscow on behalf of this party, I know I 
shall have the support of this conference and of this party in telling the Soviet 
leadership that Labour is committed to a non-nuclear Britain. But can I also 
tell the Soviet leadership that Labour wants to work for a non-nuclear 
world?’649 
 
A planned visit to the United States got a brief, passing mention. Further submissions 
to the PRG from former officials and advisors also proved helpful. The Fabian 
Society published the tract Working for Common Security, which reinforced many of 
the messages from the leadership, and sought to reframe Labour’s nuclear debate as 
one about the best way to achieve a non-nuclear defence policy. The paper argued that 
far from requiring a breach in Labour’s beliefs, multilateral success meant the tide 
was ‘turning in favour of non-nuclear defence as both the morality and practicality of 
nuclear deterrence is increasingly questioned’.650 While the paper suggested that ‘the 
point of principle – our rejection of nuclear weapons – is not an issue’,651 this 
remained a rhetorical debating point, and a weakness for the multilateralist case. For 
while the promise of multilateralism was stronger, unsuccessful talks remained a 
possibility, meaning Britain would be retaining nuclear weapons, presumably pending 
further discussions over the years. 
 
It was this point that marked the only significant concession Kaufman and Kinnock 
made. Kaufman’s draft PRG document committed Labour to some independent steps, 
including a policy of ‘no first use’ and the cancellation of the fourth Trident 
submarine. On the future of the British deterrent, three Trident submarines – which 
would be nearly completed in the early 90s – would remain, and along with Polaris 
(reaching the end of its life) would be placed into international nuclear disarmament 
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negotiations.652 There was no unconditional disarmament, nor, crucially, was there a 
mention of bilateral measures which had been offered by the Soviet Union and 
accepted as Labour policy in previous elections. The ‘reaction of the soft Left’,653 
principally Robin Cook, meant that Kinnock could not be certain of a comfortable 
vote.654 Following a meeting between the two men, Cook made a deal with Kinnock 
that revived a bilateral option,655 where negotiations with the Soviet Union could 
result in a reciprocal deal, though leaving the super-power’s arsenal relatively intact.  
 
The final draft included the following concession: 
 
‘If the beginning of START 2 [the name given to U.S-Soviet negotiations] is 
subject to long delay, and there is good reason to believe that these 
negotiations will not make the progress we will require, a Labour government 
will reserve the option of initiating direct negotiations with the Soviet Union 
and/or with others in order to bring about the elimination of that capacity by 
negotiated and verifiable agreements.’656 
 
This was an important concession, though with Kaufman’s strong view gained from 
Moscow that the Soviet Union was more interested in multilateral involvement from 
Britain, it could be argued the chances of it were less than likely. Todd, the TGWU’s 
staunch unilateralist, rejected the report in a letter to Larry Whitty, suggesting it 
wasn’t seen as particularly relevant to unilateralists.657 Hughes and Wintour, writing 
in 1990, noted the amendment ‘may well return to plague Kinnock’ as the Leader 
clearly ‘remained sympathetic to the possibility of a bilateral fallback’.658 Ultimately, 
Labour’s defeat in 1992 made this a moot point, while the party’s manifesto didn’t 
mention the policy change, nor Labour’s deterrent policy in any great detail.659 
                                                 
652 Labour Party, Britain in the World, Churchill Archives Centre, The Papers of Neil Kinnock, KNNK 
2/2/40. 
653 Hughes and Wintour, Labour Rebuilt, p.119. 
654 Ibid. 
655 Ibid. 
656 Labour Party, Britain in the World (galley proofs), Churchill Archives Centre, The Papers of Neil 
Kinnock, KNNK 2/2/41. 
657 Ron Todd to Larry Whitty, 8th May 1989, Churchill Archives Centre, The Papers of Neil Kinnock, 
KNNK 5/20. 
658 Hughes and Wintour, Labour Rebuilt, pp.126-127. 
659 Labour Party, It’s Time To Get Britain Working Again, (London, The Labour Party, 1992), p.27. 
 167 
Kinnock, at times, remained torn on the presentation of the policy. In trying to 
reinforce the message that Labour had jettisoned unilateralism, Mandelson led on the 
recording of a party political broadcast (PPB) with Kinnock being interviewed on the 
topic. However, after the first recording session, Mandelson considered the material 
unusable and enlisted a new interviewer to get clearer lines from Kinnock. Mandelson 
noted: 
 
 ‘The most difficult thing of the whole policy review was on unilateralism…. 
 
‘He [Kinnock] always wanted to do it without anyone noticing that he was 
doing it, and if they noticed that he was doing it that he wouldn’t be blamed 
for it, and that if he was blamed for it that it wouldn’t trigger Armageddon.’660 
 
Yet, in correspondence with the then head of the CND, Bruce Kent, Kinnock was 
clear in his motivation for the move, on both the weakness of unilateralism in policy 
terms and the electoral imperative. He argued that the new opportunities that existed 
for global disarmament had to be developed by states in a multilateral, rather than a 
unilateral way. On Labour’s chances of being elected on any other policy platform, 
Kinnock said he did ‘not believe – as a matter of reality, not of pessimism – that the 
Labour Party could get a mandate to govern with a policy of unconditional unilateral 
nuclear disarmament’.661 Just as Kinnock’s arguments for unilateralism in the first 
parliament had been increasingly empirical, rather than moral, the thrust of his 
support for multilateralism displayed pragmatism when it came to policy. Not only 
would Labour not be elected, in Kinnock’s view, with the 1983 or 1987 policy 
position, it wouldn’t be the most effective in seeking to capitalise on the opportunity 
he detected.  
 
Returning to the characteristics of an emblematic policy, Table 6 shows the presence, 
and relative strength and weakness of the unilateralist and multilateralist cases in 
1983 when considering the external context. All four characteristics of an emblematic 
policy were present for unilateralism in 1983, and all could be considered ‘strong’, 
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while multilateralism had only a weak presence for ‘relevance to factionalism’ – that 
being the Shadow Cabinet presence of Healey and other experienced former Ministers 
who had previously fought elections on the basis of a nuclear deterrent. Table 6 also 
shows the transformation by the time of the 1989 policy review. Unilateralist 
arguments retained the four characteristics, yet on both its relevance to factionalism 
and its adhesive quality, it was far weaker. 
 
Table 6: Unilateralism and multilateralism characteristics662 
Characteristic Strength (1983) 
P=present, S=strong, 
W=weak 
Strength (1989) 
P=present, S=strong, 
W=weak 
Socialist arguments Unilateralism: P, S 
Multilateralism: W 
Unilateralism: P, S 
Multilateralism: P, S 
Stark contrast with 
opposition 
Unilateralism: P, S 
Multilateralism: W 
Unilateralism: P, S 
Multilateralism: P, S 
Relevance to factionalism Unilateralism: P, S 
Multilateralism: P, W 
Unilateralism: P, W 
Multilateralism: P, S 
Adhesive quality Unilateralism: P, S 
Multilateralism: W 
Unilateralism: P, W 
Multilateralism: P, S 
 
Most importantly, multilateralism shows a strong presence across all four 
characteristics, as follows: 
 
• Socialist arguments: multilateralism was no longer presented as anti-
democratic, shrouded in the secrecy that had previously dogged it. With the 
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context of Gorbachev’s leadership, and the relevance of his modernisation 
project in the Soviet Union, there were stronger arguments for a multilateral 
route to peace, rather than a previous multilateralist reliance on the United 
States. The perception of how Gorbachev and the Soviet Union were seen 
within the Labour Party – in a contest with the United States, the more 
‘peaceful’ – was seen as important by Kinnock and his leadership team, 
providing authenticity for the new policy. These changes in the external 
political context were hugely significant to Kinnock’s successful strategy. 
• Stark contrast with opposition: Kinnock had assiduously built a loyal 
opposition case against Thatcher and nuclear weapons from his first months as 
leader. Crucially, that strategy remained when he began making multilateral 
arguments. A stark contrast with Thatcher/Reagan was drawn by Kinnock in 
the first parliament, while in the second a Kinnock/Gorbachev vs Thatcher 
frame was attempted, moving the debate on to multilateral disarmers and 
unilateral armourers.  
• Relevance to factionalism: Both the smaller size of the committed unilateralist 
group, and Kinnock’s own journey from unilateralist to multilateralist, 
confused the factional presentation of Labour’s nuclear debate. In a way, 
Kinnock created the semblance of a return to the Bevan-Gaitskell détente, 
with a man of the Left making the argument for multilateralism.  
• Adhesive quality: Kinnock’s personal journey from unilateralism to 
multilateralism created a pressure to be loyal. The clear ‘unifier’ by 1989 was 
to support Kinnock’s project of renewal as Labour approached the next 
election, while his victory over the Militant tendency, and the weakness of 
Bennery and the Hard Left, meant to back Kinnock was to back the majority. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Labour’s path to multilateralism was a disjointed one. The policy journey was of a 
clarified unilateralism after Kinnock’s first parliament, shorn of ambiguity and the 
concessions Foot made to Healey. In the second parliament, a policy of 
multilateralism was achieved, though with significant bumps along the way. Such a 
journey fails to support a theory of purely electoral rationalism. The second 
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parliament speaks more to the electoral imperative, but the first does not. And while 
Labour’s renewal pre-1992 had a clear electoral motive, the policy outcome and 
process were driven and affected by other factors – among them, the interaction 
between Labour’s ethos and the external political context. Kinnock provided a lead in 
terms of arguments and language, but only when he felt the party’s ties to 
unilateralism were ready to be cut. He arrived at a pragmatic stance earlier than his 
public position suggested, and earlier than he believed his party could manage. Yet he 
held back from any swift changes because of his perception of the dominant ethos of 
the time, one which valued unilateralism as an emblematic policy. How a more 
Gaitskell-like, radical revisionist stance would have fared is an interesting question, 
though one that only invites speculation. 
 
Kinnock’s successful policy transformation, as this analysis has shown, was heavily 
reliant on a double context: Gorbachev’s leadership in regard to the Cold War, and 
Kinnock’s journey from committed unilateralist to multilateralist. The challenge of 
multilateralism to unilateralism’s emblematic policy characteristics was fleeting, 
though strong enough to become accepted wisdom during the New Labour years. The 
strong socialist arguments, and a stark contrast with the opposition – created by 
Kinnock and his team around multilateralism – were still mirrored in 1989 by the 
same strengths in unilateralism, except in the case of the latter they were far less 
reliant on context. 
 
This study now moves into the New Labour years. As with this chapter, which has 
shown the strategies Kinnock employed to balance and manage different 
interpretations of Labour’s ethos, the next chapter will consider how Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown balanced competing traditions within Labour’s ethos with regard to 
decision-making. Both believed in freedom and autonomy for the leadership to make 
policy decisions, yet both were also keenly aware of a dominant interpretation which 
valued participation.  
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Chapter 5 
Decisions: New Labour policymaking and Bank of England independence 
 
‘I cannot tell you how much I… hate these people. They are stupid and they are malevolent. They beg 
me to go to their conference and then they stitch me up, and then they will get all hurt and pathetic 
when I say what I think… I have no option but to go up there and blow them out of the water’ 
Tony Blair ahead of a T&G conference, quoted in Alistair Campbell’s Diaries, Prelude to Power 
 
‘When in difficulties, the party faithful – about who he is a less than devoted admirer – are summoned 
to hear the message, not to state their views.’ 
Stuart Hall, Selected Political Writings 
 
‘Labour was more like a cult than a party. If you were to progress in it, you had to speak the language 
and press the right buttons… Even I had to learn to do it – not that well, I may say – but without doing 
some of it, you got nowhere.’ 
Tony Blair, A Journey 
 
Introduction 
 
‘I knew I could never get a policy change through the party’s usual policymaking 
machinery – certainly at that time,’ Tony Blair remarked about Labour’s stance on a 
united Ireland. ‘So I’m afraid I just popped up one morning on the Today programme 
not long after becoming leader and announced we would henceforth have a new 
policy.’663 Labour’s ethos contains within it the fault line I call ‘Decisions’ – and the 
existence of two distinct and competing traditions. Should Labour’s MPs in 
Westminster be given the space to take policy and strategy decisions independently of 
the wider Labour Party, or should these decisions be more participatory? For Blair 
and New Labour, the answer was the leadership of the parliamentary party – firmly, 
and clearly. Blair’s stance on policymaking was antithetical to any direct 
collaboration with the Labour party and movement. Blair’s approach to policymaking 
was to narrow down the pool of consultees and decision-makers.  
 
While much work has been done in studying both the functionality and reforms of 
Labour’s constitutional arrangements, there has been less of a focus on ‘the way in 
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which people orient themselves to political action and to their notion of what 
constitutes acceptable and appropriate behaviour’.664 This, according to Shaw, is what 
is most distinctive about Minkin’s The Blair Supremacy. This chapter attempts to 
build on Minkin’s approach, notably ‘the causal significance’665 he assigns to the 
shared habits and traditions within an organisation.666 It seeks to understand the intent 
behind leadership control in policymaking – in others words, the interpretation of 
Labour’s ethos held by those at the top of New Labour that influenced such agency in 
the first place. As with previous chapters, it will consider how individual 
interpretations of the party’s ethos, and perceptions of the dominant party ethos, 
affected the strategic calculations and actions of political actors – in this case, those at 
the very top of New Labour. 
 
Leadership hegemony in terms of policy making and the taking of strategic decisions 
was built upon Blair’s mandate as party leader; a mandate enhanced by Blair’s 
successful rewriting of Clause IV and the strong likelihood that Blair would soon 
become Prime Minister. Blair’s personal domination was very nearly complete during 
this opposition period, with the notable exception of the influence of the then Shadow 
Chancellor, Gordon Brown. Those at the top of New Labour believed that the Labour 
movement as a whole was tired of losing, and that Blair’s victory at the 1997 election 
seemed inevitable. This sense of inevitability leant Blair and Brown the authority of 
soon-to-be heads of a government. A team who would – if unhindered by unforeseen 
disruption – comfortably return Labour to power. In exercising this control, Blair and 
Brown focused on flexibility in policy prescription – in other words, avoiding 
comprehensive, published plans.  
 
Yet, certainly during New Labour’s opposition years, Blair and Brown also adopted a 
more nuanced stance to Labour’s traditions than is often understood. This included 
experimenting with membership votes on New Labour’s policy platform – following 
the successful Clause IV ballot – and a political and rhetorical strategy which, 
wherever possible, avoided outright confrontation with their own movement. 
Decision-making autonomy coupled with conference amelioration – in addition to 
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other rhetorical platforms – is a familiar Labour leadership strategy. This is a point of 
difference with Minkin. I argue that Blair and Brown’s early supremacy was based on 
a strategy that, where they deemed it electorally manageable, did not provoke outright 
conflict with the wider party. While membership plebiscites offered very limited 
participation in decision-making – say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to this document – these tasks 
were undertaken to create both news and a mandate. The leadership invested time and 
resources in these processes, culminating in the Road to the Manifesto project. The 
New Labour high command wholeheartedly believed in leadership autonomy when it 
came to high-level policy and political decision-making, but this was not an 
unprecedented view inside the Labour party. As Russell has noted, ‘there was no 
golden age in which Labour was controlled by its members’.667 New Labour’s belief 
in leadership autonomy, balanced with attempts at internal legitimation, represented a 
longstanding tradition within Labour’s ethos. A stress on serious efforts at 
legitimation – however flawed – is an important line of argument throughout this 
chapter and the next.  
 
The case study for this chapter is the decision taken by New Labour to make the Bank 
of England independent in its operational powers over interest rates. The analysis of 
this decision, which forms the majority of this chapter, is based on interviews with 
decision-makers, private policy papers from the time, speeches and public policy 
documents, along with published diaries and memoirs. Interestingly, while this policy 
decision has been described as historic, and became a leitmotif for New Labour’s 
early radicalism in government, the decision-making process up to 1997 is relatively 
understudied, particularly in analysing how the policy was formulated and the way in 
which the decision was taken: one of the biggest changes to Britain’s macroeconomic 
framework in the recent past, delivered nearly immediately after polling day, yet 
absent from the party’s manifesto and formulated over a number of years by a small 
group of Labour politicians and advisors. This focus means I do not attempt to situate 
Bank independence within a wider analysis of New Labour’s political economy, nor 
seek to analyse the role of other factors relevant to why Bank independence became 
Labour’s policy. One could explore the arguments of inevitability put forward by 
Blair and Brown in relation to globalisation, and the place of Bank independence in a 
                                                 
667 Russell, Building New Labour, p.283. 
 174 
global trend towards greater autonomy for central banks. However, much of this work 
already exists. This chapter – in keeping with the study’s theme – seeks to explore the 
effect of both an individual interpretation of Labour’s ethos, and the dominant 
interpretation, on the strategic calculations of the actors involved. 
 
A party subordinate 
 
‘Asserting New Labour’s differentiation from Old Labour,’ Minkin wrote, ‘involved 
making clear that the party was now subordinate.’668 Minkin described the New 
Labour top team – Blair, Brown, Mandelson, Philip Gould and other close aides – as 
perceiving a party saddled with anachronistic habits that necessitated ‘greater freedom 
of behaviour by those who would change it’.669 Blair’s predecessors had faced the 
‘intractable problem’670 of intra-party democracy: in other words the extent to which 
decisions taken by the Labour Party, including on policy, were ‘democratic’, formed 
on the basis of ‘consultation’ or even originating as ‘instructions’ from the party’s 
annual conference. A number of former Leaders, including Keir Hardie, Ramsay 
MacDonald, Hugh Gaitskell and Harold Wilson, had – in different ways, and with 
different motives – either threatened, contravened, overturned or ignored policy 
preferences produced by Labour’s democratic machinery. 
 
However, Minkin argued the New Labour period marked something different. Blair 
and the self-described New Labour ‘cadre’671 delivered ‘an unprecedented build-up of 
the role of Leader… there was a lack of reverence for party traditions and rules of 
different kinds, and there were new objectives and behaviour which would have been 
regarded as out of bounds to the older generation’.672 This older generation included 
those who Blair immediately followed: John Smith and Neil Kinnock. Blair and 
Brown, Minkin claimed, ‘dominated the policy process’ in a ‘determined’ and 
sometimes ‘most cavalier’673 way. 
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While Minkin noted some policy examples, briefly, in his analysis of Blair and 
Brown’s early domination of the party – for example, the reformulation of Labour’s 
commitment to a National Minimum Wage through a Low Pay Commission,674 as 
well as the pledge not to increase both the basic and top rate of income tax675 – his 
study focused more on the systemic and cultural change brought about by New 
Labour over its lengthy period in power, with a focus on party management. This 
chapter will focus more clearly on policy change – how the policy of operational 
independence for the Bank of England was formulated, developed, finalised and 
decided upon, and importantly who was involved. In analysing this process, this 
chapter uses Minkin’s observations as a starting point: that New Labour saw the rest 
of the party as subordinate; that New Labour’s leaders acted with great freedom in 
policy formulation and decision-making; and that those at the top of the party showed 
a lack of reverence for party traditions and rules. 
 
When I argue that those at the top of New Labour believed in leadership control of 
policymaking, instead of consultation with party members, I am arguing that – very 
broadly – this approach was antagonistic to participatory democracy within the 
Labour Party (i.e. directly involving party members) and more in line with 
representative democracy (where the leadership represents party members), two broad 
types identified in David Held’s Models of Democracy.676 Throughout this chapter I 
also engage with concepts and frameworks from Drucker, McKenzie and Schumpeter 
– work which I covered in Chapter 2. In relation to Drucker, principally this involves 
the term ‘manifestoism’: an attempt to ‘control an executive – a Labour Cabinet, for 
example – and make it responsive to the ideas and wishes of the party… it is about 
representation first of all and only secondarily, and indirectly, about governing’.677  
 
Trim, be flexible: policy mission 
 
This section discusses New Labour’s approach to policymaking in relation to 
Drucker’s arguments about loyalty, and to his concept of ‘manifestoism’. First, it 
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outlines a perception at the top of New Labour that the leadership would encounter 
minimal opposition to the changes it sought. This was based on the leadership’s 
judgement that the party as a whole was desperate to return to power and believed that 
Blair – and his style of politics – was likely to move in to Number 10. This point is 
connected to Drucker’s argument that loyalty to the Leader ‘overwhelms’678 other 
concerns within the Labour Party, and is supported by testimony from trade union 
leaders and party debates at the time: both of which suggest the perception of New 
Labour’s leaders was an accurate one. Second, this section will consider Blair and 
Brown’s policy approach in the context of manifestoism – something that previous 
Labour leaders have both fought against and, on occasion, accepted and then ignored.  
 
I argue here that Blair chose a different path. He did not so much disregard 
manifestoism as sequestrate it. In other words, he took ownership of the perennial 
problem – a gap developing between what the party wants and ‘authorises’, and what 
the leadership wants and does – then sought legitimation through high-profile 
membership ballots and events on what he was offering. In so doing Blair achieved a 
mandate from Labour’s membership for a policy platform that did the opposite of 
what Drucker argued manifestoism was for: rather than committing a future Labour 
Government to a comprehensive programme partly authored by activists, a core of 
specific commitments authored by Blair and Brown were endorsed. Such an approach 
provided flexibility for New Labour’s small group of policymakers. Yet, ultimately, it 
failed to transcend manifestoism and its inherent weaknesses. The flexibility of a 
minimal, deliverable ‘offer’ meant that, without further such processes, a gap could 
re-emerge between the membership’s objectives and the leadership’s direction once 
the original policies were delivered. 
 
Taking leadership power as the starting point, McKenzie argued ‘it cannot be stressed 
too strongly that the leader of each of the great parties is either Prime Minister or a 
potential Prime Minister… it is this fact, not the internal mechanisms of the party, 
which is the governing influence in determining the role the leader plays’.679 Those at 
the top of New Labour – by that I mean Blair, Brown, Mandelson and senior advisors 
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– had a perception very similar to this conclusion from McKenzie. As with previous 
chapters in this study, leadership perception is vital in understanding the agency of 
political actors. As has been shown, Kinnock’s perception was, at times, of a party 
that had to move gradually and through consultative processes – albeit ones 
increasingly managed by the leadership. On policy matters, Kinnock perceived certain 
policies as immoveable, based on the dominant ethos of the time. 
 
Those at the top of New Labour were less hesitant, in part because of the changes 
already undertaken by Kinnock, but also (more importantly) by the defeats Kinnock 
had suffered, particularly in 1992. The New Labour leadership perceived a movement 
desperate to win power, and one traumatised by Kinnock’s second defeat. While this 
perception did not lead to the conclusion that the wider party would abandon Labour’s 
principles, it did suggest the movement could withstand more reform. Gould – New 
Labour’s trusted pollster and advisor – recalled Blair telling him it was time he ‘gave 
the party some electric shock treatment’.680 While this eye-catching phrase is quite far 
from the way Blair behaved – as I aim to show in this chapter and the next – it does 
portray a sense that Blair himself, along with his close group of colleagues, believed 
they had the opportunity to shape the Labour Party into their chosen project. Ed Balls, 
who arrived as an advisor to Gordon Brown in 1994, had a similar perception. He 
recollected: 
 
‘The party [in 1994] is so desperate to be elected that Tony Blair wins [the 
1994 Labour leadership contest] comfortably… The deal was these guys are 
going to have their go.’681 
 
When considering how New Labour arrived at policy, Balls noted both the perception 
of freedom and the conscious decision to provide reassurance to the party that – at 
least in the run-up to 1997 – not everything was about to change. 
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Balls noted:  
 
‘There were aspects they [trade unions and activists] didn’t like… but in the 
end, the reality was that Blair and Brown were in charge, they had mandates… 
and in the end conference was not going to support them against us… we were 
not thinking… about internal constraints. 
 
‘The Blair strategy in that period was… nuanced… health was an absolute 
reassurance issue [for the party]. The deliberate strategy was there was no 
rocking the boat on health.’682 
 
For Balls, this perception that the party was desperate to win was reinforced by the 
overwhelming belief that Blair and New Labour were going to win. That the unions 
and the wider party saw New Labour as being ‘clearly ahead in the polls’ and thought 
‘we’re not going to cause trouble, were going to back them… we’re backing these 
guys because they’re going to win’.683 Minkin’s study emphasises that, of course, this 
perception did not remove the requirement for political management – that is the 
work, often undertaken by advisors close to Blair and Brown, to smooth the passage 
of change through persuasion, debate, argument, and the management of the 
bureaucracy in ways advantageous to the leader’s wishes. Yet, as David Miliband, 
Blair’s head of policy from before and following the 1997 election, recollected, this 
perception at the top of New Labour was there, and it was considered to be an enabler 
of New Labour’s strategy: ‘The hunger to win, the skills [of organisers] was 
important.’684 
 
Sally Morgan, Blair’s political secretary in Downing Street, and prior to government 
an advisor to him on party management, had an identical perception to that of Balls. 
‘They’d [the party] reached a stage of “we’ll do anything it takes to win”,’ she noted, 
while arguing Blair also believed in a strategy that did ‘try and bring them [the party] 
with us, particularly in the early days’.685 This perception was based on indications 
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from the wider party and movement – including the trade unions – that after Blair’s 
reforms to Clause IV, there was a prevailing mood outside of Westminster ‘not to do 
anything that would rock the boat’.686 
 
As I noted above, and as the next chapter will analyse in more detail, both the extent 
of how far this leadership freedom was exercised, and the efficacy of the leadership 
operation itself, are both subject to caveats. Blair exercised his freedom with a degree 
of caution, chastened by moments in his political life where he had experienced a 
clash with the traditions of Labour people. At a speaking commitment as a local MP 
following the 1983 election defeat, Blair spoke frankly of his belief that ‘Labour had 
lost touch’ and couldn’t rely on lessons from previous generations.687 Following a 
poor reception to his remarks, a grilling from fellow Labour MP Dennis Skinner, and 
attendees ‘scurrying past me like I was diseased’,688 Blair learnt a lesson: that unless 
you ‘speak the language [of the party]’689 you are irrelevant to the conversation.  
 
Blair’s consciousness of the Labour movement’s language and traditions is evident in 
remarks made as leader between 1994 and 1997. While he believed in the need for 
bluntness in his interaction with the wider party and the movement to evidence 
change with the electorate in the country, this bluntness was more often than not 
balanced with a commitment to the party’s long-held relationships, or nostalgia for 
the party’s past. For example, in Blair’s speech to the GMB trade union conference in 
1995, he argued: ‘I was elected on a platform of change and modernisation. People 
ask me when I will draw a line under reform. When can we say that it’s done with. 
The answer is never.’690 Yet a paragraph later, Blair recalled the union relationship of 
old, providing ‘ballast’: 
 
‘People say that trade unions provide the ballast for the Party. They are the 
solid number of people with real work experience, living in the real world able 
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to keep the Party in touch. That is often true. We don’t want a narrow London 
based group of intellectual activists running the party.’691 
 
The diaries of Blair’s media guru, Alistair Campbell, attest to a tug and pull in Blair’s 
rhetoric to the party – a tension far from ‘electric shock treatment’. Two days before 
the GMB speech, Campbell’s diary records Blair wanted to make a ‘big speech that 
made some waves on the theme of TB taking New Labour to the unions’.692 On the 
day of the speech, Campbell wrote that Blair ‘took out some of the more aggressive 
lines’.693 In the three short years of New Labour in opposition, the perception from 
those at the top of New Labour was undoubtedly of considerable leadership power 
which could – and should – be used and tested. Blair was willing to take risks and to 
‘take the party on’.694 
 
Yet, in considering a Labour person’s understanding of the party’s ethos as whole, 
including the dominant ethos of the time, regardless of Blair’s perception of his 
power, his exercise of it up to 1997 was more nuanced than has been suggested by the 
modernising clique, particularly in the early glut of memoirs and political tracts. 
Blair’s language when talking to the party – language, it must be remembered, being 
one of the few tools a leader of the opposition has to shape party and public opinion – 
shows a balancing of Labour’s competing traditions. This was Blair at a time when he 
would still use the word ‘socialist’. Hindmoor has noted Blair’s journey from self-
identification as centre-left, to centre-left and centre, to centre, to moderate centre.695 
From 1994 to his departure as Labour leader and prime minister in 2007, there was 
not one Blair in policy, rhetoric and strategy, there were different Blairs.  
 
A final point in relation to leadership power involves the efficacy of the Blair 
operation. The tensions at the top of New Labour – which partly consumed the party 
midway through Blair’s second term – were present from day one and affected both 
Blair’s freedom and day-to-day impact. These tensions – some of which were caused 
by Blair’s management style, others by the temperaments of the actors involved – 
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debilitated the leadership operation. The first tension was Blair’s tendency to reduce 
the pool of people affecting policy and taking meaningful decisions. From the 
Shadow Cabinet, which in opposition remained subject to PLP-election, Blair 
narrowed the scope of influence to a meeting of ‘the Big Guns’: Blair, Deputy Leader 
John Prescott, Brown, Shadow Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, and Campbell.696 In 
Blair’s mind this group was narrowed and altered even further, with Blair, Brown, 
Mandelson and Campbell being the group who Blair believed would win or lose the 
election for Labour.697 
 
Unsurprisingly, this concentration of power by Blair was not popular with those who 
found their influence diluted. Brown’s welfare-to-work proposals – dubbed 
‘workfare’ by opponents from the Left – was announced publicly without Prescott or 
Cook being consulted, sparking fury.698 Blair rewrote policy statements in front of the 
responsible Shadow Cabinet members who had negotiated them.699 The tensions 
between senior figures would sometimes exasperate Blair;700 tensions between Blair 
and Brown, between Brown and Mandelson, between Brown and Prescott, between 
Mandelson and Prescott, and between Brown and Cook. While Blair’s management 
style caused political management problems, the tension more limiting to the power 
of the leader was that between Blair and Brown. 
 
David Miliband ‘complained [Blair] had effectively given him [Brown] a veto on 
policy’701 as well as extending Brown’s reach to campaign strategy. Brown would talk 
Blair through his intentions, though, ‘as often happened between them, Gordon most 
likely hung up [the phone] thinking everything was squared off, while Tony most 
likely hung up not entirely sure what Gordon was on about’.702 Brown’s power 
remains subject to some dispute, not least from Blair himself who rejects the narrative 
that Brown set the direction of economic policy in government.703 While this study 
doesn’t extend to Labour’s period in office, the three years of New Labour in 
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opposition reveal a relationship that saw Brown invested with significant freedom to 
develop policy. However, he remained – certainly at this point - respectful of Blair’s 
mandate to deliver his own priorities. 
 
Moving from the power of the leader to Drucker’s concept of manifestoism, and how 
Blair sequestrated it, Gould recalls what Blair understood to be Labour’s ‘head and 
body problem’: ‘That Labour’s head, represented by him and other modernising 
leaders, believed one thing, but its body, represented by the party, appeared to believe 
another.’704 The concern which led to this analysis stemmed not from party 
management, according to Gould, but from fears the public were not entirely sold on 
Labour’s change. Gould noted he was ‘certain that the only way we could persuade 
the electorate that Labour as a political party had really changed was to take our 
manifesto to the party and ballot them on it’.705 This led to the Road to the Manifesto 
process, where a draft manifesto was put to a membership vote, and where Blair 
addressed meetings of Labour members and supporters across the country. The 
consequences for manifestoism were profound. New Labour’s policy objective was 
for coherence based upon a minimal offer, with a clear mandate both from the party 
and the public that was deliverable. Not only did this objective transform the concept 
of manifestoism, it also failed to transcend the weaknesses for the wider party and the 
relationship between the leadership and the members identified by Drucker, leading to 
the conclusion that Blair sequestrated manifestoism. 
 
Drucker’s concept of manifestoism was based on three core features: sovereignty 
within the party of the annual conference; a leadership responsive to the ideas and 
wishes of the party; and an ability to control Labour’s leaders. Its weaknesses were 
also threefold: manifesto wording left to the interpretation of Labour cabinets; no 
enforcement mechanism for accountability; and the inevitable failure to meet high 
expectations of members. The Road to the Manifesto process, while utilising policy 
documents that had been put before Labour’s annual conference, diluted the 
conference’s power by moving towards direct democracy, rather than consideration 
by delegates. Aside from whether or not this was a democratic step for Labour, it 
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significantly altered what Drucker understood as manifestoism. The policy document 
that sprang from Road to the Manifesto, called New Life for Britain,706 was written 
largely by Blair himself,707 working from a draft by Robin Cook and David 
Miliband.708 The lack of consultation was a topic of complaint in the parliamentary 
party and amongst people in leadership positions. For example, Campbell’s write-up 
of a leadership meeting recorded complaints from Prescott: 
 
‘TB said it was important all members of the Shadow Cabinet felt involved. JP 
[Prescott] said yes, the media would inflame divisions, but what is wrong is 
our procedures and they have to be got right. He said there had to be more 
collective decision-making. TB said there could always be improved 
consultation but it should never excuse indiscipline. This is about 
professionalism. JP returned to his theme. This forum doesn’t work, we don’t 
meet enough, we don’t discuss things. This was meant to be a check on 
policymaking and it hasn’t worked. We exist because we do represent 
different views, and ours are not taken into account. There is no real forum for 
discussion. TB said if people think it is tough now, they should wait for 
government. JP asked if the Road to the Manifesto process was going to lead 
to policy changes and TB said straight out – yes.’709 
 
As a control mechanism, the Road to the Manifesto process flipped manifestoism on 
its head. A document drawn up by Blair and his team was subject to a yes or no 
approval process, without amendment. The mechanism for policy assent, in this 
particular stage, was therefore a leadership controlling what a membership could 
approve, rather than the other way around. It was, in David Miliband’s words, to 
create ‘a focus for the media on our policy agenda, in contrast to the out-of-steam 
government, some excitement for the party, which was waiting for the election to be 
called, and a mandate and roadmap for the election campaign and our work in 
government’.710 As a process, the weaknesses of Road to the Manifesto in relation to 
leadership accountability were very similar to those for manifestoism: the policy 
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content was reasonably vague, open to interpretation, and with a process of party 
reform underway, accountability on policy was in question. The vagueness stemmed 
from a lack of detail – a conscious decision by the New Labour leadership, taken for 
two reasons. 
 
The first was that, despite many years of opposition, the figures at the top of New 
Labour did not have a fully-formed, detailed policy platform because of their short 
time in control of the party machinery. Second, a strategic bonus (in the view of Blair 
and Brown) of a lack of detail and a slim policy offer was the absence of multiple 
sticks with which the Conservative Party could hit New Labour with. Blair’s policy 
mission, assigned to David Miliband, was ‘to do bomb disposal’711 of policies that 
could lose Labour a general election, while setting out ‘a forward agenda for what 
we’d actually do in government’.712 This forward agenda, certainly in the minds of 
Blair and Brown, was of a certainty in direction that was more instinctive than 
instructive. Blair’s conclusion on New Labour’s policy preparedness was that on 
‘policy direction we were pretty firm and clear… the details, we were lacking’.713 
 
While neither this study, nor this chapter, seeks to make a contribution to more 
biographical studies of Blair, it is worth noting here two relevant aspects of his 
approach to policy and political strategy, and how they changed through his years as 
prime minister. Patricia Hewitt, who at the time of Blair’s election as leader was 
working on the Social Justice Commission, hosted by the IPPR thinktank, recollected 
a briefing session for Blair where she outlined the commission’s various policy 
proposals. ‘Some things you’ve got, and I’m sure he [Blair] used the phrase “New 
Labour”, [are] “100% New Labour” …’, Hewitt noted. ‘Something else he said “it’s 
only about 75 or 80%, feels a bit old fashioned”. Then he said “repayable student 
fees” he said “oh, that’s sort of about 150%, that feels like a bit of a stretch”.’714  
 
Blair’s focus was on political positioning, showing New Labour had changed through 
initiatives like the new Clause IV, and engaging with policy to further evidence that 
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change. It was later, following two terms as prime minister, where Blair, feeling he 
had won on political positioning, moved towards policy detail, which Powell felt was 
a switch to policy-heavy and positioning light.715 This policy ‘instinct’ from Blair had 
some immediate presentational difficulties – for example the narrative that New 
Labour was ‘spin’. The second aspect to Blair’s character, again attested to by many 
of those who worked closely with him during this period, was that Blair lacked 
political tribalism – in other words that he was not tribally Labour. This, on the one 
hand, ‘spurred him on’716 to undertake changes in the Labour Party without any 
personal commitment to some of Labour’s traditions. That being said, Blair was very 
aware of the dominant ethos that surrounded him. And he did not ignore it, as I have 
noted above. Mandelson was one of the figures close to Blair who argued, particularly 
in the early days of New Labour, that changes must not be done in a way ‘that would 
make it impossible to bring the party with you’.717 
 
Blair didn’t consider Road to the Manifesto to be a long-term solution to the head and 
body problem. As Drucker noted, Labour’s past showed the party had ‘rather more 
trouble changing from opposition to ministry’718 than manifestoism suggests should 
occur.719 This, Blair agreed with. Of particular concern to him was the tendency for 
‘increasing disillusionment with the government from the party… [to] quickly 
communicate… itself to the public’.720 Nowhere does he note the importance of party 
democracy, nor suggest sympathy with membership involvement or power, instead 
stressing ‘a managed process that required long debate and discussion in policy 
groups’.721 Organisationally, Blair’s Partnership in Power reforms (delivered after the 
1997 general election) sought to make policy discussions between the parliamentary 
party and the wider movement more discursive. Yet the result remained a position of 
dominance for the frontbench. Meg Russell’s study of Labour’s organisational 
reforms concludes: ‘Labour Party members retain important sanctions, whilst leaders 
remain largely in control.’722 
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The deficiencies of manifestoism were recognised by New Labour as a tradition 
which had plagued the party’s Ministers, sowing discord rather than binding the party 
together. Blair’s response was to tie the wider party to a slimmed-down policy 
prospectus, restating the changes made to the Labour Party as much as stating the 
need for change in the country. This form of direct democracy sequestrated 
manifestoism as a concept, with leadership control of what the party could approve, 
prior to longer-term reform aimed at a more discursive process with the party. 
Overall, while passing up the opportunity for a detailed plan for government, this 
process gifted Blair and Brown a large degree of flexibility. Yet, it also failed to truly 
transcend the weaknesses built into manifestoism, leading some to observe that ‘New 
Labour is not the political agenda of either the entire national or the Parliamentary 
Labour Party’.723 Rather it belonged to ‘Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, their respective 
advisers’.724 Meanwhile, the leadership worked to ‘develop the orientation for policy 
across a range of issues’725 knowing that, at least publicly, the job of presenting a 
policy platform to the party and the public was mostly complete. One of these policy 
areas – with the aim of establishing a policy direction that was ‘plainly New 
Labour’726 – was central bank independence. 
 
No more boom and bust: policy formulation 
 
Independence for the Bank is progeny-in-dispute among New Labour’s high 
command. Yet the intellectual origin of the policy – certainly in terms of substance 
within New Labour – sits with Ed Balls. While a leader writer for the Financial 
Times, Balls wrote a pamphlet for the Fabian Society which blended Euroscepticism 
and support for central bank independence as the basis for balanced growth and stable 
inflation. There was a contemporary and more long-term context for Balls’ paper. 
Though he had been working on it during the summer of 1992,727 it was subsequently 
edited and published following Black Wednesday and Britain’s exit from the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). This debacle, the relative political consensus that 
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lay behind it, and perceptions of the inevitability of European monetary union 
following the Maastricht Treaty provided the contemporary context. Britain had 
joined the ERM in 1990 in an effort to control high rates of inflation, and remaining 
in the mechanism had become a test of strength for the Conservative Government. 
Balls had disagreed with the decision to join the ERM – a point of difference between 
himself and the Labour frontbench at the time, including John Smith and Gordon 
Brown. In addition to criticisms of the way ERM entry was delivered by the 
Conservatives – overvaluing the pound, leading to higher interest rates to attract 
money – Balls’ Fabian pamphlet argued against both re-entry to the ERM and to 
monetary union in Europe (both in the short term) on the basis that the costs to the 
British economy would be ‘prohibitively high’.728 This early outing of, if not 
Euroscepticism, then certainly scepticism of the euro, is noted in Balls’ memoir. 
‘Witnessing the ignominy of Black Wednesday and Britain’s exit from the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism,’ Balls wrote, ‘I was already convinced that any attempt by Britain 
to join the single currency would end equally badly. As far as I was concerned, the 
euro was economically and politically misconceived.’729 In the absence, then, of 
confidence in European mechanisms to help solve Britain’s inflation proneness, Balls’ 
pamphlet needed to offer something else. 
 
Having studied at Harvard under Larry Summers, Balls was well-versed in the 
arguments around central bank independence. A paper from Summers and Alberto 
Alesina had evidenced that ‘the monetary discipline associated with central bank 
independence reduces the level and variability of inflation’.730 The Harvard 
connection – the importance of which Balls attests to in much of his early policy 
thinking731 – provided the longer term context for Balls’ pamphlet. He used an earlier 
version of the Alesina and Summers paper to build the argument for Britain 
undertaking some form of central bank independence, and would return to Summer’s 
thinking over the development of the policy – for example, what became the 
‘symmetrical inflation target’ (that deviations below a target are treated as seriously 
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as deviations above).732 Central to Balls’ thesis was a message of economic discipline 
that would – following his appointment to Brown’s team in 1994 – become embedded 
in New Labour’s policy message. While attacking the use of monetary policy under 
the Conservative Government, Balls broadened his argument to encompass what 
would become (in the early days of New Labour) the ‘Old Labour-style’ demand 
management that could also be damaging. Balls argued: 
 
‘Active macroeconomic management – lower interest rates and higher public 
investment – is necessary and desirable when economies are stuck in recession 
and confidence is low… Yet active demand management can only be pursued 
in short sharp doses when the economy is depressed. Old-style Keynesianism, 
pursued for too long, simply leads to high and rising inflation, unwieldy fiscal 
deficits and finally damaging recessions. This is the stuff of which boom-bust 
cycles are made.’733 
 
Turning to the political problems behind the economic levers, Balls identified both the 
inherent short-termism in political decision-making, as well as the renowned secrecy 
of the Treasury and Britain’s institutions. He wrote: 
 
‘If politicians and civil servants control interest rates the temptation to 
manipulate the economy for short-term electoral advantage is likely to result 
in higher inflation and more variable inflation with no long-term return in 
terms of higher growth or lower unemployment… [the] degree of centralised 
and unaccountable executive and bureaucratic power over economic policy is 
inefficient and out of date. Successful developed economies – including left of 
centre governments such as Australia – have realised that an independent 
central bank, charged to deliver low and stable inflation, is a better way to 
achieve macroeconomic stability.’734 
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Addressing a more substantive plan for the Bank of England, and to the advantages of 
such a policy for Labour, Balls first caveated the meaning of independence. He was at 
pains to point out that while the month-by-month process of decision-making on 
interest rates should be removed from Whitehall, policy ambition and associated 
targets would remain in political hands, with stronger accountability mechanisms for 
the Bank to shine a light on the economic rationale for interest rate decisions. Four 
reforms were suggested by Balls at this stage. First, diversification of the Bank’s 
decision-making bodies – its court – with representatives from ‘industry and trade 
unions as well as the City’.735 Second, as with the United States Federal Reserve (the 
Fed), the Bank’s Governor would be ‘required to testify regularly to House of 
Commons committees’.736 Third, the Bank’s mandate to control monetary operations 
‘would be dependent on the continued support of parliament’, with the House of 
Commons able to ‘over-ride a decision by the Bank in extreme circumstances’.737 The 
Bank would need ‘to reflect the parliamentary and public consensus about the 
desirable long-term rate of inflation’.738 Fourth and finally, the Bank would lose 
responsibility for City supervision, focusing instead on macroeconomic stability.739 
Having already argued for the positive economic effects of independence, Balls noted 
what he considered to be the electoral advantage for Labour: credibility. 
 
‘This would strengthen the hand of a Labour government. Freed from 
debilitating market doubts about the government’s anti-inflationary resolve, a 
Labour chancellor would be free to concentrate on the many other aspects of 
policy, including fiscal policy, which are much more important in determining 
whether the UK can build and sustain an economic recovery.’740 
 
The four parts of Balls’ plan, as set out in his 1992 pamphlet, survived (with 
additional measures and some alteration) to form a large part of the New Labour 
government’s macroeconomic framework. So too did the political arguments he set 
out, both to differentiate from ‘Old Labour’ and to provide political cover and 
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economic credibility in place of market doubts about a Labour chancellor. Both Blair 
and Brown consistently pushed differentiation with the economics of the 1970s in 
opposition, while post-independence the importance of avoiding conflict between a 
Labour chancellor and the Bank has been attested to by Brown. ‘Every single month 
the newspapers would have been setting up the meeting [on interest rates] as the Bank 
establishment against a Labour chancellor,’741 Brown has argued. ‘No matter what 
you tried to do… it would have been incredibly difficult to avoid… the suggestion 
that there was always a tug of war between a Labour chancellor and the governor of 
the Bank of England.’742 This distrust Brown foresaw was based on many years of 
suspicion in Labour’s ranks of Bank secrecy and Conservatism. Denis Healey, 
Labour’s Chancellor from 1974-1979, recollected that some in the Bank of England 
‘still attempted to maintain the cabbalistic secrecy of its most famous Governor, 
Montague Norman’.743 He expanded: ‘In Britain relations between the Governor of 
the Bank of England and Labour Governments have sometimes been very bad, 
especially when, as in the case of Lord Cromer, the Governor was a committed 
Conservative.’744 Lord Cromer’s governorship, during Harold Wilson’s first period as 
Prime Minister, was notoriously fraught.  
 
Balls was not, of course, working in a political vacuum. In the same year as his 
pamphlet was published, the former Conservative Chancellor Nigel Lawson published 
a memoir outlining his own past attempts to push for the Bank’s independence. 
Lawson believed in a maximal approach to either government supremacy or Bank 
independence,745 rather than the hazy arrangement that had existed for decades. As 
Peter Hennessy has argued, while the Attlee Government, with Hugh Dalton as 
Chancellor, had nationalised the bank, this move was ‘symbolic, almost cathartic… 
for both the labour movement and the City, a truce if you like – a nominal shift of 
power to the state; in practice, business-as-usual’.746 In Lawson’s view, aside from 
interest rate decision-making, ‘the Bank had considerable discretion’.747 Lawson’s 
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proposals to make this relationship clearer, with independence for the Bank, was 
fiercely opposed by Margaret Thatcher, and so never saw the light of day in 
parliament. Thatcher’s autobiography noted: 
 
‘My reaction [to Lawson’s proposal] was dismissive… I did not believe, as 
Nigel argued, that it would boost the credibility of the fight against inflation. 
In fact, as I minuted, ‘it would be seen as an abdication by the Chancellor 
when he was at his most vulnerable’… I do not believe that changing well-
tried institutional arrangements generally provides solutions to underlying 
political problems… He [Lawson] wanted to pass the responsibility for them 
to something – or someone – else.’748 
 
While consecutive Conservative governments could not agree on a policy of 
independence – Chancellor Norman Lamont also raised it – the idea did not disappear 
from political debate. Privately, the Treasury worked up further options following the 
ratification of Maastricht749 – which required states to make their central banks more 
independent prior to the proposed monetary union. Lamont did institute some reforms 
(which I discuss further below in relation to Labour’s policy development), including 
an inflation target, the publication of an inflation report, and the formalising of 
meetings between the Chancellor and the Governor of the Bank.750 The House of 
Commons Treasury Select Committee, chaired by the then Labour MP Giles Radice, 
recommended Bank independence at the end of December 1993 (only one Labour 
member opposed the committee’s report – Diane Abbott, who also opposed 
independence when the New Labour government introduced its legislation).751 
 
The origin of Labour’s policy, based on Balls’ paper, was a paradox of resilient detail 
and argument (in terms of survival from Balls’ initial work through to government 
policy) alongside low political salience and a lack of direct engagement from senior 
Labour politicians. While undoubtedly the issue was alive in Westminster and in 
Whitehall, it lacked committed supporters. Reform of the Bank – through the inflation 
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target and monthly reports – was settling in. Brown recalled how, at the time, ‘there 
was a lot more openness in the making of monetary policy decisions... I felt under no 
pressure… none of us felt under any pressure to make the Bank of England 
independent, we did not feel we had a political imperative to do it’.752 However, while 
revealing very little publicly, Balls continued to develop and press the arguments for 
Bank independence. ‘I must have seemed a bit obsessive about my plan,’753 Balls has 
noted, yet, following his formal recruitment by Brown in 1994, a fairly swift decision 
was taken to make it Labour policy, albeit secretly. 
 
Different kinds of ‘independence’: policy development 
 
It is in the development of Labour’s policy for Bank independence that both the 
supremacy of the leadership, and the tensions between Blair and Brown, are evident. 
While the origins of a policy idea often come from one source, or from a small group 
of people, the development and delivery of independence for the Bank of England 
never left a tiny group of decision-makers. The plan drawn up by Balls and Brown 
was not in Labour’s manifesto, had not been debated or considered by Labour’s 
annual conference, had not been considered by Labour’s members as part of the Road 
to the Manifesto process, nor discussed with the party’s executive or Cabinet (Shadow 
or otherwise). Following Balls formally entering the Labour fold, Brown’s new 
advisor wrote a paper advocating independence for the Bank in Spring 1995, a point 
attested to by Campbell, who recorded in his diary that Balls ‘did a good presentation 
on Bank of England independence’.754 Balls noted that at this meeting there was no 
decision about whether to go ahead with the policy, and in his view Blair didn’t 
engage a great deal with the presentation.755 
 
Blair’s recollection, in his memoir, conflicts with this, writing: ‘In May 1995, we had 
the first of a series of discussions, internally in the office, about Bank of England 
independence. I was already firmly of the view we should do it.’756 There is little of 
note about the policy in Campbell’s diary until two and half months’ later, when 
                                                 
752 Brown, Speech to Bank of England ‘20 Years On Conference’. 
753 Balls, Speaking Out, p.147. 
754 Campbell, Prelude to Power, p.158. 
755 Ed Balls, interview by author, London, 15th September 2017. 
756 Blair, A Journey, p.89. 
 193 
Blair’s press aide wrote that he and Blair ‘discussed the need for a proper plan and 
strategy re the Bank of England. He was sure independence was the answer’.757 This 
reflection came a few days before Brown was scheduled to make his first – and last 
before the election – substantive remarks about central bank independence, something 
that concerned Campbell because of competition for economic news headlines: ‘My 
concern,’ Campbell recorded in his diary, ‘was that GB [Gordon Brown] was making 
a speech on Wednesday in which he was putting forward new ideas likely to be seen 
as leading us to an independent Bank of England. It was full of newsworthy material 
likely to dwarf anything TB had to say. TB said there was an easy way to get him to 
drop the announcements, namely warn him there could be an outcry in the party.’758 
Furthermore, Gould’s recollection is of an idea pressed by Brown and Balls at the all-
day meeting in March 1995: ‘The most noticeable policy insight of the day was that 
Gordon Brown and his team were keen, even at that early stage, for a degree of 
independence for the Bank of England. Ed Balls… presented these plans to the 
meeting at great length.’759 Gould does not mention a contribution from Blair, though 
he does note John Prescott was not invited to the meeting – something he was later 
‘furious’760 about. 
 
Prior to and following Balls’ presentation to Blair and the leadership team, Brown’s 
team were preparing the arguments for central bank independence, alongside wider 
options to build Labour’s macroeconomic framework. This culminated in a month of 
economic policy activity, with three speeches by Brown and one by Blair in May 
1995. In a draft policy note on ‘The Macroeconomic Framework’, policy detail and 
contributions to Labour’s political strategy that built on much of Balls’ 1992 
framework were aired. These arguments had a caveat, that much of it did not ‘demand 
public action now or even before the election, or… for complete candour’,761 though 
the paper did note ‘some further shift on policy will be needed sooner rather than 
later’.762 The paper’s covering note set out five arguments for Labour saying more on 
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its macroeconomic framework: that while Labour had a poll lead on economic 
competence, more detail was needed to avoid the impression Labour would be less 
tough on inflation that the Conservatives; the media were focused on the 
macroeconomic framework; there were media accusations Labour were being too 
evasive; that it was important to signal to the City that Labour could alter the 
relationship between the Bank and the Treasury, despite perceived institutional 
opposition; and that European integration, going forward, required more 
independence for central banks.763 
 
A central argument in the paper was for Labour to be clear that, while reform could 
well be on the agenda, it would not replicate versions of independence that were often 
assumed to be templates for reform. To follow New Zealand, which handed decision-
making to the bank governor, or to look towards the German Bundesbank, which had 
independence of policy objectives as well as operational tools, needed to be ruled out, 
the paper argued.764 This would mean Labour rejected templates of independence ‘in 
favour of a new division of responsibility with operational control over interest rates 
being passed to a re-structured and accountable Bank of England which is charged 
with pursuing government determined targets’.765 Familiar arguments were put for 
why such a move would be politically advantageous to Labour. It would boost the 
anti-inflationary credibility of an incoming Labour government and it would allow 
Labour politicians to keep a critical distance – if necessary – from BoE operational 
decisions.766 Importantly, the task for the Bank would be to achieve the government’s 
inflation target and growth over the medium-term, meaning the Bank ‘will not be 
required to run short-term risks’.767 
 
Brown’s speech – the second of three economic speeches in May 1995 and the one 
that concerned Campbell because its newsworthy lines – was also titled ‘Labour’s 
Macroeconomic Framework’. The early part of Brown’s speech included the dual 
critique of Old Labour and Conservative monetarism – as noted above in Balls’ 1992 
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pamphlet – as well as language to stress Labour’s anti-inflationary commitment. 
Brown argued: 
 
‘The challenge is to transcend the old divisions between Keynesians and 
Monetarists and to recognise that strong and sustained growth and low 
inflation are necessary responsibilities of government. Inflation is an enemy of 
the poor, the pensioner and the middle income family… That is why the war 
on inflation is a Labour war.’768 
 
In building the case for Bank independence, Brown argued that the ‘essential 
insight’769 from Labour’s approach was an understanding of the role for, and the 
limits of, government.770 Short-termism in the UK economy was being driven, Brown 
argued, by the narrow political considerations of governments. Changing this required 
‘a careful assessment of the relationship between the government and the Bank of 
England as well as reform of the Bank to ensure greater accountability’.771 Brown’s 
criticism of the policy context he would inherit was threefold: that it still lacked 
transparency; that it was overly personalised, focused only on the Chancellor and the 
Governor – the ‘Ken and Eddie show’ as it then was between Chancellor Ken Clarke 
and Governor Eddie George; and that decision-making had not been placed in an 
‘explicitly medium-term framework’.772 Brown’s speech then accepted the logic of 
his team’s analysis: that to criticise the current context meant either reversing the 
recent changes or reforming it further. 
 
Brown set out three reforms that explicitly engaged with the recent Treasury and 
Bank changes, followed by three more significant reforms to the Bank’s structure, 
governance and accountability mechanisms. On the swift tweaks envisaged to the 
existing protocols, Brown argued for meetings between the chancellor and governor 
to be timetabled a year in advance; for interest rate decisions to be announced 
immediately after meetings; and for post-meeting information, such as the inflation 
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report, to be published quickly.773 On the more structural changes to the Bank, Brown 
first proposed the establishment of a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to ‘decide 
on the advice to be given to the government on monetary policy’.774 Crucially, this 
reform ruled out an all-powerful governor of the Bank should Labour take office. 
Instead the MPC would comprise 6 members in addition to the governor and deputy 
governor. Second, Brown suggested the Bank’s Court – responsible for the strategic 
governance of the Bank – should have an expanded membership to reflect a wider 
range of interests from ‘the city, both sides of industry and the regions’.775 Third, 
reforms to the Bank’s accountability mechanisms would mean more regular scrutiny 
of the governor before Select Committees as well as independent reviews of the 
Bank’s inflation reports.776 While Brown summed up these reforms as positive and 
significant in improving the credibility of monetary policymaking, the remainder of 
his speech gave a carefully-worded assessment of the benefits of central bank 
independence, should Labour wish to go further. 
 
In establishing Labour’s aim of removing ‘the suspicion that short-term party political 
considerations are influencing the setting of interest rates’,777 Brown set out two 
options: establish clear rules to guide policymaking that are agreed and followed 
irrespective of the decision-maker; or considering ‘whether the operational role of the 
Bank of England should be extended beyond its current advisory role in monetary 
policymaking’.778 Brown ruled out the first on the basis of ‘international evidence’779 
and then set out about setting the limits to the second. As Labour’s private policy 
work had suggested, Brown ruled out regimes of independence which he considered 
as going too far. 
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While being attracted to the ‘internal democracy of decision-making in the 
Bundesbank and the way in which government sets targets for the bank to pursue in 
New Zealand’,780 he argued: 
 
‘I do not, however, believe that any of these models would be acceptable for 
wholesale adoption in the UK. The Bundesbank does not have an inflation 
target set by government. I reject this model of target independence. The Bank 
of New Zealand personalises its decision-making process. We are not in the 
business of depoliticising interest rate decision-making only to personalise it 
in one, independent governor. This is a form of independence I reject.’781 
 
Brown then both signalled what Labour’s future policy would be, while also 
appearing to suggest it would not be an early reform of the next Labour Government. 
First, he stated that Labour would ensure the government continued to set the inflation 
target and control fiscal policy, but did not say it would retain the final say on the 
operational powers – interest rate setting – in order to meet that target.782 Brown then 
concluded with language which suggested, regardless of his views, any reform would 
need to be in the context of the Bank’s record following a strengthened advisor role: 
 
‘The debate on future operational arrangements will continue. But, as I have 
said, it is time now to strengthen the Bank’s advisory role. Internal reforms at 
the Bank of England must therefore take place and the Bank must demonstrate 
a successful track record in its advice… And we must observe the Bank’s 
track record of advice in the future – in particular in predicting inflation.’783 
 
Balls later reflected that Brown had ‘dipped his toe in the water’ with a ‘fairly dry 
speech at the Labour Finance & Industry Group’ that suggested Labour would 
‘consider [EB’s emphasis] the case for independence once we had seen the track 
record of the new reformed institution’.784 Yet, as Campbell had feared, there was 
media interest in this toe-dipping. A write-up of the speech in The Independent noted 
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that Brown had ‘proposed that interest-rate advice – and possibly decisions – should 
be agreed by an eight-person monetary policy committee appointed by the 
Government’.785 While noting the speech was a ‘careful balancing act’ and ‘cautious’, 
the report considered the speech ‘important’ and noted that Brown had signalled ‘his 
willingness to hand over decisions on interest rates to the Bank… provided it were 
reformed’ and evidenced a good track record of advice.786 
 
Five days later, Blair reiterated Brown’s messaging on the Bank in his Mais Lecture 
at City University, though with a more cautious tone: 
 
‘Germany’s economic record and the potential role of the Bundesbank 
demands attention… we have to design an institutional arrangement that fits 
Britain, and it may use the best practice from a number of countries. Our 
objective is clear. This is to reform the Bank of England so that it can carry 
out its increasingly important functions in an open and more accountable 
manner. Gordon Brown spelt out a series of reforms last week. We will then 
watch the track record of the Bank before deciding what, if any, further steps 
should be taken towards greater operational responsibility for the Bank in 
interest rate policy.’787 
 
‘Completed and filed’: policy decision-making 
 
Labour’s commitments on paper, as well as the testimony of those involved in 
economic policy-making, attests to a divergence, in 1995, between the policy 
commitment to Bank independence and the politics of this commitment – particularly 
how it should be communicated and delivered. The commitment was strengthened 
and the decision was taken that Bank independence was the right policy, yet the 
timing and presentation of the decision was debated upon and ultimately left unsettled 
until shortly before polling day. In the summer following Brown’s speech on 
Labour’s macroeconomic framework, Brown’s team worked on the economic policy 
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commission paper – to be considered by Labour’s 1995 conference – and on 
communicating Labour’s economic message – something Blair’s team were anxious 
about in the run-up to the 1997 election. This anxiety stemmed from two problems 
Blair and his aides saw in Brown’s operation. 
 
First, the animosity they perceived to be held by Brown and his team regarding 
Mandelson and his election team at Labour’s headquarters in Millbank Tower, a short 
distance from Westminster Palace. According to Mandelson, ‘Gordon remained often 
unwilling to engage with, sometimes even to communicate with, me or key players at 
Millbank. Almost every decision was a struggle’.788 Second, Blair was concerned 
Labour lacked a clear and concise message on the economy. In 1996 he worried that, 
on tax, Labour was ‘getting a reputation we had been trying to shelve’, while Brown 
similarly derided Blair’s interest in the ‘stakeholder economy’,789 which Blair had set 
out in a speech in Singapore, indicating a willingness to reform business governance 
‘towards a version of the company as a community or partnership in which each 
employee has a stake, and where the company’s responsibilities are more clearly 
delineated’.790 Both Brown and Balls saw this as a distraction.  
 
In an economic briefing provided to the PLP in August 1995, Brown and his Shadow 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, the MP Andrew Smith, argued that Labour’s ‘real 
difference’ with the Tories on the economy amounted to ‘job-generating investment 
and employment measures’ and ‘measures for fairness – e.g. the minimum wage and 
fair tax’.791 In a lengthy briefing of economic data, policy and campaign messages, 
the policy announcements and nods to independence from Brown’s macroeconomic 
framework speech were minimised or excluded entirely. There was one rather vague 
bullet point noting Labour’s commitment to ‘reforming the conduct of monetary 
policy, with a more representative Bank of England’.792 The economic policy 
document taken to Labour’s conference in 1995, A New Economic Future for Britain, 
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used Brown’s May speech as the basis for its macroeconomic framework section – 
though it did not include the sections of both Brown’s and Blair’s speeches which 
engaged with the need for further reform in the medium-term, informed both by the 
Bank’s record and the experience of independent central banks, like the Bundesbank.  
 
The section on the Bank of England reintroduced Brown’s speech commitments on a 
new MPC, though the document was silent on what a future role for that committee 
could be when it came to monetary policy decision-making. It stated: ‘The Bank of 
England will need to be restructured in order that it can carry out its functions in an 
open and accountable manner… We are attracted by the option of establishing a new 
monetary policy committee, overseen by a more representative court… Labour will 
consult further on these proposals.’793 
 
While the document did pursue Labour’s criticisms of both the short-termist, political 
pressure on interest rates, as well as what Brown and Balls saw as the deficiencies of 
the Conservative accountability reforms, it did not ask the party to consider further 
reforms, nor offer to consult on the kinds of issues Brown and Blair raised in relation 
to different models of central bank independence. Later in 1995, a further contribution 
to New Labour’s policy agenda, in the form of a book by Mandelson and Roger 
Liddle, also touched upon the issue of Bank independence. What Campbell referred to 
in his diaries as ‘Peter’s bloody book’794 had caused consternation among the ‘Big 
Guns’ owing to concern over Mandelson’s influence extending from electoral strategy 
to policy. Brown – following a newspaper publishing a synopsis of the book – wanted 
Mandelson to ‘rewrite the book and take out anything difficult for the party’.795 
Mandelson recollected: 
 
‘Gordon also read the manuscript. His main objection was to our including an 
idea, originating with him and Ed Balls, that we had been discussing with 
Tony for some time: giving the Bank of England independent control over 
setting interest rates We took that out [of the book] too.’796 
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A section on Labour’s macroeconomic framework in what became The Blair 
Revolution, published in 1996 (and later revised), restated the language from Labour’s 
1995 conference policy document, with the addition of a sentence based on Blair’s 
Mais Lecture: ‘Any further steps to strengthen the Bank’s independence would 
depend on the success of these arrangements.’797 Following Brown’s 1995 speech 
foray into central bank independence, much of the rest of the year saw Labour’s 
economic policy team actively hold back from pushing the idea. Yet, according to 
Brown, his mind was made up in 1995 that independence was the right thing to do. 
In a speech to the Bank of England’s conference marking 20 years since its 
operational independence, Brown noted: 
 
‘I went away in 1995 for a series of days reading all of the literature that Ed 
[Balls] had brought together for me, with what was an embryonic plan to 
make the Bank of England independent… I was reading about the short-
termism in British economic policy. This short-termism that characterised 
British economic policy was what I was targeting, and we had to overturn the 
orthodoxy, the orthodoxy was fiscal and monetary policy were best conducted 
by one agency together, in other words the Treasury, Bank of England 
independence would be a diversion from your primary objectives – full 
employment and high levels of economic growth – and I turned it on its head, 
and said high levels of economic growth and full employment are not possible 
unless we have economic stability and we cannot have economic stability if 
we cannot take the long-term view and simply be governed by the short-
termism of the Treasury making interest rate decisions primarily for political 
reasons. And that was the basis on which we made the decision… 
 
‘The objectives [for the Bank] I wanted to be exactly the same as the Fed … 
low inflation and high levels of employment and growth. Therefore, we also 
had to have a symmetrical inflation target because we had to send out a signal 
that we were as worried about deflation as about inflation, and our 
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symmetrical inflation target, which we had decided by 1995 was the right 
thing to do, had to be pro-growth.’798 
 
Brown added: ‘This was the model we agreed – Ed and I – in 1995, and I do pay 
tribute to the original thinking that he brought to bear on this.’799 The statement made 
by Brown on 6th May 1997 – announcing operational independence for the Bank of 
England – provided an opportunity for the chancellor to enjoy ‘the element of coup de 
theatre in springing this announcement on a surprised world’.800 Yet, while surprised 
journalists had to be briefed by Balls after the press conference about exactly what 
Brown’s statement meant, his words revealed the importance of 1995 for Labour’s 
thinking and decision points. Brown told the collected journalists and the Treasury: 
‘In a speech in May 1995 and subsequently in our 1995 policy document, A New 
Economic Future for Britain, I set out my view of the proper roles of the Government 
and the Bank of England in economic policy… as I have repeatedly made clear since 
1995, we will only build a fully credible framework for monetary policy if the long-
term needs of the economy, not short-term political considerations, guide monetary 
decision-making.’801 
 
Brown’s language, and the substance of his policy announcement, were consistent 
with the policy development Labour had conducted in 1995, as well as with Balls’ 
earlier thinking from 1992. In his book on the 2008 financial crisis, Brown says as 
much: ‘The original plan, written by Ed, remained intact.’802 The chancellor used the 
term ‘operational responsibility for setting interest rates’, rather than ‘central bank 
independence’, as Labour’s earlier policy papers had argued. Broadly, the MPC 
composition and the changes to the Court were consistent. While the symmetric 
inflation target – referred to earlier in this chapter – was not included in the statement, 
this was not ditched, but merely held back until the following month. While 
legislation had to be drafted, debated and agreed by Parliament – necessitating detail 
which had to be drawn up by civil servants – the letter to the Bank Governor, drafted 
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by Balls and delivered to the Treasury by Brown, and the substance of the press 
conference were based on work and decisions that had been taken many months 
earlier. As Brown reflected in his memoir: ‘Long before we came into government, 
his [Ed Balls’] plan had been written, rewritten, reviewed, finessed, tested to 
destruction, completed and filed.’803 
 
The timing was far more of a surprise, though with the policy development 
completed, Balls and Brown were ready to go with an announcement when they 
desired. Brown took the decision to proceed immediately after the general election, 
informing Balls and Blair a few days before polling day in 1997. The timing of the 
announcement is, rather more famously than the story of the development of the 
policy, a further example of the supremacy Blair and Brown exercised over policy-
making. The civil service, eagerly trying to integrate the new prime minister and his 
team into Whitehall’s ways of working, were shocked by the swiftness of the 
decision.  
 
Brown recollected: 
 
‘The civil service were absolutely right, it was totally unconventional, we 
should have gone through the proper procedures, we should have had 
committees, we should have had cabinet decisions, we should have had 
cabinet sub committees looking at the intricate details of the proposals, but I 
thought – and I think I was right – that you cannot do this properly without 
having a fresh start and it had to happen immediately. I met Tony on the 
Saturday morning, I think his words were “fine”, so he agreed we go ahead – 
of course this was the start of sofa government because I actually met him in 
his house, in Islington, and I was sitting on a sofa while I explained to him 
what we wanted to do… so on the Tuesday we went ahead.’804 
 
As this chapter has argued that both Blair and Brown shared an interpretation of 
Labour’s ethos that its leadership should be the drivers of political decision-making, it 
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is important at this point to rule out one potential reason for secrecy in policy 
development, and surprise in presentation: the views of the Labour Party more widely 
– in this case, concerns about internal opposition to the policy. Brown has noted that 
Bank independence ‘wasn’t in our manifesto, we had no party people asking us to do 
it… the decision we made was not because of political pressures, it was because we 
thought it was in the right interests of Britain’.805 Here Brown is noting the absence of 
a ‘bottom-up’ aspect to the policy: it did not come from the party, and it did not have 
consent – through debate, amendment or authorisation – from the party. Were Brown 
and Balls, or Blair, concerned there would be opposition to its ‘top-down’ imposition 
on the party? 
 
While possible, I do not judge this to be the case. Brown’s own characterisation of 
Labour’s historical position was being ‘generally throughout its history violently 
opposed to independence of the Bank of England’,806 noting the tying of the currency 
to gold reserves in the 1920s, the fall of the Labour Government in 1931, and Harold 
Wilson’s tensions with the Bank, referred to earlier in this chapter. Writing prior to 
the 1997 election, Shaw noted that any measures giving the Bank further 
independence would be ‘signalling that it is prepared to endorse the Bank’s order of 
priorities, in which full employment comes a long way behind price stability’.807 Ken 
Livingstone reflected that the decision ‘would favour the financial sector and 
undermine the country’s manufacturing base’,808 while arguing that Brown announced 
the policy quickly because he ‘knew there would be strong opposition… so they 
announced it the day before Labour MPs met for the first time’.809 Many of the left-
wing Campaign Group of Labour MPs were opposed to Bank independence. 
 
However, the rationale for not announcing the policy – in the minds of Balls and 
Brown – had nothing to do with the Labour Party’s internal debates. Indeed, on one 
occasion, Blair suggested to Campbell it could be announced if it was electorally 
advantageous against the Conservatives.810 And the reality of the opposition from the 
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Labour Left was mild, with no Labour MPs voting against Bank independence 
following the 1997 election owing to the Campaign Group’s view that an 
insubstantial number of MPs would rebel and there was low public understanding of 
the issue.811 Following Brown’s speech and Labour’s economic policy document, 
debates at the 1995 Labour Party Conference didn’t mention Bank independence, 
with conference composites focusing on the minimum wage, pensions, nationalisation 
and trade union laws.812 Instead, it entirely came down to the strategic views of 
Brown, Balls and – on this particular policy – to a lesser extent Blair. 
 
According to Balls, both he and Brown believed the issue would be contentious in the 
national political debate, with opposition from the Conservatives, as well as 
institutional resistance – so, electorally, there was a downside risk. A second electoral 
point added to this caution – neither Brown nor Balls thought Labour needed Bank 
independence to cut-through on the economy. Balls noted: 
 
‘If in the year before the general election we were really in trouble over the 
economy and our commitment to stability, we might have decided, Gordon 
might have gone to Tony and said “I think we should say something more 
about this”. But actually the calculation in that period was that on the one hand 
we didn’t need to do that because we were already doing pretty well on 
stability, and toughness relative to the Tories. And secondly, there was the 
danger that Bank independence would have been seen as being risky and 
deflationary, therefore why rock the boat? And I think we had a pretty clear 
idea, before the election, the Tories were opposed to it. So if we had said we 
will make the Bank independent, our concern was the Tories would say “aha! 
This is how they’re going to jack up interest rates and destroy your 
mortgages”. So there was a good reason why it happened the day after the 
election. We were right that it would have been contentious.’813 
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Brown’s recollection reinforces Balls’ point about mortgages. Announcing Bank 
independence, would, according to Brown, have ‘politicised interest rates’.814 It was 
well-reported in the build-up to the 1997 election that the then chancellor, Ken 
Clarke, was choosing to ignore the Bank’s advice to raise interest rates.815 An 
announcement from Labour that Bank governor Eddie George would be given free 
rein to change interest rates was, therefore, tantamount to a commitment to raise 
them. ‘Our pre-election silence was caution for a purpose,’816 Brown argued in his 
memoir. Yet it is not entirely clear that caution over Conservative attacks on interest 
rate raises should disbar consultation within the Labour Party over the future direction 
of monetary policy, including independent central banks. Brown had, after all, 
suggested in his 1995 speech that the ‘debate’ on models of operational independence 
would continue. But Labour didn’t have one. Forms of dialogue and debate within the 
party, for example on the minimum wage, existed, all the while managing not to pre-
empt the actions of a future Labour Government. While concerns over the electoral 
impact of Bank independence were valid, and part of the mix of uncertainty 
surrounding such a significant policy, it is not at all clear that such concerns debarred 
more participatory policy development.  
 
These uncertainties meant that, from 1995-1997, the timing of when to go for Bank 
independence was never clear to Brown and Balls. As Brown noted, ‘we had the 
plans, we had known it was the right thing to do, but it was not clear to us throughout 
the previous two years what the right timing should be’.817 The clarity from Brown 
just a few days before polling day both surprised and pleased Balls: ‘Regardless of the 
timing, just the fact that Gordon seemed to have made his mind up was significant… 
I’d always expected him to be more equivocal on the risks, but this was him at his 
decisive best.’818 It is clear considerations of what the party wanted were not a factor 
in the timing of the Bank announcement, nor in the development of the policy. 
Furthermore, when the decision was finally taken is symptomatic not of any 
organisational limitations on Brown or Balls, but rather that their political analysis 
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and instincts guided when things happened. Their strategic context was 
overwhelmingly about the electoral contest with the Conservative Party, and Labour’s 
likely success or failure when it made it to government. Managing the tradition of 
democratic participation involved, for Blair and Brown, both legitimation on their 
terms and an ameliorative rhetorical strategy.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Returning to Minkin’s observations regarding the subordination of the wider party, 
and the far-reaching freedom of decision-making for the leadership, the decision to 
make the Bank of England operationally independent supports his central claims. 
‘Traditional’ party decision-making structures were bypassed – indeed, on Bank 
independence, any structure was bypassed entirely as the policy was neither voted 
upon by the membership as part of the Road to the Manifesto, nor agreed by the 
party’s ‘Clause V’ meeting which considers Labour’s manifesto. Interestingly, Balls 
did not attend the Clause V meeting in 1997,819 while David Miliband – the leader’s 
head of policy and the man who authored the 1997 manifesto text – couldn’t recollect 
whether he attended or not.820 Individual interpretations of Labour’s ethos, held by 
New Labour’s senior figures, contained a clear belief in leadership autonomy. In 
relation to the dominant interpretation of Labour’s ethos at the time, it is important – 
once again – to consider how Labour’s ethos interacted with the external political 
environment and the extent to which New Labour’s leadership perceived a difference 
of opinion in the party. 
 
There was a perception – a powerful and persistent one – held by those at the top of 
New Labour that they had licence to act with significant autonomy. This stemmed 
from two important insights: that the party was desperate to win and that the party 
thought Blair would win. Following Blair’s successful amendment to Clause IV in 
1995, his authority was further enhanced. Trade union leaders who had expressed 
disquiet at the change to the constitution accepted that Blair had a mandate, meaning 
there was near unanimity across the trade union section of the movement that Blair 
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and Brown needed to be supported into power.821 If one reflects on the changed 
strategic context from Kinnock to Blair, and the different judgements of the two 
leaders, stark differences are apparent. Kinnock did believe he had a mandate for 
change, particularly after the 1987 election, but this was balanced by his perception of 
a party that had to move gradually. Kinnock judged a party that had to be changed 
gradually, in keeping – where possible – with the dominant interpretation of the 
party’s ethos. Blair judged a party that was sick and tired of losing, giving him greater 
autonomy. Both perceptions were based on indications from union leaders and other 
readers of the party’s ethos, yet both remained judgements. Had they reached 
different judgements, and regardless of party structures or the electoral climate, 
Kinnock could have chosen to pursue further and faster changes, while Blair could 
have pursued slower, more gradual reform. 
 
Yet, while these differences are both important and stark, this chapter has argued a 
point of difference with Minkin, though one he occasionally alluded to in The Blair 
Supremacy:822 that the Blair of 1994-1997 retained some similarities with Kinnock 
and past Labour leaders. As opposition leader, Blair spoke to his party as a man 
seeking to persuade. As this chapter has sought to show, Blair reconsidered instances 
where he may have confronted his party more directly. He recognised the ‘head and 
body’ problem when it came to the legitimacy of policy. Party member plebiscites – 
for a short time – seemed to have replaced activist sovereignty, and Blair and Brown 
were selective about which policies to commit to, and potentially argue over, in 
opposition. Their beliefs and strategies were not, therefore, unusual within the 
competing traditions of Labour’s ethos. Autonomy was balanced with attempts at 
conciliation. This changed over time. Powell’s observation that Blair prioritised 
winning the battle for positioning and then, thinking he had won it, moved on to a 
policy legacy823 suggests a leader who thought he had changed his party’s outlook, 
and so disengaged. Prior to this, in Blair’s words, he did ‘some of it’.824 ‘It’ being 
speaking the language of the party and learning how to ‘press the right buttons’.825 
The next chapter examines this further. 
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Chapter 6 
Outsiders: Tony Blair’s expressive and instrumental leadership blend 
 
 
‘They argue Labour should drop its socialism, or at least say little about it, and then we can win 
government. Yes, we might win, but we would no longer be a socialist party, we would be a Social 
Democratic Party Mark 2.’ 
E. Heffer, Labour’s Future 
 
‘It has to be conceded that conservatives suffer from a singular disadvantage… lacking any obvious 
aim in politics, they lack any offering with which to stir up the enthusiasm of the crowd. They are 
concerned solely with the task of government.’ 
R. Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism 
 
‘As long as there are people whose political commitment is motivated by a profound sense of 
discontent and distress over the iniquities of contemporary societies… then these people will keep alive 
the ideals which have characterised all left-wing movements for over a century.’ 
N. Bobbio, Left and Right 
 
Introduction 
 
As Tony Blair reminded party members in 2006, ‘there’s only one tradition I hated: 
losing’.826 Recollecting Drucker’s observation that, within Labour’s ideology, there 
existed an oppositionist tendency, one can see the tradition within Labour’s ethos 
which Blair also had in mind. Philip Gould recollected Blair’s impatience with 
opposition politics: ‘He paced around the room and wouldn’t sit down. He could not 
have made his intentions more clear [sic]. “Past Labour leaders lost because they 
compromised,” he said. “I will never compromise. I would rather be beaten and leave 
politics than bend to the party. I am going to take the party on.”’827 The message, 
privately and sometimes publicly, was unrelenting from New Labour: that you can’t 
change anything in politics unless you win, and you can’t win unless you change your 
politics. This, in New Labour’s outlook, was in sharp contrast to ‘the oppositionist 
left’.828 It was an endorsement of ‘instrumental’ politics – that ‘primarily concerned 
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with the attainment of power to bring about desired ends, even if this means some 
compromise of principles’.829 While there is some truth in this analysis of early New 
Labour (this study is focused on the pre-government period), the central conclusion of 
this chapter is that Blair did compromise with his party and its expressive tendency – 
though this strategy did not last. 
 
When past membership surveys have shown Labour people are more likely to join the 
party for expressive purposes (to give expression to their ideals) rather than for 
instrumental purposes (because they believe they need a Labour government),830 it is 
not so obvious that a leader’s strategy should be to stress, purely and above all else, 
the instrumental nature of their politics. After all, as Whiteley noted, party members 
are ‘interested in symbolic or rhetorical issues, and a party leader who pays due 
deference to this has a wide scope for pursuing policies opposed by Conference’.831 In 
other words, recognition of expressive politics may enable action which is focused on 
instrumental outcomes. It isn’t, therefore, necessarily an example of where ‘Labour 
leaders were constrained by the party’s constitution and ethos’,832 for skilful use of 
symbolism can liberate a leader. 
 
It also has the capacity to both legitimise and embed a political project, and if that 
project is focused on political change – for instance, significant policy change – a 
greater sense of expressive Labour politics may be necessary if that change is going to 
be anything other than fleeting. Indeed, a failure to do so can lead to a dispiriting 
experience for members. As Black pointed out in his study of Labour in the 1950s, 
‘the more ideological and missionary temper of many members was frustrated by the 
limited time afforded for political education, discussions of policy, theory or 
“political” resolutions. Local parties were often “electoralist” (oriented to winning 
elections to the exclusion of other activities) more by default than intent’.833 To keep 
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members motivated for ‘electoralist’ purposes, one must also provide the fuel for 
missionary temper. 
 
In the previous chapter I noted that Blair often wrestled with a private impatience: the 
Blair who railed against his party and movement, and the Blair who would then step 
back from an ‘uncompromising’ message. While Blair did not prioritise non-
confrontational unity in the style of Neil Kinnock, there is a danger that in listening to 
New Labour’s elite actors defining their legacy, and in only analysing the later Blair 
years, our understanding of how political change came about in opposition is skewed 
by years of government. This chapter seeks to posit the temporal nature of New 
Labour, in this instance, treating Blair’s opposition period and early years in power as 
a distinct phase of Blair’s and New Labour’s internal political strategy. It also seeks to 
present a clearer balance of Blair’s relationship with Labour’s more expressive 
outlook – one often confused by his willingness both to challenge Labour’s traditions 
and to ‘pay heed to its established shibboleths’.834 In short, there was more ‘taking the 
party with us’ during Blair’s opposition years, in political and rhetorical strategy, than 
the New Labour leadership team have since suggested and Blair’s critics have 
claimed.  
 
Utilising speeches and press notices from Blair’s leadership campaign,835 this chapter 
reveals a political and rhetorical strategy from Blair which blended expressive and 
instrumental political approaches – something Parkin rightly noted that most political 
activity seeks to achieve.836 Aware of the suspicion of succumbing to MacDonaldism 
– that of ‘being captured by the conventional wisdom, establishment opinion, civil 
service advisers, or of being browbeaten by a hostile press, the City or the 
International Monetary Fund’837 – Blair’s political and rhetorical strategy were crafted 
to prevent accusations of selling out.838 It has been recently claimed that, from 1994 
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onwards, Blair presented ‘a conservative vision of modernity with a populist rhetoric 
that disavowed even the mildest version of social democracy’.839 The analysis that 
follows, focusing on the period 1994-1997, would suggest this claim is wide of the 
mark. However, while this study ends its analysis when New Labour entered 
government, I do discuss how this approach changed during Blair’s tenure in the 
Conclusion of this study. In particular, I highlight Blair’s final conference speech as 
Labour leader where attention to the party’s ethos – and its more expressive tendency 
– appears to have been forgotten, with consequences for those who followed Blair and 
Gordon Brown in leading Labour. 
 
In his analysis of New Labour, Hindmoor discussed the role of rhetoric in shaping the 
‘centre’ and in persuading voters of an argument. ‘Politicians who start a speech with 
a blanket denunciation of their audience and of its audience’s beliefs will be 
unpersuasive,’840 he argued. Turning to Blair’s early mission to change his party, 
Hindmoor continued: 
 
‘[When] Blair sought to persuade those in the party he had just been elected to 
lead that Labour needed to change, he did not do so by arguing, in public at 
least, that the party needed to be entirely reconstituted… Rhetoric is path-
dependent. The beliefs an audience has today are not necessarily those it will 
have tomorrow. Beliefs can be changed and can be changed through rhetoric. 
The beliefs an audience has tomorrow will however be affected by those it has 
today, because the beliefs it has today will partly determine which arguments 
it finds persuasive.’841 
 
I argue in this chapter that, as Hindmoor suggested, Blair and New Labour were alive 
to what they perceived to be the expressive tendency of the party they led, and 
accepting of the need to find rhetorical arguments that were persuasive to Labour 
people. I also argue that as well as a persuasive rhetorical strategy, giving greater 
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resonance to Labour’s more expressive tendencies is important for a Labour person’s 
identity and the collective unity of the party as a whole. The use of expressive oratory 
not only helps to cajole and persuade, it connects an actor to an important tradition 
within Labour’s ethos. In other words, it shows an actor understands – in relation to 
this tradition – the ‘right’ and appropriate way to engage in Labour Party politics. 
This chapter does not argue, however, that those at the top of New Labour held 
individual interpretations of Labour’s ethos which highly valued the expressive nature 
of the party’s politics. Indeed, I believe the opposite is the case. Blair undoubtedly 
held an interpretation of Labour’s ethos which believed in the instrumental priority of 
Labour politics – that one can express their ideals all they like, but without power 
these ideals remain an abstract notion.  Yet ‘speaking the language’, as I argued in the 
previous chapter when considering Blair’s political strategy, was considered essential 
by the New Labour leadership to convince the wider party to support them, and 
indeed invest them with sufficient freedom to make policy decisions. 
 
Andrew S. Crines has argued that prominent Labour people from the 
‘moderate/radical left’ have tended to be ‘more romantic and emotion-driven’ in their 
rhetorical style ‘because of the inclination to draw from past battles and future causes 
as a means of challenging “the establishment”… [and for] justifying socialist 
thought’.842 Such a style included ‘drawing on historical movements or individuals 
who appear to give credence to their argument of a longer running opposition to “the 
establishment”’.843 Crines identified Michael Foot, in particular, for using ‘arguments 
based on moral causes and collective opposition rooted in class conflict, liberal 
socialism and the rank and file’.844 In contrast, leading Labour figures from the ‘social 
democratic right’, including Blair, tended to use language which ‘appeared more 
pragmatic and logical… [and] tended to prioritise electoral victory at the expense of 
socialist romanticism’.845 Social democrats were ‘more willing to change aspects of 
Labour’s historic raison d’etre in order to appear in touch with the electorate’.846 
While I agree with aspects of Crines’ argument, particularly some of the features 
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which he assigns to the Labour Left and to social democrats, and which I assign to 
expressive and instrumental politics respectively, this chapter argues that such an 
analysis overlooks a tendency among the majority of Labour people – including social 
democrats – to offer a blend of expressive and instrumental politics. This was the case 
with both Blair and Brown in opposition, though it was a strategy the former – and to 
a lesser extent, the latter – abandoned following years of government, to the cost of a 
generation of politicians who followed them. 
 
Managers of a conservative country 
 
The fault line in Labour’s ethos between interpretations which posit a more 
expressive or a more instrumental politics was recognised by Blair in a lecture he 
gave at a university in Perth, Australia in 1982. As Rentoul noted, as a ‘seeker of a 
safe seat’847 Blair’s tone and content at the time were uncontroversial, while he rarely 
stretched far from frontbench positions.848 He had fought and lost for Labour the no-
hope seat of Beaconsfield earlier that same year – having been heartily endorsed by 
party leader Michael Foot in the process –  and was soon to be selected for the safe 
seat of Sedgefield to contest the 1983 general election. Nevertheless, while Blair’s 
words were undoubtedly affected by the strategic imperative of appearing attractive to 
all but the Militant tendency and those defecting to the SDP, for the purpose of this 
chapter, his strategy is instructive. For while there are signs in the lecture of what 
would become, two decades later, Blair’s reputation for pragmatism, more obvious is 
Blair’s perception of a party that required change, but through a process which 
blended expressive and instrumental political approaches.  
 
The Perth lecture criticised the Labour Right for cosiness with the establishment 
press, while applauding the Left for resisting the party leadership’s slide into 
management of a conservative country instead of commitment to transformative 
change. 
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In critiquing the Right, Blair argued that in order for Labour to bring about ‘enormous 
state guidance and intervention’, the next Labour government would: 
 
‘[Come] into sharp conflict with the power of Capital, particularly multi-
national Capital. The trouble with the right of the Party is that it has basked 
too long in the praise of the leader writers of the Financial Times, Times and 
Guardian, that it is no longer accustomed to giving them offence. It will find 
the experience painful but it is vital.’849 
 
Such language brings to mind the critique of the first Attlee Government, in the 
pamphlet Keep Left, that Labour’s difficulties were the result of ‘not enough boldness 
and urgency and too much tenderness for vested interests’.850 It isn’t quite ‘you can’t 
make socialist omelettes without breaking capitalist eggs’,851 as Keep Left argued, but 
in criticising ‘mild tinkering’852 and elucidating Labour’s struggle against capital, 
Blair was speaking to a more expressive interpretation of Labour’s ethos. Applauding 
the Left, Blair took aim at something that would later become synonymous with New 
Labour’s objective - being ‘the natural party of government’. He argued: 
 
‘Honest people on the right and centre will admit that the Left has generated 
an enormous amount of quite necessary re-thinking in the Party. We were in 
danger of drifting into being “the natural party of government” but of a society 
that was unradicalised and unchanged. We had become managers of a 
conservative country.’853 
 
Yet the Labour Left didn’t have it all. Blair argued the Left retained a narrow, 
doomed strategy of trying to win an election based on a working class base topped up 
with liberal metropolitans.854 It occasionally risked ‘blind obedience to traditional 
doctrine’855 (note: traditional doctrine, not traditions per se). It failed ‘to mix 
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sufficiently with the electorate’ and resisted having ‘a democratic relationship with 
the electorate’856 (a process of listening to and interpreting the public’s views). 
Finally, it maintained too strong a commitment to outdated Marxism, which Blair 
considered to be influential, but strongly without a roadmap or plan for the future.857 
The Right, Blair contended, brought the ‘pragmatism, that hard-headedness of 
purpose’ which the Left ‘consistently underestimates’.858 What was required, then, 
was a coming together. However, in taking public opinion as an example, Blair 
contrasted two extreme positions without fully explaining the alternative:  
 
‘It would be absurd if the Party descended into oblique populism, merely 
parroting the views of “the electorate”, however those views could be gauged. 
Equally absurd, though, is the view that there is anything to be gained from 
capturing control of the Labour Party machine whilst leaving the voters 
behind.’859 
 
From where did Blair’s call for reconciliation and compromise – from both Left and 
Right, expressive and instrumental – spring? His Perth lecture identified two points 
that informed his analysis: that the Left convincingly crushed a more complacent, 
crudely instrumental view of politics following the 1979 election defeat; and that the 
party’s rank and file had changed, risking a divergence between members and the rest 
of the Labour movement, including the trade unions. Summing up his view of the 
legacy of the 1974-1979 Labour Governments, Blair argued: 
 
‘The powerful appeal of the Left to the fundamental socialist instincts of the 
Party, coupled with the election defeat, easily overwhelmed the tired excuses 
of pragmatism from the Labour right. As often in politics, it is not how things 
actually are, but how they are perceived that is important. The May 1979 
election defeat was perceived by the Party and indeed Labour Movement as a 
whole, as a victory for the ideology of Thatcher and a defeat for middle-of-
the-road consensus politics... The 1979 election defeat propelled the leftwards 
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movement forward… it lifted the responsibility of power from the shoulders 
of the Party… [and] by pointing to the election defeat, the Left were able to 
dispose of the continual refrain of the right-wing that moderation was essential 
to the retaining of power.’860 
 
This convincing victory for the narrative of the Labour Left was coupled, in Blair’s 
argument, with the need for the Right to acknowledge ‘that the Party has changed 
irreversibly’ through the influence of ‘new white-collar participants in the Labour 
Party’.861 Blair’s conciliatory view of Labour’s ‘new’ Left was of a people who bring 
social issues to Labour which break with ‘traditional’ socialist political economy. 
Discussing green issues and social equality, Blair noted: ‘Ironically, indeed, they tend 
to be issues cutting across Party boundaries. The “new” left, so readily accused of 
being sectarian, often embrace policies that have non-sectarian appeal.’862 In 
Rentoul’s biography of Blair, he argued that ‘it is difficult to trace Blair’s 
transformation from labour movement orthodoxy to arch-revisionism in his public 
utterances for some time’ after these comments.863 Indeed, while Blair’s Australia 
lecture was delivered 12 years before Blair led the Labour Party, what makes it an 
important – and curiously under-studied – piece of Blair oratory is it’s early indication 
that Blair’s public arguments would not commit to outright confrontation with 
Labour’s members and the wider movement. There is a clear recognition evident in 
both Blair’s argument and tone that the power of the Labour Left in the early 1980s 
was not only organisational – it struck numerous chords with Labour’s rank and file 
for its expressive and ideologically-confident approach.  
 
More than vanguardists – Blair’s strategic context 
 
Before analysing Blair’s rhetorical and political strategy during the 1994 leadership 
contest, some of the main factors within Blair’s strategic context must be expanded 
upon. John Smith’s sudden death had created an unusual moment for the 
‘modernisers’ and their efforts to change the Labour Party. On the one hand, the 
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majority of the PLP had been happy with Smith’s leadership, believing him to be 
more popular than Kinnock and in with a very strong chance of winning the general 
election. On the other hand, Smith’s leadership had frustrated some within the 
modernising clique. Mandelson had argued for a more ‘radical option’864 at the time 
of Kinnock’s resignation, and Blair had attempted to convince Brown to run against 
Smith.865 Despite Brown’s hesitation and loyalty to Smith – a moment both Blair and 
Mandelson argued ended his chances of becoming leader before Blair – and his 
agreement to back Smith and become Shadow Chancellor, on economic policy Smith 
was seen to rebuff the modernisers. His address to the 1993 Labour Party Annual 
Conference argued: 
 
‘This commitment to the goal of full employment is central to our economic 
approach. It means using not just interest rates - which now even the IMF 
believe should be cut - but all the instruments of economic policy to go for 
growth, jobs and investment. It means what we, as democratic socialists, have 
always believed, that it is the duty of Government to match unmet needs with 
unused resources.’866 
 
This was seen by Brown and his allies as a commitment to profligacy. When Jack 
Straw, who had written a pamphlet on reforms to Clause IV, privately raised its 
publication with Smith, he demanded Straw drop the idea, told him he could lose his 
Shadow Cabinet seat, and ‘threw the envelope containing the pamphlet’ at Straw as 
he exited the meeting.867 Some saw the ‘one-more-heave’ narrative as a concoction of 
the Blair coterie to make the case for change, rather than being grounded in reality. 
Yet, whatever its origins, the ‘one-more-heave’ narrative had purchase, and was 
continuously repeated by many Labour people. Overall, Smith’s sudden and 
unexpected legacy was something to be handled carefully by Blair and his allies. In 
addition to basic humanity and good nature following the death of a colleague, the 
mandate sought by Smith’s successor needed to recognise the limits to Smith’s 
approach, but delicately. Another important part of Blair’s strategic context was 
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Brown. Without replicating the drama of the back and forth between the two men 
following Smith’s death, nor the agreement reached over economic and social policy, 
Brown’s presence both as potential rival and as advisor to Blair was a significant 
factor in shaping Blair’s political strategy. I return to Brown’s impact on Blair’s 
context and the 1994 contest later in this chapter. 
 
Writing after Smith’s sudden death, but before the election of Blair, Shaw warned that 
a more ‘emphatic rapprochement with the established order’868 to achieve electoral 
victory – what he saw as the modernisation discourse of the period – risked 
divergence from the party’s historical objectives. From Blair’s early biographers, a 
similar impression of non-conformism within the Labour church is conveyed. Blair 
stood ‘outside many of Labour’s traditions, and causes consternation, alarm and 
excitement in roughly equal proportions in his efforts to articulate a new, more 
pluralist language for left-of-centre politics in Britain’.869 Furthermore, Blair ‘doesn’t 
talk wistfully of bygone days, conjuring up folklore memories of comrades… Blair 
wears none of the Labour movement’s campaign medals’.870 Engaging more directly 
with the expressive/instrumental fault line in Labour’s ethos, Cronin argued that Blair 
‘discovered the same passive mentality as he rose through the ranks of the party and 
was infuriated that party leaders should be content to remain forever in opposition. A 
resolve to break that mentality thus became central to Blair’s thinking and to the 
entire “modernising” project’.871 Gould’s reflections on the 1994 leadership contest 
emphasise an instrumental heart in Blair’s approach: 
 
‘He was thinking [at the time of the discussions with Brown over standing 
down] about fighting the Tories in a new way. He did not want to get trapped 
on their ground: he said we should concede and move on – agree with the 
Conservatives where we could only lose, fight only where we could win.’872 
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As the previous chapter explained, I agree with Shaw’s conclusion that Blair and the 
New Labour leadership believed that both the Kinnock and Smith leaderships had 
been too cautious and too often compromised with the soft Left underbelly of the 
party, from its activists to its MPs. Similarly, I agree with Cronin that, with respect to 
Blair’s individual interpretation of Labour’s ethos, he came down heavily for an 
instrumental interpretation of Labour’s mission, rather than one which sought to 
balance Labour’s expressive nature. Yet, while agreeing with Shaw – on policy – 
there is a danger in then inferring from this a strategy of persuasion that ignored 
Labour’s ethos. That – as with the focus of Gould’s reflections – Blair’s strategy was 
primarily about ‘electric shock treatment’.873 Similarly, while agreeing with Cronin, 
this individual interpretation should not be read as one that – from the beginning of 
Blair’s leadership – sort to confront a more expressive interpretation of Labour’s 
ethos. Undoubtedly the theatre – and the coup of a clear victory – over Clause IV 
reflected Blair’s willingness to challenge Labour’s attachment to its past and critically 
engage competing traditions within Labour’s ethos. Yet, as this section will go on to 
argue, hegemony in policy-making, and exercises in ‘strong leadership’, were built on 
a political strategy which recognised the beliefs of Labour’s members in 1994, just as 
Blair had urged his colleagues to recognise over a decade earlier. 
 
What were those beliefs?  Analysing Labour’s membership base during Blair’s early 
period as leader, Syed and Whiteley’s surveys revealed a consistent majority view 
that ‘the Labour Party should always stand by its principles even if this should lose an 
election’.874 Table 7 presents Syed and Whiteley’s membership data for this 
principles/electoral tension, including a ‘longstanding member’ and ‘new member 
differentiation’ for 1997. By 1999, attachment to ‘an ideology attached to class 
conflict’875 had weakened, dropping from 66% support in 1990 to 39% in 1999.876 
During Blair’s early leadership period, Blair’s members were less attached to class 
politics and held on to the view that the party’s principles – which in Syed and 
Whiteley’s surveys included market scepticism, commitment to taxation and public 
expenditure, and support for trade unions877 –  were paramount in its politics. As this 
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chapter will show, these policy themes were highlighted in Blair’s opposition 
speeches, particularly during the leadership election. Overall, this data attests to most 
Labour people presenting a blend of expressive and instrumental political approaches. 
 
Table 7: Membership attitude to the statement ‘the Labour Party should always 
stand by its principles even if this should lose an election’, adapted from Syed 
and Whiteley.878 
 
Year members’ 
attitudes recorded 
Strongly 
agree/agree % 
Neither % Strongly 
disagree/disagree 
% 
1990 61 12 28 
1997 
(longstanding 
member) 
61 17 23 
1997 (new 
member) 
63 16 21 
1999 59 17 23 
 
Ed Balls recollected Blair’s ‘nuanced’ strategy in opposition.879 Specifically in 
relation to Blair’s leadership contest, Balls noted: 
 
‘Our positioning and our language, and his leadership election, was quite 
sensible, soft-Left. It wasn’t in any way what people would recognise as 
‘Blairite’… it wasn’t right-wing.’880 
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Sally Morgan, who was asked to join Blair’s team following the leader’s Clause IV 
announcement at the 1994 party conference, also saw Blair’s early strategy as being a 
nuanced approach, balancing the focus on winning with a strategy to cohabitate, 
rather than embrace a ‘vanguardist’ approach. She argued Blair’s early strategy as 
leader: 
 
‘Was to try and not lose the party, really… it was to try and make sure we kept 
a coalition of the party. You never wanted to be in the position where the only 
people supporting you were the sort of vanguardists… we constantly worked 
to try and widen the circles.’881 
 
Blair’s staff appointments, following his election, show a more nuanced mix over an 
instrumental focus. Jonathan Powell, one of the few Blair appointees without a 
previous career steeped in the Labour Party and the trade unions, explained: 
 
‘There is a particular culture… a language [in the party] … which I didn’t 
have… For me it was very foreign… it came as a bit of a shock to me… I used 
to put my foot in it pretty regularly… 
 
‘That was probably part of the reason that Tony brought me in, he wanted a 
sort of foreign germ to come in and make the place serious about governing 
rather than about just being a political party.’882 
 
In contrast, Powell believed most of those working with Blair shared in the ‘culture’ 
of Labour people, and were more at ease in comprehending its traditions and 
language.883 In considering the motivations for this strategy, Balls argued that those at 
the top of New Labour ‘were always aware from the very beginning that, for the 
Labour Party, the betrayal of 1929 was in people’s recent memories’884 – a reference 
to Ramsay MacDonald and the short-lived Labour Government which collapsed in 
1931 over public spending cuts. Powell has a very similar reflection in his book, The 
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New Machiavelli, noting that ‘the ghost of Ramsay MacDonald hangs heavy over the 
Labour Party, and no leader wants to find himself seen as a Judas, clinging on to 
power by selling out’.885 On economic policy, Balls suggested to Brown that Labour 
rewrite a document setting out the ‘purpose of the Treasury’ to show that it would be 
a different kind of Treasury from the past, inserting ‘a lot of Labour language… we 
were doing pre-emptive reassurance on that’.886 
 
New Labour’s fascination with Bill Clinton’s New Democrats and the Clinton 
Whitehouse also had an element, certainly in the minds of Balls and Powell, of 
reassurance – an example of how to govern in a progressive way. While recognising 
the impact of the New Democrats on electoral strategy, campaign techniques, and 
policy, Balls believed ‘there was nothing “sell-out” about the Democrats’.887 From the 
interviews conducted for this study, two things are apparent. First, there was more to 
Blair’s strategic context than a purely instrumental imperative. While the wider party, 
including the trade unions, was subordinate in relation to leadership decision-making, 
it was not a neutral element in Blair’s world. Blair and his team recognised the 
importance of avoiding a leadership ‘transfixed between what they really wanted to 
do and what they could do’.888 Better to take the party with you, using the vital tool of 
Labour’s symbolism and more expressive political style. 
 
Second, those close to Blair undoubtedly detected in his early strategy as leadership 
candidate and then leader a willingness to avoid direct confrontation with his party in 
public. While Clause IV was undoubtedly a bold initiative in challenging parts of 
Labour’s image Blair disapproved of, he correctly judged that Labour people were 
willing to back him on it. He did not judge – and again, I would argue correctly – that 
his political arguments and his language could fully embrace his individual 
interpretation of valuing instrumental politics far and above Labour’s more expressive 
mix. Over time, and years in government, this balance became more strongly in 
favour of the instrumental – something I will return to in this study’s Conclusion. 
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Where there is greed 
 
The starting gun for the ‘non-campaign’ period of the Labour contest (it did not begin 
officially till 10th June 1994)889 was fired not by Blair, or either of the other two 
candidates, but by Brown on 22nd May, the day after Smith’s funeral. Brown’s speech 
was pushed to the political media as a ‘call for unity’.890 Aware that Blair was 
preparing to stand for the leadership, Brown’s speech was ambiguous in its 
implications for his potential candidacy, while clearly stating the need to avoid a 
difficult and politically-charged contest. In substance, Brown’s speech sought to show 
continuity of purpose with John Smith, and a strong attachment to Labour’s heritage. 
Brown began by stating that the ‘challenges’ a Labour leader faced were poverty, 
unemployment and inequality, while urging a continued commitment to Smith’s 
‘unshakeable commitment to fairness and equality’ and to ‘keep alight that flame 
burning bright against injustice’.891 Early on his speech, Brown both lauded Wales’ 
mining heritage and committed to continuing it: 
 
‘If anyone is in any doubt about why we must win here in Wales, let them just 
visit the abandoned tower colliery… the last deep mine colliery in south 
Wales… abandoned not because there is no market for coal. Not because there 
is no coal – we are walking on top of 1000 years of coal. But because there is 
no minister with the political will to do what I pledge Labour will do – 
implement a strategy for coal.’892 
 
Brown attacked Conservatives politicians for accusing the unemployed of ‘being 
workshy, feckless and inadequate, when it is government ministers themselves who 
are guilty of these crimes’.893 His peroration sort to draw a more nuanced agenda for 
modernisation and its relationship with the party’s past: ‘Past achievements are for 
guidance. Past struggles are for instruction. Past successes are to be respected. But for 
socialists it is the future that must be served.’894 
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In its themes of tackling inequality, helping unemployed miners and opposing 
punitive welfare, Brown’s speech was some distance from the ‘prawn cocktail 
offensive’ Labour’s economic team had publicised so much in the early 90s. In his 
memoir, Brown noted he had decided ‘to fight on [following Blair’s entreaties to 
stand aside] and make a leadership speech the next Sunday in Wales’.895 The speech 
emphasised, certainly in Brown’s mind, the ‘two forms of modernisation’896 that he 
and Blair represented. Brown, certainly in his rhetoric, had for some time shown a 
blend of the expressive and instrumental. 
 
His 1989 book, Where There is Greed, presented a lengthy, forensic critique of 
Thatcherite economics. The nearest Brown came to more instrumental language 
regarding Labour’s own positioning was a sentence saying ‘how we [Labour] plan for 
a successful economy… will determine whether were are recognised by the broad 
mass of the public as their natural voice in government’.897 Since leaving office, 
Brown has singled out Where There is Greed as a missed opportunity for him to 
‘define New Labour’ and move on from ‘old-style national corporatist strategies’.898 
He does not address why he chose not to do those things. Such an example – of more 
expressive strategies from the earlier days of Blair and Brown, contrasted with their 
reflections after a decade in office – is instructive and important in emphasising the 
need for a more temporal understanding of New Labour, and how political change 
within the Labour Party came about. 
 
Don’t frighten the Labour horses 
 
Cronin has argued that where Brown had, early on in the campaign, ‘seemed to 
invoke the spirit of old Labour, Blair balanced this by carefully restating his 
commitment to the new’.899 Based on an analysis of Blair’s rhetoric, and his strategic 
context, I lay particular emphasis on the word ‘carefully’. Rentoul has described 
Blair’s formal campaign as ‘bland’, with no ‘lurch to the centre’ so as not to 
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‘frighten… the Labour horses’.900 While agreeing it was bland on policy, the next 
section of this chapter will go further, demonstrating Blair’s willingness to deploy 
rhetoric which appeared to counter the Blair image – paying tribute to Labour’s 
heritage, invoking folk memories, and speaking to the party as he saw it, rather than 
as he wished it to be. Soon after the formal leadership contest began, the BBC’s 
Panorama programme hosted a debate between the three candidates in front of an 
audience of union delegates. Blair answered the first question from the host, David 
Dimbleby, with the message that ‘what is absolutely essential is that we lead the 
Labour Party into government’901 – a straight, instrumental message playing to reports 
of Blair’s polling potential as leader. 
 
Blair then went on to describe modernisation as a series of processes that needed to 
happen in the UK economy, in society and in the constitution, before concluding what 
became a short opening statement with the theme of applying Labour’s ‘traditional 
values’ in the modern world. Blair’s strategy, throughout the debate, was to present a 
consensus – as far as possible – between himself and the more ‘traditional’ candidates 
from Labour’s Left. When Prescott also noted what became a ‘Prescott phrase’ – 
traditional values in a modern setting – Blair agreed, saying ‘that’s precisely what we 
need to do’.902 When pressed by another questioner that Blair might miss out on 
Labour people’s votes because he may appeal to their head, but not their ‘gut’, both 
Prescott and Blair responded that they were not mutually exclusive: 
 
Prescott: They’re not alternatives 
 
Blair: … exactly so, they’re not alternatives, we need heart and head in the 
Labour Party and I tell you this, when you’ve seen the Labour Party in 
opposition for all these years and we’ve not been able to help people, what 
we’re talking about is not ripping up traditional principles in the Labour Party, 
it is traditional principles in a modern setting.903 
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Blair’s concluding statement was slightly more instrumental in tone, though again 
balanced with connections to Labour’s history: 
 
‘We owe obligations to one another as well as ourselves and that we depend in 
part upon one another to succeed. And just as people understand that in their 
family, so they understand it in a broader society and we’ve got to use that 
principle, the founding principle of our party. We’ve got to use it in order to 
demonstrate how we can set out a new future for this country and win a 
general election… move from the politics of protest to the politics of 
government.’904 
 
When the contest fully got underway, Blair undertook to give a set of policy speeches 
to supplement a campaign launch and election statement. While Gould subsequently 
argued that Blair’s leadership campaign displayed his ideas in a coherent way, and 
had advised the Blair team to present a candidate who was ‘an uncompromising 
champion of change’,905 the collection of speeches Blair delivered in the June and 
July of 1994 evidenced caution – both in presenting his ideas in a manner consistent 
with Labour’s heritage, and in avoiding new ideas which may have suggested he had 
an overhaul in mind for the party’s policy platform. In relation to the former, when 
Blair’s tentative programme was briefed to the media by Mandelson, resulting in a 
headline comparing it to a new version of the SDP, Blair fumed at his close ally – 
owing to his belief that ‘the party and the trade unions were neuralgic about the 
parallels with the SDP’.906 In relation to the latter, David Miliband – who led on 
Blair’s policy work before joining his staff as leader – told Gould the policy agenda 
had been ‘stuffed in at the last minute’.907  
 
In considering the set of speeches Blair gave, it is particularly helpful to observe what 
Blair wanted to be the focus – something revealed in the press releases that acted as 
guides to the speech messaging, and campaign literature which condensed quite 
lengthy statements into core substance. What is striking, as I argued earlier, is the 
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extent to which Blair put forward the party’s principles as his campaign messages to 
the media – not only in campaign literature, but the speeches and press notices that 
would be reported to everyone who showed an interest, including the wider electorate. 
For example, the first substantive policy speech from Blair of the campaign was on a 
‘new economic programme for Britain’.908 Drafted by Brown, Andrew Smith and 
David Miliband,909 the speech bore many of the hallmarks of later Brown rhetoric – 
including a focus on long-termism, and a partnership approach to the economy as a 
third way between the free market and state intervention. Yet, taking a more party-
friendly approach in its appeals and rhetoric, the press notice focused on the following 
lines of argument: 
 
‘[Blair] savages the tax system which penalises the average family and 
provides scams, perks and city deals for those who can employ the right 
accountants… 
 
‘Demands a “whole new economic culture for Britain”.’910 
 
Further extracts from the press release added emphasis: 
 
‘There are great British success stories in industry but the levels of investment 
and new capacity have been wholly insufficient to lay the foundations for a 
stable and successful economic future… 
 
‘Mr Blair says that we need to do nothing less than “change the whole 
economic culture of our country”. 
 
‘He says: “The culture of the 1980s was based on a very narrow view of self-
interest. At its worst, it was just greed, making as much in as short a time as 
possible. And the benefits of it were limited. The biggest rewards by and large 
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went to the City, the speculators, the middle men and a few at the very top of 
industry.”’911 
 
In a speech on education the following week, Blair commenced his address with a 
lengthy tribute to Labour’s past record. Speaking in Manchester, he began: 
 
‘The founders of the Labour Party, whose archives are stored in the 
magnificent Museum of Labour History in this city, knew that knowledge was 
the basis of power. They knew that to change the world, we first had to 
understand it. In discussion groups and reading circles, WEA lectures and 
Fabian summer schools, a passion for learning and self-improvement has 
motivated generations of socialists. That tradition should inspire us today.’912 
 
This was in many ways a very traditional way for a politician representing the Labour 
Party to begin a speech, paying tribute to the party’s founders, the achievements of 
the British working class, and connecting Blair’s message to that from ‘generations of 
socialists’. The speech went on to list the campaigns of the 1920s for universal 
secondary education, Ellen Wilkinson’s implementation of the 1944 Education Act, 
Labour’s campaign against selection at 11 in the 1960s, and the creation of the Open 
University during Harold Wilson’s tenure. Blair explicitly tied his contemporary plans 
to the origins of the party, labouring the nostalgia which some analysis has claimed he 
shunned.913 A speech on welfare reform enveloped a plan to tackle welfare 
‘dependency’ in the language and legacy of John Smith, along with one of Wilson’s 
more famous lines. Blair argued: 
 
‘Labour must never lose its anger at injustice. Most of us came into the party 
because that passion for social justice is so strong. It was central to the 
philosophy of John Smith. We must continue to honour his legacy. The 
Labour Party is a crusade for social justice or it is nothing.’914 
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Two days later, in a speech on constitutional reform, Blair channelled Labour’s 
predilection for systemic transformation at the heart of government: 
 
‘Our system and processes of Government have to change… too centralised, 
too bureaucratic and too indifferent to the fundamental rights of the citizen 
which no Government, irrespective of their “mandate” should be able to 
ignore. 
 
‘… the Labour Party was founded on a set of values or principles, not a set of 
fixed policy prescriptions or methods of achieving these principles. The 
essential belief is that a strong united society is necessary to individual 
achievement… For this reason, it is doubly important for socialists to 
modernise the system of Government so that it fulfils its true purpose and does 
not become a playground of vested interests or worse still, a source of 
oppression.’915 
 
The values of democratic socialism 
 
Prior to this set of policy speeches, Blair gave an address to a conference where he set 
out many of the arguments he would later include in his 1995 lecture marking the 50th 
anniversary of the election of the Attlee government, and published a pamphlet with 
the Fabian Society called Socialism. His argument in both was based on an analysis of 
socialist thought which divided it into ‘ethical’ and ‘scientific’ strands – dismissing 
the latter as related to Marxist centralisation which, since the collapse of 
Communism, was ‘dead’,916 and embracing the former as something allied to 
European social democracy and Croslandite revisionist thought – particularly the 
disaggregation between ‘ends’ and ‘means’ which became central to New Labour. In 
this speech, more so than the lecture he gave a year later, Blair repeatedly connected 
his definition of socialism with the modern world and electoral victory. In other 
words, it was not dry, instrumental rhetoric about the Labour Party learning how to 
win – instead, it showed a blend of the expressive and instrumental, conscious as it 
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was of the party’s dominant ethos and focus on principles. For example, Blair 
contended: 
 
‘Socialism as defined by certain key values and beliefs is not merely alive, it 
has an historic opportunity… to give leadership. The basis of such socialism 
lies in its view that individuals are social interdependent human beings, that 
individuals cannot be divorced from the society to which they belong. It is, if 
you will, social-ism.’917 
 
On ideas and winning elections, Blair concluded his speech arguing: 
 
‘By re-establishing its core identity, the Labour Party and the Left can regain 
the intellectual self-confidence to take on and win the battle of ideas. For too 
long, the Left has thought it had a choice: to be radical but unacceptable; or to 
be cautious and electable… 
 
‘Once being radical is redefined as having a central vision based around 
principle but liberated from particular policy prescriptions that were then 
confused with principle, then in fact being radical is the route to 
electability.’918 
 
The pamphlet, Socialism, made arguments in favour of greater clarity in the party’s 
objectives, enhanced intellectual self-confidence, and reassurance to party members 
about respecting Labour’s traditions. ‘For almost two decades,’ Blair argued, ‘the Left 
has felt itself on the defensive. Having fashioned the post-war consensus of 1945, its 
intellectual confidence became sapped by its own inner doubts, the problems of 
government in the 1960s and 1970s and the onslaught of the Right through 
Thatcherism.’919 The solution, he suggested was to ‘regain the intellectual high 
ground, stating with clarity its [Labour’s] true identity and historic mission. In doing 
so, it must show how this is not a break with its past or its traditions but, on the 
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contrary, a rediscovery of their true meaning’.920 As ever, Blair sought a third way 
between Labour’s tradition of policy pragmatism and inward-looking ‘resolutionary 
socialism’: 
 
‘This is the chance for the Labour Party and the Left to capture the ground and 
language of opportunity for itself by policies that are entirely consistent with 
its traditional principles – namely intervening to equip and advance the 
individual’s ability to prosper within this new economy – but applying them in 
a different way for the modern world. How it does so should be where the new 
thinking and ideas are developed, released from false ideological constraints. 
The result is not a policy vacuum or a retreat into philosophy rather than 
political action. It is, rather, the development of a new policy agenda and in 
many ways a broader one at that.’921 
 
As is to be expected of an internal election with different audiences – from Members 
of Parliament to ordinary party members – Blair’s election literature for the 
‘selectorate’ showed messages with variations of expressive/instrumental orientation. 
In letters to parliamentary colleagues, Blair would describe ‘the goal’ as ‘to bring 
Labour back to Government’,922 along with the message of applying traditional 
principles in the modern world.  Blair’s leaflet for constituency Labour parties (CLPs) 
had a more expressive orientation. Beginning with a Smith tribute, Blair offered his 
double-message: ‘We must transform Labour from a party of protest to a party of 
government. I believe Labour must stand where it has always stood – for the values of 
democratic socialism, for the people who rely on hard work and fair play to keep 
them away from hardship.’923 Blair’s ‘election statement’, expected to be read by 
fewer members than the leaflet, landed somewhere in between: 
 
‘Our job is to honour the past but not to live in it. I have never believed that 
Labour’s essential principles and values were its problem. On the contrary, 
they still retain their validity and their support amongst the public. But the 
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public have longed for us to give modern expression to those values, to 
distinguish clearly between the principles themselves and the application of 
them. That is the difference between honouring the past and living in it.’924 
 
Following Blair’s election as leader, further changes in expressive/instrumental 
orientation were evident. However, and rather importantly for a chapter that has 
looked at material from an internal election, Blair’s rhetoric did not suddenly ditch the 
patterns I have highlighted above. A potential challenge to an analysis which looks at 
material so heavily influenced by an election – and the clear interest for the candidate 
of appealing to their voters – is whether or not, once removed from that context, there 
are fewer signs as to the effect of that audience. Yet such a distinction would be too 
crude. The absence of a leadership election did not transform Blair’s rhetorical 
strategy. And, it must also be remembered, Blair was the run-away favourite in the 
contest, providing him with significant scope for his own strategic judgements about 
how he should present his case. 
 
There were changes during Blair’s opposition period, many of which can be seen in 
the collection of speech excerpts and articles published by Blair in 1996 under the 
title New Britain. In Blair’s lecture marking the election of the 1945 Attlee 
government, added to the existing analysis he had used the year before was more 
instrumental language. Labour’s record in office was criticised for not succeeding in 
‘establishing itself as a natural party of government’.925 Added to the party’s history – 
and, he argued, vital to comprehending its origins – was its founding ‘as a majority 
party in Britain’ with time having come ‘to fulfil that destiny in government’.926 
Following his success in securing party and union support for the revising of Clause 
IV, Blair’s rhetoric again shifted: ‘I did not come into the Labour Party to join a 
pressure group. I didn’t become leader of this party to lead a protest movement. 
Power without principles is barren. But principle without power is futile. This is a 
party of government, and I will lead it as a party of government.’927 
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Yet, in the same speech, Blair also provided a level of reassurance explicitly 
connected to Clause IV – with words that would, later in his career, be hard to 
imagine him uttering: ‘Let me tell you this: I will renationalise the National Health 
Service, to make it once more a service run for the whole nation.’928 In the run-up to 
the Clause IV conference, Brown also made an intervention, seeking to provide 
reassurance about New Labour’s approach to the party’s traditions, and to its 
commitment to socialism. In the ‘anthology of socialism’, Values, Visions and Voices, 
Brown and the Labour MP Tony Wright wrote that ‘at a time when those of us in the 
Labour Party are setting out our basic values and beliefs, it seemed an appropriate 
moment to bring together a collection of material from our socialist tradition in 
Britain… identifying its enduring socialist themes through the voices of some of those 
who have best articulated them’.929 Of the ‘voices’ picked several times in the 
collection, one does not find contemporary political figures, but instead the names of 
William Morris, Raymond Williams, George Orwell, R. H. Tawney and G. D. H. 
Cole.  
 
As I noted in the previous chapter, some policy areas were chosen by the New Labour 
leadership as reassurance issues for the party – symbols, if you will, for traditional 
values in a modern setting, not the junking of Labour’s principles. Health was one 
such area. Blair’s leadership campaign secured three sentences in his memoir. Blair 
recollected that it ‘passed off without incident’ and that his preoccupation throughout 
was to ‘minimise stray comments… or concessions to the Left’.930 An observation 
about Brown reveals a little more about Blair’s reading of the period. Brown was, 
Blair wrote, ‘brilliant, had far more knowledge of the party than me, with an acute 
and, even then, well-honed tactical brain; but it operated essentially within familiar 
and conventional parameters. Within the box he was tremendous, but he didn’t 
venture outside of it’.931 In contrast, Blair self-appraised: ‘By 1994, I was straying 
well outside the box in policy and party reform, and I began to realise, with dismay 
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but then soberly, that something was missing. Something he [Brown] lacked. 
Something I started to know inside I had.’932 
 
The previous chapter revealed the extent of Blair’s and the New Labour team’s 
hegemony over policy-making and key political and strategic decisions. Through 
Blair’s long period as Labour leader and as Prime Minister, he ‘politically 
reoriented’933 his party, he drove – for a time – intellectual activity to reframe and 
revise his party’s objects, he pushed through controversial policies and decisions in 
the face of intense Left and Centre opposition, and bequeathed to a generation of 
Labour politicians the fiercely instrumental, ultimate goal of winning elections.934 To 
co-opt Blair’s language, much of this was ‘outside the box’. Yet, suggesting this was 
the case from 1994 onwards does not match the evidence from the period, nor the 
assessments of those Blair relied upon to deliver his political strategy. Blair, like 
Brown, is keen to defend his policy record on the grounds of progressive 
achievement, but oddly abandons a political strategy as Leader of the Opposition 
which was more nuanced, and expressive, than he appears willing to accept.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Blair held an individual interpretation of Labour’s ethos which was strongly oriented 
towards an instrumental understanding of the party’s purpose. Yet, in recognising the 
more expressive nature of the party he led, his political strategy was more nuanced 
than his individual interpretation suggested would be the case. He compromised with 
Labour’s competing traditions, seeing such compromises as important to legitimising 
(internally) the changes he wanted to make, all the while minimising any risk to the 
mandate he sought from the public. It was a balance, but one Blair was more attentive 
to than is often recognised. Is this a surprising move from Blair? Partly no. As 
Rentoul noted, ‘Blair’s leadership election manifesto, which did not advertise any 
changes to the Labour Party, turned out to be a misleading prospectus’.935 Blair the 
leadership candidate was, as any political observer would probably expect, more 
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circumspect than Blair the leader, and then Blair the Prime Minister. Following his 
election as leader, Blair wanted to push the boundaries of what was possible in 
seeking to ‘aim for the centre’936 electorally. Yet as this chapter has shown – through 
revealing the people and ideas behind Blair’s strategy, and his continued balancing of 
expressive/instrumental language following his election as leader – it wasn’t the case 
that Blair the candidate ran left, and Blair the leader ran right. 
 
Blair the leader may have been more honest, but his political strategy still showed an 
awareness of the party’s ethos. Was it, then, the move into government which 
changed Blair’s strategy? Blair, undeniably, caught the government bug. While he 
was not ‘captured’, as older suspicions on the Left would have it about past Labour 
politicians (indeed, Blair’s relationship with the civil service, at least initially, was 
quite antagonistic), he was convinced of the priority for politicians to grapple with the 
machinery of government, and to make it work – creating a bureaucratic industry in 
the process: ‘deliverology’.937 This priority meant that, while party management 
remained a constant and time-consuming demand,938 the continued connection 
between Labour’s identity, and Blair’s actions, gradually severed. On one level, this 
was conscious (Blair’s prioritisation of executive management), on another, it was a 
consequence of the passage of time, and political events which had a direct impact on 
Blair’s popularity and effectiveness as a party leader – the Iraq War being an obvious 
example. Blair’s later years were focused on the machinations at the top of New 
Labour – primarily the disagreements with Gordon Brown – and the consequences for 
what he saw as his policy legacy. Expressive politics to enable political change was 
little in evidence. 
 
This need not imply, however, that such a divergence was inevitable, or that Blair had 
always planned to cease to speak and act in a manner consistent with Labour’s 
expressive tendency. What became the ‘Third Way’ narrative can be criticised, as 
Stuart Hall did, for its ‘rousing but platitudinous vagueness’939 and its ‘shifting 
indecisions and ambiguous formulations’940. Yet, for a time, the ‘Third Way’ came to 
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‘symbolise the ideology of a revived European social democratic politics’.941 That 
Blair and New Labour were, ultimately, ‘unable to define in any precise or elaborate 
way what its adopted doctrine’942 amounted to was a failure. Yet, from Blair’s ethical 
socialism, to what became the ‘Third Way’, one can detect a willingness to speak 
about socialist tradition and to connect his government’s mission to the identity of 
Left politics. Not continuing to do so left a purely instrumental approach to politics to 
fill the void.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
941 S. Bastow and J. Martin, Third Way Discourse, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), p.1. 
942 Ibid., p.45. 
 238 
Conclusion 
 
‘It could be claimed that the Utopians, at present a scattered minority, are the true upholders of 
Socialist tradition.’ 
George Orwell, Essays 
 
‘In following the course of policy changes it was necessary to accompany the instrumental reforms and 
the range of contact activities… with perpetual reminders of the purpose of change.’ 
Neil Kinnock, Reforming the Labour Party 
 
‘I know I look a lot older. That’s what being Leader of the Labour Party does to you. Actually, looking 
round some of you look a lot older. That’s what having me as Leader of the Labour Party does to you.’ 
Tony Blair, Speech to the 2006 Labour Party Conference 
 
‘So what are our first big campaigns?’ 
Jeremy Corbyn, Speech to the 2015 Labour Party Conference 
 
Imaginative sympathy 
 
Writing on Hugh Gaitskell’s leadership, Michael Foot commented that ‘the charge 
was that he lacked the imaginative sympathy to understand the Labour movement 
which he aspired to lead, and that he was constantly, almost congenitally, seeking to 
guide it into alien channels’.943 Such an understanding, from Foot, was drenched in 
the traditions of the Labour Left, the Labour Party more generally, and of the 
experience of having led them. Most thought-provoking from Foot, though, is the 
typically adroit turn of phrase ‘imaginative sympathy’. As Foot argued, the charge 
against Gaitskell was, certainly in his opening gambit after Labour’s 1959 election 
defeat, that he was too adversarial, and showed an insufficient grasp of both the 
importance and relative strength of different traditions within Labour’s ethos which 
he did not believe in. That is not to say, however, that Gaitskell was ‘not Labour’. He 
held to different Labour traditions, positing the importance of ideological clarity, for 
example, and the need to be flexible on policy, ditching ‘sacred cows’.  But it is to say 
that in taking on, directly and robustly, competing traditions within Labour’s ethos – 
including those that appeared to be dominant – he walked into division and strife. 
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While seeking to make light of a similar reputation in his valedictory address to 
Labour’s annual conference, Tony Blair suggested he too had given his party a hard 
time. On policy, and on foreign policy decisions, most notably the nightmare of the 
Iraq War, he undoubtedly had. Yet in terms of engagement with what is it to be 
Labour, the traditions and practices of the institution, and its future as a political 
force, Blair had disengaged. As he noted in his memoir, after Labour had returned to 
opposition in 2010, ‘Labour should also focus attention on renewing the party… I 
wish I had had the time to devote to this when Prime Minister, but the Prime Minister 
never does’.944 He too, after some years in government, lacked ‘imaginative 
sympathy’, but in a different way to Gaitskell, choosing to opt out of debates 
involving the party’s ethos rather than engaging with its competing traditions. This 
was not, as this study has argued, the way Blair began as leader. 
 
What were the consequences? As Randall has insightfully argued in relation to New 
Labour’s relationship with the party’s past: 
 
‘In disarticulating itself from the party’s past this sense of historical continuity 
and the solidarity and teleology it generated were placed in jeopardy. The 
result was that the significant social democratic achievements of the 
governments since 1997… were discounted both inside and outside the party. 
In the absence of this sense of historical continuity the identity of New Labour 
could easily appear as managerialist at best, inauthentic and opportunist at 
worst… That Gordon Brown struggled so profoundly to find a distinctive 
direction in the initial months of his premiership must in part be accounted for 
by the very intangibility of his predecessor’s legacy to which he was expected 
to respond.’945 
 
I think this conclusion is applicable, too, to New Labour’s disengagement with the 
competing traditions within Labour’s ethos. A tight managerial squeeze on the party 
machinery was, as Minkin has shown, a lasting feature of New Labour. Yet the, at 
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times, more gradual process of modernisation, sensitised to Labour’s traditions, was 
not lasting. It was, rather complacently, considered to be an opposition pastime. 
 
This did not change with the departure of Blair. Gordon Brown, having injected 
Values, Visions and Voices into the 1995 Clause IV debates, was undoubtedly 
buffeted by events as Prime Minister. Yet he was also caught in the strategic bind of 
seeking to ditch what he thought were the unpopular bits of New Labour – Blair’s 
policy agenda, and the poisonous legacy of the Iraq War – while retaining New 
Labour’s electoral strategy. He struggled to develop an alternative to New Labour, 
while maintaining what could be described as its instrumental objective of holding on 
to the reins of government, come what may. That, fairly or unfairly (and I would 
judge it to be a bit of both), is the interpretation of Labour’s ethos often attached to 
the generation of Labour politicians that followed Blair and Brown into government: 
coldly rational, electoralist, lacking a defining mission, and shy of the word socialism. 
 
In the Introduction, I discussed the significance of this legacy and the contribution of 
this thesis. Critics of Blair and New Labour, often building on New Labour memoirs 
and earlier contemporary accounts which sought to portray the novelty of New 
Labour, have articulated a narrative of upheaval and discontinuation. How New 
Labour ended, with the accumulation of encumbrances from office (some inevitable, 
some the result of misjudgement and error) and a distant, uncommunicative 
relationship with the wider party, was not how New Labour began. That this point has 
been lost has had repercussions for Labour’s political trajectory ever since New 
Labour began to fall apart. The popularity of Corbyn’s leadership among party 
members in both the 2015 and 2016 leadership contests, which I discuss in greater 
detail towards the end of this conclusion, is a reaction to how New Labour came to be 
seen. This was not, however, a direct consequence of Labour’s modernisation up to 
1997. Instead, this thesis has shown how Labour’s modernisers often worked within 
the competing traditions of Labour’s ethos – traditions that remain today.   
 
The effect of ethos – revisiting this study’s research questions 
 
This study has argued that there are different and distinct interpretations of Labour’s 
ethos, based on competing traditions that have long been contested, quite legitimately, 
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through Labour’s history. In analysing four key fault lines that result from these 
competing, and conflicting traditions, I have sought to show how these distinct 
interpretations are factored into an actor’s strategic calculations, affecting political 
actors themselves, as well as their strategic contexts. Overall, this study suggests that 
the process and substance of modernisation, undertaken from 1983-1997, was 
affected by Labour’s ethos. The dual understanding of the party’s ethos that this study 
puts forward – that of the individual interpretation and the dominant interpretation – 
helps us understand the role ethos can play in both the motives and outcomes of 
political change. 
 
An actor’s individual interpretation interacts with, and is relational to, the dominant 
interpretation of Labour’s ethos. That isn’t to say that, if they clash, an actor must 
decide to either ‘take the dominant ethos on’ or accept that it is a constraint. Its effect 
can be subtler. Instead, it is relevant to an actor’s chosen strategies, affecting their 
pace, scale and presentation. At times, traditions within Labour’s ethos can be 
harnessed, as part of a political strategy, to help an actor with their chosen plan. At 
others, it means the party’s traditions must be engaged with, forming a part of an 
actor’s endeavours. When the party’s dominant ethos does appear to be more of an 
unavoidable obstacle, an actor’s choices can come down to conflict or compromise, 
though the dynamic nature of an actor’s strategic context, and the interactions 
between the various factors within it, means the management of Labour’s competing 
traditions must be subject to reassessment and new judgements. 
 
Turning specifically to Kinnock and to Blair, both leaders were frustrated by what 
they perceived to be the party’s dominant ethos, but Blair was more willing to mount 
a sustained challenge to what he perceived to be its weaknesses. While Kinnock 
generated a reputation for ‘taking on the Left’, he did so very much from a basis he 
believed to be more ‘traditionally Labour’. To Kinnock, challenging the ‘hard’ or 
‘extreme’ Left was not challenging Labour’s ethos, it was restoring it. In a revealing 
preface to a popular history of the Tolpuddle Martyrs, Kinnock wrote in 1985 that the 
‘six Dorset labourers now honoured by democrats everywhere did not have their eye 
on posterity. They were profoundly moderate and pitifully honest. They did not seek 
martyrdom or self-glorification… It is the simplicity of their case and the propriety 
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and patience with which they put it as much as the elementary justice of their 
demands which has given strength and resonance to their message down the years’.946 
 
In the midst of what Kinnock believed to be crazy leadership from Arthur Scargill and 
the National Union of Mineworkers during the miners’ strike, what he saw as the self-
indulgence of the Trotskyite Militant Tendency and, notably, the Labour local 
authority in Liverpool, and his preference for patience and gradualism, Kinnock’s 
language here is not only relevant to his view of Tolpuddle and the virtues of the 
British working class, but encapsulates his interpretation of Labour’s ethos too. On 
issues which he felt did potentially antagonise the vast majority of his comrades, he 
trod very cautiously. As Hattersley recalls, ‘there is no doubt that Neil Kinnock came 
to the Labour leadership determined to make the Party electable again. Though, in the 
early eighties, he still had to learn that the policy of unilateral disarmament 
guaranteed political defeat as well as intellectual discredit. But from the start he was 
determined to dispose of what he called the “illegitimate left”’.947 
 
Blair, of course, became the leader of a party in a very different condition to that 
which Kinnock inherited. Many of its policies had been revised through a slow, 
difficult process of reform. What Kinnock had considered to be the illegitimate Left 
was mostly eradicated from Labour’s ranks. Many of the ‘soft-Left’ at the top of the 
PLP had been on the journey with Kinnock, were traumatised by defeat and ready to 
embrace more change to achieve it. Clare Short, later a trenchant critic of Blair, 
recollected that the ‘job of the reformers from 1983 was to re-establish Labour’s 
values, update them for the present era and eject from the party those who came from 
a different ideological position and were misusing the democracy of the Labour 
Party’.948 While Short was on the soft Left of the party (as a frontbencher) and did not 
vote for Blair, she thought him an ‘asset’949 and argued in favour of his changes to 
Clause IV,950 agreeing with the need for both changes in style and substance. The 
wider party was perceived as being in a very similar place. Yet while all of this 
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context is highly relevant to Blair’s strategic context – the factors he considered when 
making political choices, both stimulating and inhibiting change – none of it changes 
the similarities and differences between Blair and Kinnock as actors, including their 
differing interpretations of Labour’s ethos. 
 
Blair wanted to reform Labour’s Party Objects, both to send stronger signals to the 
electorate and to instigate more lasting ideological change for Labour. Kinnock did 
not want to, despite having the opportunity – if he fought for it – to do so.  Both 
leaders perceived some policies, or policy areas, to be powerful emblems for Labour 
people, despite holding individual interpretations that valued pragmatism over 
symbols. This affected Kinnock’s approaches to policy change, and led to Blair’s 
initial reluctance to touch some policy areas – the National Health Service being the 
prime example – as a matter of reassurance to the party. Over time, Blair’s objection 
to Labour’s symbols became far more prominent. Both leaders also perceived a 
movement which valued internal democracy and a lean towards expressive politics. 
On the latter, both emphasised their expressive tendencies in rhetoric. Both indulged 
in nostalgia in their speeches, and both saw such tactics as important in ameliorating 
the disgruntled and encouraging waverers to support them. On internal democracy, 
both believed in grip and the centralisation of control – something many Labour 
leaders have believed in. Yet on both, this study argues that Blair held an individual 
interpretation of Labour’s ethos that was increasingly sceptical of these parts of the 
Labour tradition, more so than Kinnock’s approach. Over time, as his position 
appeared to be dominant, Blair became increasingly distant from the approaches he 
had adopted as Leader of the Opposition.  
 
Revisiting this study’s four research questions, in light of the four case study analyses, 
allows us to explore these conclusions further. RQ1 asked whether there are different 
interpretations of Labour’s ethos held by Labour Party people, while – connected – 
RQ3 asked what are the different interpretations of Labour’s ethos? The case studies 
presented here suggest there are different interpretations and, significantly building 
upon Drucker’s original insight, this study has shown how distinct interpretations of 
Labour’s ethos exist along four key fault lines. Chapter 3, which focused on 
engagement with Party Objects, explored how the actors involved in the Aims & 
Values process held different views on the significance and relative importance of 
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clarifying the party’s ideological objectives, balancing – as they did – their views on 
this fault line with other considerations of party management and political necessity, 
such as the need for significant policy alteration. 
 
Hattersley and Kinnock held distinct and different interpretations of this fault line. 
Broadly, they stood on different sides, though both ultimately compromised: Kinnock, 
albeit for reasons of NEC management, commissioning Hattersley to work on Aims & 
Values; and Hattersley, having argued for a strategy of ‘addition with silent 
substitution’ finally accepting one of purely ‘addition’. Other actors held their 
distinctive interpretations as well, with Mandelson broadly agreeing with Hattersley’s 
initial position, though being critical of his work, while others around Kinnock, 
including Hewitt, largely agreed with their party leader that the work was a 
distraction. All of the actors, though, shared a perception of the party more widely as 
one reluctant to alter Labour’s Party Objects – while Blair, nervous at first, ultimately 
judged the party ready to accept such a move by 1994. 
 
There are wider questions, that I have not been able to address in this study, including 
the relative importance of Party Objects both to members of a political party and the 
wider electorate. Yet it is important to note that, while party programmes and policies 
both change and do not represent – particularly when a party reaches government – 
the fullness of an ideology, Party Objects are longer-lasting, can be harder to change, 
and provide – at least on paper – a commitment to ideological consistency from 
opposition to office. The limitations of policy reviews created by Labour leaders to 
‘cut through’ with the public have been well documented,951 while altering Party 
Objects has, in contrast, provided ‘a political moment for re-evaluating the key policy 
instruments for delivering democratic socialism’.952 Indeed, such an argument has 
been used by Labour people to press for reform of Party Objects. Jack Straw, who 
published a pamphlet advocating for the revision of Clause IV in 1993, suggested the 
Conservative charge at the 1992 election that ‘if we [Labour] could change once [on 
policy], we might change again, who knows in what direction, was a powerful one’.953  
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Chapters 4 and 5 explored the different interpretations of Labour’s ethos in relation to 
the fault lines around emblematic policies and decision-making. While Kinnock was 
inwardly pragmatic on changing policies, other actors – including Blunkett on 
unilateralism – believed the policy was important to retain, owing to the connection 
Labour members had with it. Blair, in common with former leaders of the party, 
believed Labour’s tradition of more participatory policymaking through the party’s 
institutions – such as policy committees and the party conference – to be wrong, 
favouring a more Schumpeterian-like position of leadership control. Others, mostly 
on the Labour Left, contested this view, and those holding to more participatory 
traditions have returned to these debates post the collapse of the New Labour project. 
Chapter 6, specifically in relation to RQ1 and the differing interpretations held by 
Labour people, speaks a lot more to the ‘different Blairs’ and ‘different New Labours’ 
this thesis has explored. The early Blair showed a blend of expressive and 
instrumental politics, one more attuned to Labour’s expressive tradition. This 
approach was largely abandoned as Blair clocked up his decade in power, something I 
address below. 
 
RQ2 considered the co-existence of both individual interpretations and a dominant 
interpretation of Labour’s ethos, while RQ4 asked whether the existence of these 
affected a political actor’s strategies and choices. Each chapter has explored these 
questions. An actor’s perception of what they considered to be the dominant 
interpretation of Labour’s ethos, having greater salience, was something they factored 
into their strategic calculations. Chapter 3 showed how Kinnock and others, including 
Crick, Blunkett and Hattersley, perceived a dominant interpretation which was 
reluctant to embrace changes to Labour’s Party Objects, principally because of the 
continued attachment to Clause IV and the interaction between this part of Labour’s 
identity, and other parts that were subject to reform and revision – such as the party’s 
policy programme. Such a perception was built on, in Kinnock’s case, his reading of 
the party’s reactions to Thatcherism, the miners’ strike and his interactions with 
members at informal and more orchestrated events. 
 
In Chapter 4, the analysis shows the Kinnock leadership’s perception of a party 
unwilling to entertain the ditching of emblematic policies – in this case unilateralism 
– and how this changed over time, crucially due to the interaction with a dynamic, 
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global external context. The data presented in Chapter 4 shows how this perception of 
the dominant interpretation was reinforced by observable, ‘real’ events (such as 
conference composites and motions). The salience of unilateralism, as an issue at 
party conference, reached fever pitch during the early to mid-80s, gradually lessening 
as external events changed the context of the debate. In both Chapter 3 and 4, the 
analysis suggests that both an individual interpretation held by a political actor, and 
their perception of the dominant interpretation, affected their chosen strategies and the 
political outcomes. In Chapter 3, Kinnock’s de-prioritisation of reforming Party 
Objects was reinforced by his perception of the dominant ethos of the time. In 
Chapter 4, Kinnock’s individual interpretation of the emblematic policy fault line was 
to be pragmatic, yet his inaction – for most of the 1980s – was significantly due to his 
perception of a party that would not tolerate such a change. 
 
Neil Kinnock has recognised the effect these judgements on the party’s ethos had on 
his political strategies. As I argued in Chapter 3, while the 1989 Policy Review has 
understandably been subject to a great deal of analysis, and was an important process 
of significant change, opportunities to engage with Labour’s Party Objects, and its 
aims and values, were not taken by Kinnock. He has since reflected that ‘a justifiable 
criticism could be that we were not sufficiently audacious and that there was no 
central philosophical theme to the exercise… I would have preferred much greater 
attention to this, and it would have been useful to have had a neat and magnetic 
central theme for the work. I have to say, however, as a matter of fact rather than self-
defence, that until as late as 1991 there was always a significant risk that any 
progressive lunge that was too big or too quick could have fractured the developing 
consensus and retarded the whole operation of reform and change. And as far as the 
central theme was concerned, I and others put it repeatedly – “the purpose is to win. 
Make the changes necessary to maximise the possibility of fulfilling that purpose”’.954 
 
The analysis I presented in Chapter 3 challenges some of these reflections and 
reinforces others. Most importantly for this study, both my analysis and Kinnock’s 
review of his time as leader posit the need to understand his perceptions of the party 
mood, and his judgements, when explaining Labour’s political trajectory. While the 
                                                 
954 Kinnock, ‘Reforming the Labour Party’, p.545. 
 247 
Aims and Values process does not support Kinnock’s assertion, post his resignation as 
leader, that he wanted ‘much greater attention’ on a guiding political theme for 
Labour, it does attest to his constantly calibrating calculation of what he could and 
couldn’t manage without risking ‘fracturing’ within the Labour Party. Without an 
understanding of the party’s competing traditions, and Kinnock’s appreciation of the 
party’s ethos, it is not possible to fully understand the limitations of Labour’s 
modernisation up to 1992, nor why Labour’s ideological objectives remained 
untouched.  
 
The same can be said of the party’s attachment to emblematic policies. On the timing 
of Labour’s move away from unilateralism, Kinnock has argued that he ‘would have 
liked a much earlier change in the defence policy, certainly from 1985, when that 
became feasible even in terms of the fixed views of the Labour Party. With the 
appointment of Gorbachev and in the wake of a speech that Reagan made… things 
shifted very quickly. I am not saying that we could have secured the change at the 
conference of 1985 but, after Reykjavik, 1986 would have been a possibility’.955 This 
reflection again attests to the fine tuning of political judgements, yet I think Kinnock 
overstated the potential for a change prior to the 1987 election – and from the analysis 
I presented in Chapter 4, Kinnock himself was highly uncertain as to how such a 
change would be received. Interestingly, Clare Short, a member of the NEC during 
the passage of the Policy Review, has maintained that the position agreed under 
Kinnock was an ‘intelligent’956 refinement of Labour’s policy, though never 
implemented, an outcome for which she blames Tony Blair.957 As I noted in Chapter 
4, the policy agreed upon by the NEC still maintained the option for bilateral 
disarmament if global talks failed – which is Short’s evidence for the ‘refinement’ – 
though, as I concluded in that chapter, such a commitment was absent from Labour’s 
1992 manifesto, before Blair became leader. 
 
More broadly, and with relevance to contemporary debates on nuclear weapons 
policy, after two decades the potency of unilateralism remains alive in the Labour 
Party. Nuclear weapons have been retained and global disarmament talks are rarely on 
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the political agenda. Commentators continue to reflect on the popularity unilateralism 
has in Labour’s ‘grass roots’, while pointing to a PLP opposed to any unsettling of the 
status quo.958 Multilateralism lacks calls to action, and any contrast with Labour’s 
opponents. In the context of the continued – and powerful – legacy of the Iraq War, 
the moral and ethical simplicity of unilateralism, in the absence of the hopeful 
external context which Kinnock capitalised on, may well become attractive to Labour 
people in the future. However dormant in New Labour’s time, and the years 
immediately afterwards, unilateralism has not lost its potential to become an emblem 
once again. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 also showed individual interpretations of the party’s ethos, held by 
those at the top of New Labour, and their perceptions of a dominant interpretation. On 
policy decision-making, Blair and Brown held to an individual view that posited 
leadership supremacy, but recognised a movement more accustomed to deliberative 
processes, even if these were ignored. Blair’s response was, for a time, to sequestrate 
manifestoism. He moved sovereignty from conference and delegates to party member 
plebiscite. New Labour was also selective about what policy changes to pursue in 
opposition. Undoubtedly, as Shaw observed, Labour’s rank and file had approached a 
point in the mid to late-1990s ‘which facilitated the leadership’s modernisation 
drive’.959 The party was tired of losing. New Labour’s internal political strategy, 
meanwhile, sought to avoid direct confrontation, and balanced leadership autonomy 
with a more nuanced, ameliorative political strategy. However, New Labour’s 
approach saw increasing distance, over time, between what a majority of party 
members wanted and what Labour’s leadership appeared committed to. High-profile 
policies – both domestic and foreign – were not only fiercely opposed, but long-
remembered as things foisted upon the party rather than embraced by it. 
 
The analysis in Chapter 5 has a bearing on this study’s challenge to the ‘politics of 
catch-up’ thesis. Heffernan mentioned Bank independence only briefly in his account 
of Kinnock and Blair’s modernisation, suggesting that it offered early evidence of 
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‘neo-liberal macroeconomic rectitude combined with the prospect of further 
liberalisation and retrenchment of the state’s role in the economy’;960 an analysis 
presumably based on a policy objective of low inflation, and a transfer of decision-
making from the Treasury to the Bank. Yet, a more-rounded analysis of this policy 
must surely include what the Conservative Party actually thought about it? As 
Chapter 5 showed, independence for the Bank was fiercely opposed by the 
Conservatives. Indeed, with regard to the impact on interest rates of such a move, 
concern about the Conservatives using Labour’s policy to politicise interest rates was 
a major reason for the policy remaining secret. It is a stretch to assign Bank 
independence to a Thatcherite, neo-liberal paradigm when Thatcher opposed the 
policy, and the Conservative opposition following the 1997 election voted against it.  
Finally, Chapter 6 showed Blair’s approach during the party’s leadership contest, and 
as leader, to be more sensitised to the party’s expressive tradition than is frequently 
suggested. This involved an appreciation of ‘nostalgia’, ‘speaking the language’ – 
notably, I think, of socialism – and arguments positing the need for intellectual self-
confidence and the ‘rediscovery’ of values as the way to win, rather than suggesting 
winning was in itself the sole value Labour should pursue. It would be too crude to 
suggest that is where New Labour ended up, but this study has certainly concluded 
that Blair’s balance of expressive and instrumental styles was more firmly 
instrumental by the time he left office. What was considered, by the New Labour 
leadership team, to be ‘unfinished’ modernisation under Kinnock has a more 
contemporary example in the Conservative Party: David Cameron’s more ‘cosmetic’ 
approach to party reform. 
 
Yet, as Bale has recently recognised, ‘[Cameron] might have staked a reasonable 
claim to be “the heir to Blair”… but rather than re-engineering his party, as Blair 
seemed to have done (before, that is, the election of Jeremy Corbyn demonstrated 
Labour’s longing for purity rather than power lingered on regardless), the Tory leader 
only re-styled it’.961 This study has challenged the view that New Labour changed, or 
re-engineered Labour’s ethos and its traditions. In both Chapters 5 and 6, I argued that 
New Labour, more so than has been recognised in other studies of Labour’s 
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modernisation, adopted an approach in opposition which was selective in its 
challenges to party tradition. Post the election of Jeremy Corbyn, past claims must be 
subject to significant reconsideration, as Bale rightly suggests. As I noted in Chapter 
1, Labour’s competing traditions are inscribed into Labour as an institution, passed on 
by generations. They can be interpreted by Labour Party people, yet the extent to 
which a group can overhaul them must not be overstated. As an empirical question, 
Labour’s competing traditions are enduring.  
 
Evaluating New Labour 
 
As I noted in the introduction to this study, there is extensive literature contesting the 
view that New Labour was a continuation of Thatcherism in terms of doctrine. Much 
work was produced during the early days of New Labour, which I discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 1, with a smaller number of studies published since which consider 
New Labour’s governing record. It is surely right to recognise that the ‘imprint of 
neoliberal ideas can clearly be discerned in privatisation, the creation of internal 
markets within public services, contracting out, [and] deregulation’.962 New Labour 
took office after nearly two decades of Conservative rule and believed that some of 
the changes introduced during that period were necessary. ‘Acceptance’, however, is 
not even close to being the full story. New Labour ‘combined Thatcherism’s emphasis 
on competitive markets with the aim of a fairer, more inclusive society’.963 In terms of 
outcomes, the ‘Labour governments after 1997 were not as far removed from the 
Attlee and Wilson administrations in politics and policy as is often assumed’.964 From 
1997 to 2010, public expenditure on health, education and social security increased 
faster than under previous Labour governments.965 
 
From 2001 onwards, New Labour contested elections on the basis of investment in 
public services versus Conservatives cuts. Labour’s programme under Blair and 
Brown, Diamond and Kenny have argued, ‘was often highly redistributive, 
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particularly in its first two terms in office’.966 With regard to past Labour 
administrations, ‘all postwar Labour governments embraced markets and competition 
as the driving force of a modern industrial economy’.967 While such conclusions do 
not necessarily indicate that New Labour was a wholly social democratic project, they 
do question the extent to which New Labour – and Blair and Brown – were 
‘following’ Thatcherism. As New Labour clocked up the years in office, Blair in 
particular became blindsided to the limitations of his public service reform agenda, 
particularly the involvement of the private sector. Yet overall, as Thorpe has noted, 
New Labour oversaw ‘real improvements to the lives of many people, including many 
of the weakest and most vulnerable in society’.968 
 
Where this study has sought to add to our understanding of New Labour is in its non-
doctrinal outlook. In other words, in addition to the debate about how social 
democratic New Labour was, in terms of ethos, was it Labour? While for many 
longstanding Labour Party people involved in New Labour, this question may sound 
strange – even offensive – there is a narrative which seeks to supplement critiques of 
New Labour as neo liberal with one more applicable to the party’s ethos. In one 
recent account, Blair is portrayed as ‘effectively an SDP viper in the Labour breast’ 
with New Labour seeming to be ‘neither entirely new, nor entirely Labour’.969 This 
narrative involves an intra-familial othering of New Labour. It becomes a project that 
was ‘done’ to the Labour Party. While accepting that an old Labour Right laid the 
foundations for New Labour, and that much of the party’s post-Attlee history is 
inglorious, this narrative still posits something peculiarly un-Labour about New 
Labour. Understood in this way, New Labour unceremoniously ‘gutted’ the party’s 
constitution and ‘banished even a nominal commitment to socialism’.970 Labour Party 
members surrendered and New Labour became a calculating electoral machine that 
attacked its own heritage.971 
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As with many retellings of Labour’s past, there are some credible elements of this 
critique. New Labour was an incredibly focused group of politicians, intensely self-
confident and anxious to get into power. They did believe the Labour Party, as a 
whole, was feeling deeply sorry for itself. They believed Neil Kinnock had saved the 
Labour Party, but couldn’t turn Labour into an election-winning force that would 
deprive the Conservatives of power for a generation. Yet Tony Blair, Gordon Brown 
and their close allies were not aliens from outside the Labour universe. Across the 
fault lines of Labour’s ethos – matters alluded to in much Labour literature and 
discourse, but never properly expressed – New Labour engaged quite legitimately 
from the standpoint of longstanding traditions within Labour’s ethos.  
Yet, as I noted earlier, a strategy sensitised to Labour’s traditions did not seem to last. 
In a recent book, White and Ypi outlined three principles for political parties which 
overlap with some of the fault lines I presented in this study. First, parties should 
maintain ‘the distinctiveness of the partisan claim… defined by a principled position 
irreducible to sectoral interest alone’.972 Second, parties should ‘give voice’973 to 
members and supporters. And finally, to foster ideological certainty over time, parties 
‘need ways to authoritatively articulate the commitments partisans hold in common, 
manage their periodic revision and bring them to bear on the party’s decision-
making’.974 In terms of the ‘health’ of Labour’s identity, early New Labour met the 
principles set out by White and Ypi. It was distinctive from a tired Conservatism. It 
sought a mass membership, experimenting with new forms of internal decision-
making. And it articulated the party’s aims and objectives, revising them, and 
connecting them with the project as whole. ‘Politics is an expressive form of human 
activity’, Hindmoor has argued. It includes ‘who we are and what we want to be and 
how we want other people to view us’.975 The leadership of New Labour 
comprehended that politics within the Labour Party is an expressive business. 
 
Why did Blair disengage with debates regarding Labour’s ethos? Why did he stop 
‘speaking the language’? In a 2018 newspaper interview, Tony Blair argued that ‘the 
single most difficult thing for politicians today is realising the difference between 
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campaigning and governing. The skillset that makes you a great campaigner is not 
necessarily one that makes you a great executive. In governments it’s executive 
capability that matters’.976 This is an understandable reflection from someone who 
arrived in office on the back of a stunning electoral victory, but who had no 
experience of having been in office. Yet as a maxim, Blair’s statement is incomplete. 
Aligning one’s campaigning principles and executive actions, with each 
complimenting the other, is essential to a political actor filling the two roles Blair had 
to fill from 1997 to 2007: Prime Minister and Leader of the Labour Party. Towards 
the end of Blair’s period in both roles, the executive function dominated Blair’s mind. 
To some extent, Blair has recognised this. In a foreword to a later edition of Phillip 
Gould’s The Unfinished Revolution, he noted: 
 
‘One area where I completely agree with Phillip, and which is a reproach to 
my leadership, is that in government I did not pay sufficient attention to 
continuing to build the party. There are a multitude of reasons for this – not 
least the enormous pressure of governing – but it was a fault.’977 
 
In his valedictory address to the 2006 Labour Party Conference – his final conference 
as leader – Blair gave what was expected: an impassioned defence of New Labour’s 
record in office. Alongside this, though, was a strongly instrumental argument which 
sought to frame Labour as the natural party of government – one that would have to 
continue taking the ‘tough decisions’. He argued:  
 
‘The danger for us today is not reversion to the politics of the 1980s. It is 
retreat to the sidelines. To the comfort zone. It is unconsciously to lose the 
psychology of a governing party. As I said in 1994, courage is our friend. 
Caution, our enemy. 
 
‘A governing party has confidence, self-belief. It sees the tough decision and 
thinks it should be taking it. Reaches for responsibility first. Serves by leading. 
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The most common phrase uttered to me – and not at rallies or public events 
but in meetings of chance – quietly, is not “I hate you” or “I like you,” but “I 
would not have your job for all the world”. 
 
‘The British people will, sometimes, forgive a wrong decision. They won’t 
forgive not deciding. They know the choices are hard. They know there isn’t 
some fantasy government where nothing difficult ever happens. They’ve got 
the Lib Dems for that. 
 
‘Government isn’t about protests or placards, shouting the odds or stealing the 
scene. It’s about the hard graft of achievement. There are no third-term 
popular governments. Don’t ignore the polls but don’t be paralysed by them 
either. 10 years on, our advantage is time, our disadvantage time. Time gives 
us experience. Our capacity to lead is greater. Time gives the people fatigue; 
their willingness to be led is less. But they will lose faith in us only if first we 
lose faith in ourselves.’978 
 
For Jonathan Powell, the purpose of this final speech – and much of Blair’s later 
period in office – was to protect his policy agenda against what he suspected was 
Gordon Brown’s intention to row back on some of Blair’s plans. Here the issue is not 
time and governing, put political priorities and strategy. Powell argued that Blair 
‘thought we’d already won [inside the party] political positioning… nobody was 
going to go back to Corbynism’.979 Labour, it should be stated, had never been to 
Corbynism. But some of the seeds for Corbyn’s internal revolution were certainly 
present all along, and flourished in part because of New Labour’s disengagement with 
Labour’s ethos. 
 
A new kind of politics? 
 
‘A new kind of politics’ was Jeremy Corbyn’s campaign slogan during the Labour 
Party’s 2015 leadership election. If one considered the Blair and Brown Labour 
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government era to be the ‘old’, Corbyn was certainly reacting with difference, 
offering a ‘new’ approach. Similarly, for somebody wanting to lead the opposition 
and be Prime Minister, Corbyn’s style was out of the ordinary, and felt ‘new’. Yet 
Corbyn’s understanding in 2015 of what it was to be Labour was far from new. His 
‘kind of politics’ was based on well-established narratives that had long been part of 
the Labour Party’s ethos, indeed to many Labour supporters this was part of his 
appeal. Where opposing candidates appeared instrumental, or ‘electoralist’, Corbyn 
was expressive. When his opponents ran for particular policies in response to the 
Conservative government, Corbyn focused heavily on democratising the Labour 
Party. And while other candidates had in their sights, at times, a perceived Labour 
trait of playing to its electoral base, Corbyn was not shy in invoking some of Labour’s 
longstanding socialist goals. This was an effective strategy. Corbyn’s chances of 
success had been enhanced by New Labour’s disengagement with the party’s ethos, 
and the deep suspicion that had built up around the politics and leadership of the 
politicians who had followed Blair and Brown. 
 
During the contest, the Fabian Society published a collection of short essays from the 
candidates standing for the leadership. The contributions from Andy Burnham, Yvette 
Cooper and Liz Kendall each contained clutches of policies, statistics about the state 
of Britain, and attacks on the Conservative Party around some of the themes of the 
moment: Conservative budget cuts, concerns about the National Health Service and 
devolution. Corbyn began his contribution by noting the challenges Labour faced to 
win the next election, but then focused almost entirely on the way the Labour Party 
could be organised and run to ‘stop being a machine and start being a movement 
again’.980 The first commitment in his essay was to reviewing membership fees and to 
‘democratise our party’.981 His critique of the ‘machine’ was as follows: 
 
‘The politics of the machine dominate too much. It looks at the electorate 
through party labels, asking how can we win back Tory voters? How can we 
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appeal to SNP voters? How can we outflank UKIP? Machine politics sees 
elections as a game to win.’982 
 
Corbyn addressed Labour’s internal democracy, something no other candidate 
explicitly did. He argued that ‘in the past when Labour party conference voted for 
something the leadership didn’t like, senior MPs wheeled out to tell the press that it 
could be ignored. That alienates our support and undermines our principles as a 
democratic socialist party. That top-down behaviour has to end – we make the best 
policy through inclusive democratic discussion’.983 Corbyn’s only clear policy 
commitment was for Labour to become an anti-austerity movement.984 Corbyn’s 
landslide win in the 2015 leadership election delivered him an astonishing mandate 
from Labour’s members, but his leadership was swiftly challenged by the 
Parliamentary Labour Party, leading to another summer leadership election in 2016, 
with a similarly thumping mandate for Corbyn from members, registered supporters 
and trade union affiliates. He argued then that: 
 
‘There’s no doubt my election as Labour leader a year ago, and re-election this 
month, grew out of a thirst for a new kind of politics, and a conviction that the 
old way of running the economy and the country isn’t delivering for more and 
more people.’985 
 
None of this is to say that Corbyn has not, since he spectacularly entered the scene at 
the top of the Labour Party, been distinctive when it comes to policy, nor that there 
are not substantial differences between ‘Corbynites’ and their opponents when it 
comes to doctrine. During the 2015 election campaign he ventured into policy areas 
that other candidates didn’t, with references to ideas like ‘People’s QE’, where the 
Bank of England’s quantitative easing policy would fund state investment. Since then, 
in the debates around what ‘Corbynism’ is, some have argued that Labour under 
Corbyn is ‘assembling the tools and strategies to enable a Labour government to 
pursue a bold transformation of the British economy organised around ownership, 
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control, democracy and participation’.986 And policy differences from Corbyn’s past 
have proven highly significant in differentiating him from his competitors, whether it 
be the Iraq War or the more recent decision by Labour’s then Deputy Leader, Harriet 
Harman, to not oppose Conservative welfare policies. Corbyn was a well-known 
member of the Labour Left’s Campaign Group, membership of which ‘was a very 
public signal that an MP was opposed to much of the Government’s programme and 
was not interested in promotion’.987 In short, Corbyn has been seen as a divergence 
from the policies of New Labour, both on the basis of Corbyn’s record as a rebel and 
in the policies he has floated since. Yet Corbyn’s success, his ‘new kind of politics’ 
mantra, and the competing narratives in the 2016 leadership election about a Labour 
person’s capacity to win elections and to govern, have a commonality: they are about 
the party’s ethos, as well as its doctrine. 
 
When Owen Smith challenged Corbyn for the leadership of the Labour Party in 2016, 
his approach to policy was characterised as ‘man-for-man policy marking on the left 
wing’.988 Writers and activists sympathetic to Corbyn’s leadership have since pointed 
out that such a stance left the debate empty of substantive difference – though they 
omit to mention the significant gap between Smith’s opposition to Britain’s exit from 
the European Union and Corbyn’s position, at that time, of upholding the 2016 
referendum result – resulting in Smith making ‘increasingly ugly attacks on the leader 
and his supporters’.989 Smith’s pitch boiled down to a debate about political 
professionalism: whether or not, with Corbyn’s dire personal approval ratings, it 
would be better to pick a new leader with similar policies but a new face. Below the 
surface, however, were far deeper differences. Smith, and much of the parliamentary 
party, adhered to different Labour traditions to Corbyn. The veteran Islington MP 
continued to hold firm to policies from Labour’s past that were considered, by most 
other MPs, to be anachronistic – unilateral nuclear disarmament being one example. 
His support for enhanced internal democracy was seen by the parliamentary party as 
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the long-held Labour Left position of surrendering the PLP’s autonomy to party 
conference, and thus to activists closer to Corbyn’s politics. The concern of non-
Corbyn MPs was heightened, in this regard, by the pro-Corbyn leadership of some of 
major trade unions affiliated to Labour, and with their significant influence in the 
party structures. 
 
‘Professionalism’ and ‘being a competent opposition’ also meant much more. 
Corbyn’s approach was seen as too activist-friendly, and far too expressive in its 
understanding of Labour’s politics. Corbyn, to many Labour MPs, embodied the 
party’s outsider tradition: he took on causes, many foreign policy-related causes, 
which were important to Labour Party activists but low on salience with the public; he 
vented at the “establishment” and was supported by those who sought to challenge, 
albeit rhetorically, Britain’s institutions, from the Royal Family to the ‘mainstream 
media’; and he sought to use parliament as an outlet for the campaigns he was 
personally invested in, rather than – as many MPs were more accustomed to – seeing 
it as a forum for debating contemporary events, ‘catching out’ the government and 
seeking the fleeting advantage an opposition so often craves. As we have seen, in 
terms of the party’s traditions, some of the interpretations Corbyn holds – and 
increasingly, for his supporters, seems to embody – are not illegitimate, nor are they 
new, they are closely connected to the enduring, competing traditions within Labour’s 
ethos. When these competing traditions clash, with increasingly stark positions taken 
on both sides, some Labour Party people run low on ‘imaginative sympathy’ and 
leave – as happened in the 1980s. As observers and commentators of the Labour Party 
consider the current battle for the party’s ‘soul’, the competing interpretations of the 
party’s ethos seem likely to lead to further discord. 
 
Ethos and political parties 
 
The Conservative Party, following its defeat in 1997, had politicians who – without 
significant institutional constraints, and in the wake of huge electoral defeats – 
seemed ‘unwilling and unable to act in a way that might have given them more hope 
of winning or at least losing less badly’.990 While the fault lines explored in this 
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research are particular to the Labour Party, it is quite possible that competing 
traditions give rise to similar, or indeed completely different fault lines within the 
ethos of other political parties. Drucker’s original insight, as I have noted before, was 
that Labour had both a doctrine and an ethos. Its ethos, Drucker argued, was rooted in 
the communities from which Labour originated, yet as a concept, ethos is not by 
definition restricted in its applicability. Consider different interpretations of traditions 
related to decision-making. The Liberal Democrats have a strong, dominant tradition 
of membership involvement and a sovereign conference, though the extent to which 
this is respected has seen division and turmoil, particularly following the 2010 
Coalition Agreement with the Conservatives. On the same issue, the Conservative 
Party has a different dominant tradition, one which typically involves little or no 
involvement in policy-making and where the party’s annual conference serves as a 
platform for its politicians. Yet those same conferences have long been scenes of 
doctrinal dispute and witnessed the airing of competing political strategies, suggesting 
the autonomy of Conservative leaders is not always fully respected. 
 
Indeed, some of the tensions I analysed in this thesis, and that can be observed in the 
coverage of contemporary events, raise questions for democratic politics in Britain. In 
particular, the wishes of party memberships – an incredibly small fraction of the 
voting public – translating into policy, or pressuring actors towards particular political 
strategies and decisions, is a prescient issue today. Research from the Economic and 
Social Research Council-funded Party Members Project has shown that, on Britain’s 
exit from the European Union, Conservative Party members favour one extreme,991 
and Labour Party members another.992 In an intractable political struggle in 
Westminster, triggered by a referendum which divided the country and the electorate, 
followed by an international negotiation where both sides have stressed the need for 
compromise, is it possible or practical to commit to membership-led policy-making in 
such a context-specific, dynamic environment? As we learn more about the 
membership of political parties, there are opportunities to delve deeply into the values 
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party members hold, the traditions and norms they adhere to – at both the level of 
‘high’ politics and ‘low’ – and the role both individual interpretations of party ethos 
and dominant interpretations play in the strategic contexts of political actors. 
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